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Indonesians may use a single name (for example, Suharto) or multiple names (for 
example, Megawati Sukarnoputri or Siti Muhyina Muin).  In this dissertation the 
individuals with multiple names are referred to by that part of their names, which 
are generally known in Indonesia.  For example, Prabowo Subianto is shortened 
to Prabowo while Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is shortened to Yudhoyono.  In 
addition, following Indonesian practice, this thesis uses some nickname for 
individuals commonly known by such to the public, for example, Jokowi for Joko 
Widodo, Foke for Fauzi Bowo and Ahok for Basuki Tjahaja Purnama.  This 
dissertation uses the post-1972 Indonesian spelling system (for example, 
‘Sukarno’ instead of ‘Soekarno’).  Unless otherwise noted, all quoted translations 
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This dissertation analyses the emergence of social media for electoral 
campaigning in post-authoritarian Indonesia.  Using a critical political economy 
perspective, it examines the interactions between social media, the political 
campaign industry, which is understood as a product of “the cross-development of 
political and commercial persuasion techniques in the 20th century” (Stockwell, 
2000, p. 3), and electoral players.  This thesis evaluates how the political 
campaign industry intersects with social media-enabled production and 
distribution of campaign messages (content), audience (users) mobilisation and 
labour organisation.  It also assesses the impact of the political campaign 
industry’s social media work upon the web of relations between candidates, 
donors and voters during electoral periods.   The findings confirm that social 
media has enabled the growing Indonesian political campaign industry to develop 
social media campaigning services that have been adopted widely in Indonesian 
elections.  These findings contradict previous studies that have suggested that 
social media contribute to the nurturance of democracy in contemporary Indonesia 
by enabling citizens to discuss alternative issues to elite-generated ones carried by 
conventional media (Nuswantoro, 2014; Suaedy, 2014).  By contrast, this 
dissertation demonstrates that during electoral campaign periods social media 
were not autonomous from heavy industry-driven engineering.  Instead, social 
media enabled the political campaign industry to further encroach upon 
Indonesian electoral politics and thereby generate greater profits for the industry.  
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These strategies were made possible because social media electoral campaigning 
serves not only a s practical tool of persuasion but also a new mechanism to 
manage the temporary converging interests of political, economic and cultural 
forces during electoral campaign periods.  Put differently, with the assistance of 
the political campaign industry, Indonesian political economy elites have been 
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This dissertation examines the use of social media for electoral campaigning in 
recent post-authoritarian Indonesia elections.  It emphases the contribution of the 
political campaign industry to highlight a basic argument that the use of social 
media in electoral campaigning could not be understood on the basis of the 
technological forces (that is, the social media), the political forces (the political 
parties, politicians or candidates) or cultural forces (the voters or social media 
users) alone.  Instead, I argue that the use of social media in electoral campaigning 
requires mediation by economic forces as represented by the political campaign 
industry.  Further, I argue that the extent to which the political campaign industry 
takes advantage of the new opportunities enabled by social media is dependent on 
specific relationships among the key electoral players, largely constituted of 
political elites, during electoral campaigns. The Indonesian case particularly 
shows that the professionalisation of electoral campaigning is tied closely to the 
nature of political parties and their relationships to candidates in a democracy rife 
with money politics and easily shifting elite alliances.  Such a situation places 
increasing pressure on candidates to develop new and innovative ways to reach 




Informed by Gramsci’s hegemony that links the use of the media for the complex 
maintenance of the ruling class’ interests, my arguments are based on the core 
idea that the use of social media for electoral campaigning purposes does not only 
signify persuasive efforts aimed at gathering popular votes or influencing voters. 
Instead, this dissertation finds that such persuasive use of social media is 
sustained by the nature of electoral campaigning that shapes, and is shaped by, 
negotiation and cooperation as well as tensions and contradictions in the 
candidates’ relations to other political players.   Based on this idea, such a 
dynamic web of relations enables the political campaign industry to play its part 
in assisting the candidates or political parties to persuade voters through mass and 
new media. Through their campaigning works, the political campaign industry is 
able to develop its business and significance in electoral politics. 
 
In addition, I argue that democratic elections signifiy both major political events 
and economic opportunities.  As the only accepted mechanism of transfer of 
power to express the will of the people, the elections’ political significance often 
overshadows its economic importance. In fact, in such important periods, political 
parties and politicians pull together their energy and resources to engage in 
political activities such as lobbying, negotiating campaign strategies to reach out 
to as many voters as possible, intensifying communication channels as well as 




While those activities are indeed political, elections are not autonomous of 
economic activities. Elections involve a series of economic activities that involves 
a significant amount of money spent by elections organisers, government, 
citizens, and, more importantly, candidates and political parties.  Although 
generally more visible in democracies such as the U.S. (Stromback, 2007), the 
practices of increasing electoral spending are evident too in newer democracies 
like Indonesia (Dwipayana, 2009; Mietzner, 2008; Ufen, 2010a). 
 
In Indonesia, similar to in other democracies (Kotler & Kotler, 1999), the cost of 
electoral campaigning can be substantial; and this  cost tends to increase each 
year, as demonstrated in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1. 
Total amount of electoral campaign spending (in rupiah) 
 
Election 2004 2009 2014 
The Legislative Election*  297,629,275,399  826,556,080,587  3,109,934,812,094 
The Presidential Election** 256,350,866,878 576,340,156,985    410,648,064,292 
Source: Supriyanto & Wulandari (2013, p. 11-12); KPU (2010); KPU, (2014) 
 * The 2004 and 2009 data cover the campaign spending of the 10 biggest political parties, 
while the 2014 data cover that of 12 political parties 
** The 2004 presidential election involved 5 candidates, the 2009 election 3 candidates 
and the 2014 election 2 candidates 
 
 
Such increasing electoral spending is driven partly by a post-authoritarian 
electoral system that requires candidates to garner popular votes in their bid to 
win the elections, thereby intensifying campaigning efforts.  A significant amount 
of an electoral campaign budget is commonly allocated for media campaigning 
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purposes.  One study suggested that 30 percent of campaign budgets is allocated 
to campaigning through media, mainly television (Mietzner, 2007).  A study by 
anti-corruption organisation Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) of the campaign 
spending in the 2004 legislative election, however, showed that the media 
campaigning budget was mainly allocated for outdoor media, like billboards or 
leaflets, and radio, instead of print media and television (Badoh & Dahlan, 2010, 
p. 47).  Regardless, both studies supported the notion that the economic aspects of 
the elections had contributed to the flourishing of the political campaign industry 
in Indonesia (Danial, 2009; Qodari, 2010).  While the Internet infrastructure is 
still developing and the number of users is less than, for example, television, 
which covers nearly the total population of the archipelago, the emergence of the 
Internet has further reinforced the expansion of the political campaigning 
industry. 
 
To demonstrate my arguments, this dissertation poses two research questions: 
How does the political campaign industry mediate social media campaigning? 
How does social media campaigning shape the electoral process in Indonesia? 
The use of social media in recent Indonesian elections is selected to answer the 
questions. Although the Internet had been used for political purposes since the late 
period of the New Order government, it was not until the 2012 Jakarta 
gubernatorial election that the use of social media was clearly visible in the 
country’s electoral process (Ahmad & Popa, 2014; Suaedy, 2014). This 
emergence of the use of social media for electoral campaigning merits further 
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examination for at least two reasons.  Firstly, Indonesian politicians and political 
parties in the early post-authoritarian period, more precisely from 1998-2009, did 
not appear enthusiastic about using the Internet websites and social media for 
electoral campaigning (Hameed, 2007; Hill, 2008; Nurhadryani, Maslow, & 
Yamamoto, 2009).  Studies of this period focused largely on either the Internet 
penetration or infrastructure and the party organisation or individual politicians, 
without paying much attention to the contributions of the political campaign 
industry in mediating such use of the Internet and social media. 
 
Secondly, the emerging use of social media in electoral campaigning in Indonesia 
occurred after the victory of Barrack Obama in the 2008 US presidential election, 
which has fuelled popular discussions in Indonesian media over the positive 
impacts of the use of social media in electoral politics (Ahmad & Popa, 2014; 
Utomo, 2013; Wijayanto, 2010). 1 Such discussions were also present in the 
emerging studies on social media campaigning in Indonesia, which have focused 
mainly on examining the positive contribution of the new technology to the 
development of democracy (Nuswantoro, 2014; Sobri, 2012).  Such a view might 
be inspired by the significance of the Internet in contributing not only to resisting 




1 Obama spent some years of his early childhood in Indonesia, which may have encouraged 
Indonesian media to cover his victory more widely (see Pratomo, 2012). 
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These ideas about the potent impacts of social media are widely replicated in 
recent studies of the Internet and politics or online political campaigning from the 
fields of political science, communication studies, and information and 
technology engineering.  The studies often examine details of social media’s 
technological features and their subsequent impacts on politics, particularly 
electoral processes in Indonesia (Ibrahim, Abdillah, Wicaksono, & Adriani, 2015; 
Utomo, 2013; Wijayanto, 2010; Yuliatiningtyas, 2014). 
 
One of the most common views about social media is that it enables citizens to 
discuss issues alternative to those which are determined by the political and 
economic elites, and which are therefore commonly produced and distributed 
through conventional media. This view is represented in an opinion piece by 
Indonesian senior public opinion surveyor Toto Sugiarto, which was published by 
leading Indonesian newspaper, Kompas daily: 
“As a note, social media may be a solution to minimize injustice.  
Social media may balance broadcast television media that can no 
longer maintain their independence and justice.  Television (stations) 
are owned by entrepreneurs, who are as well political party members.  
This condition turns television into the loudspeakers of their owners’ 
political parties.  Here lies the urgency of social media” (Harian 
Kompas, 2014).2 
 
His opinion indicates two basic ideas.  The first idea is that media, both 
conventional and Internet-based mass media, accommodate and channel the 
																																																								
2 The original quote was written in Indonesian language. 
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interests of the elites, which have controlled conventional media and the broader 
political economy in Indonesia.  Secondly, in relation to the first idea, social 
media serve as an alternative forum to develop possible contrary ideas to those of 
the elites.  In other words, his views suggest that social media are a neutral or 
impartial medium that is autonomous from possible intervention of the political 
elites or their operatives.  
 
However, previous studies had demonstrated the professionalisation and 
commercialisation of electoral processes, characterised by increasing campaign 
costs and the development of the political campaign industry in post-Suharto 
Indonesia (Danial, 2009; Qodari, 2010; Trihartono, 2011; Ufen, 2010a).  The 
engagement of the political campaign industry in the electoral process has been 
accommodated by the increasing use of mass media for electoral campaigning.  In 
fact, mass media assumed a significant position in post-authoritarian Indonesian 
electoral campaigns, particularly after major electoral system changes requiring 
political parties and candidates to win the popular vote in direct elections (Danial, 
2009; Hill, 2003). The political parties and the candidates are seen not only as 
individuals but most significantly as a part of the vast, often complicated, web of 
interests of the political economy elites and their operatives (see Hadiz, 2003, 
2004; Hadiz, 2010).    While such networks are not immune to social changes, it 
should not be seen as fragile either. In fact, they are adaptive to such changes that 
require collaboration with the middle class, which is often portrayed as the agent 
of change in pluralist studies (see Robison, 1995; Robison & Goodman, 1996). 
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It would be an oversight, therefore, not to take into consideration the interests of 
the elites or the political campaign industry’s contribution to the operations of a 
new media, such as social media, for electoral campaigning.   
 
In fact, this is precisely the problem that this dissertation analyses. In contrast to 
studies examining social media as alternative media through which voters engage 
in political deliberation and participation (Nuswantoro, 2014; Suaedy, 2014), this 
study is concerned with the ways in which the political campaign industry 
mediates the use of social media for electoral campaigning.  However, unlike 
political marketing studies that focus on the political marketing practices (Ahmad 
& Popa, 2014), it concentrates on the broader political economic aspects that 
shape the use of social media. Therefore, rather than social media texts or content, 
this dissertation focuses on examining the offline process in the real world within 
which social media campaigning is mediated by the political campaign industry in 
Indonesia.  
 
1.2. The Political Campaign Industry  
In many democracies, it is not uncommon for politicians and political parties to 
obtain assistance from the political campaign industry, which might be defined as 
a product of “the cross-development of political and commercial persuasion 
techniques in the 20th century”, to help manage their electoral campaign 
(Stockwell, 2002, p. 3).  The primary service of this particular industry, which 
defines its existence in politics, is to support the candidates and political parties to 
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win elections. In this regard, the political campaign industry is seen “as the 
stewards of the electoral process – though not actual managers.  Stewards 
ultimately act on behalf of larger power and ideological interests” (Sussman, 
2005, p. x).    
 
The political campaign industry consists of profit-oriented businesses, similar to 
other commercial consulting businesses that provide services to support their 
clients (see Kotler & Kotler, 1999).  The main difference between the two types of 
businesses is in the domain of the business. The political campaign business 
operates in the political domain.  It accumulates profit by catering to the needs of 
political players, most notably the candidates and the political parties, to win 
elections or to win public support in more general competitions over public 
policy. The scope of campaign consulting industry services ranges from public 
relations and advertising to polling and political lobbying (Thurber, Nelson, & 
Dulio, 2001).  Much of the work of the political campaign industry is channelled 
through media.  This highlights the significance of media in political campaigns. 3  
One major political marketing study suggests that 
The media market plays a unique role in campaigns.  Print and 
electronic media are vehicles of both communication and sales in the 
political marketplace.  As the perceptual screen through which 
candidates communicate to voters and through which voters view 
candidates, the media are critical intermediaries between candidates 
and the other campaign marker” (Kotler & Kotler, 1999, p. 5).   
																																																								
3 Some scholars posit that communication plays a central role in election campaigns to the point 
that “without it, there is no political campaign” (Trent & Friedenberg, 1995, p.13). 
	
	 10	
The necessity for the candidates and the political parties to engage with media 
was signified by the involvement of public relations and advertising businesses as 
the first commercial services to join in electoral campaign teams in the US, the 
homeland of the political campaign industry (Sabato, 1981). The politicians and 
political parties recruited the public relations and advertising professionals to 
assist their electoral campaigning, particularly in reaching out to the electorates 
through media like television (Plasser & Plasser, 2002; Trent & Friedenberg, 
1995). The emergence of newer media such as the Internet enabled the industry to 
expand its scope of business services further (Bimber & Davis, 2003).  
  
The degree of the engagement of the political campaign industry in electoral 
campaigning could be assessed from the three tiers of the political consulting 
business: strategists, specialists and vendors (Hamburger, 2001). Strategists are 
individuals and groups providing advisory services, such as general consultants, 
campaign managers, polling firms, media firms and direct mail firms. These 
strategists are usually employed in campaign teams that are more receptive to 
non-party members.  It is these strategists whom many studies blamed for the 
professionalisation of elections or politics, which has eroded the influence of 
party members and volunteers in electoral campaigning (Norris, 2004a).  The 
second tier, specialists, comprises those who do campaigning work such as 
research, tele-marketing or fund raising; while vendors, in the third tier, are those 
selling campaign logistics, including website developers, printing firms or 
campaign software suppliers. In comparison to the strategists, both specialists and 
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vendors are perceived to be less influential to the political party-led electoral 
campaign organisation, as their roles are limited to assisting the politicians and 
political party with technical issues, particularly in media campaigning, instead of 
dealing with more strategic issues.  
 
The diverse services of the political campaign consulting business are fluid and 
competitive (Hamburger, 2001).  The competitive, fluid and technology-driven 
characteristics of the industry are primed by the incentives provided and the ways 
in which services are remunerated. While the industry depends on election 
campaigns that are concentrated periodically in every few years, to maintain a 
stable business it needs to generate income regularly.  In addition, political 
campaign-consulting businesses may be compensated in different ways.  A study 
suggested that campaign consultants may be paid by flat fee; by victory bonus or 
fees contingent on winning; or by percentage of the total campaign budget 
(Grossmann, 2009).  The ways in which the political campaign industry is 
remunerated for services shapes the media campaign operations.  According to 
Grossmann (2009), 
“If, however, they are paid more when the campaign spends more, 
they may have incentive to direct funds toward-high-cost expenditures 
such as television-advertising; if these funds are dependent on 
contributions, they may also favor increased candidate attention to 
fundraising” (p. 4).    
 
The fluid and competitive nature of the business can be identified through the 
ways in which campaign professionals enter the industry, including those coming 
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from a background in media technology.  Sabato (1981) suggested that media 
technology enables them to offer new services to their clients (candidates, 
campaign organisations or other political organisations).4  Sussman (2005) also 
considers media technology to be a new tool of the trade for a political campaign 
business. Such an understanding of media technology’s position in electoral 
campaigning indicates that new media enable new business opportunities for the 
political campaign industry.   
 
To sum up, the involvement of the political campaign industry in electoral 
campaigning or in campaign teams does not occur automatically.  The industry is 
required not only to demonstrate its value and significance in electoral campaigns, 
but also to develop new political campaign services to sell to their clients, most 
notably the candidates and the political parties.  Therefore, the emergence of 
social media is seen as offering an opportunity upon which the political campaign 
industry can capitalize, in order to expand its business further and to deepen its 





4 There are several definitions of campaign professionals or consultants. Some scholars suggest 
that a professional in the context of campaigning is “someone who derives at least part of his or 
her income from providing campaign services’ (Farrell, Kolodny, & Medvic, 2001, p. 27). 
Another scholar defines ‘professional political consultant’ as “[a] person who is paid, or whose 
firm is paid, to provide services for one presidential/national or more than one non-
presidential/sub-national campaign (whether candidate or issue) per election cycle for more than 
one cycle, not including those whose salary is paid exclusively by a party committee or interest 
group” (Medvic, 2003, p. 124). Karlsen (2009b) notes that a professional should also possess 
particular expertise.  Thus, he defines a campaign professional as “someone who derives part of 
his or her income from working on campaigns, and possesses specialized knowledge, whether this 
is acquired through training or experience” (p. 195). 
	
	 13	
1.3. Understanding Social Media 
The political campaign industry largely considers media to be tools with which to 
develop new political campaign services, and thereby to enhance the industry’s 
role in the electoral process (see Sussman, 2005).  In this section, it is argued that 
the political campaign industry faces both opportunities and challenges with 
regard to social media, due to the new media’s characteristics, which differ 
substantially from those of conventional media.  Thus, this section considers the 
multiple dimensions of social media, which shape the ways in which the Internet 
platforms are used for electoral campaigning.  
 
Two dimensions of social media are particularly highlighted: their sociality, and 
their commercial nature. Social media are far from neutral and are, instead, 
potentially subjects of capture by the political economy elites through the 
mediation of the political campaign industry.  In this study, the term social media 
is used to refer to such Internet platforms as Facebook, Orkut or Cyworld, 
Twitter, Youtube, Instagram, Paths and others.  Some scholars refer to these as 
Social Network Sites or Social Networking Sites, abbreviated to SNS.  While not 
wishing to become embroiled in debates over the definition, it is important to 
highlight the characteristics of social media that make these new platforms 
distinct from conventional media.5  boyd and Ellison (2007), who were among the 
first scholars examining these platforms, highlighted the technical communication 
process of social media. They referred to Social Network Sites as 
																																																								
5 To understand more about the discussion of the definition and understanding of the new media 
platforms, Boyd & Ellison’ study on social network sites provides a sound start (boyd & Ellison, 
2007).  Critiques of their works could be examined from works of Beer (2008) and Fuchs (2014). 
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A networked communication platform in which participants (1) have 
uniquely identifiable profiles that consist of user-supplied content, 
content provided by others, and/or system-provided data; (2) can 
publicly articulate connections that can be viewed and traversed by 
others; (3) can consume, produce and/or interact with streams of user-
generated content provided by their connections on the site (boyd & 
Ellison, 2007, p. 211).  
 
Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) define social media as “a group of Internet based 
applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 
2.0, and allow the creation and exchange of user generated content” (p. 61).    
Web 2.0 is a term coined by Tim O’Reilly, a computer-based publishing 
entrepreneur, to define the web as a network enabled by computer software, “ as a 
continually-updated service that gets better the more people use it, consuming and 
remixing data from multiple sources, including individual users, while providing 
their own data and services in a form that allows remixing by others, creating 
network effects through an architecture of participation, and going beyond the 
page metaphor of Web 1.0 to deliver rich users experiences” (O’Reilly, 2006, p. 
16).  Web 1.0 suggests computer-based technologies that provided less support for 
such an architecture of participation. 
 
These definitions essentially highlight social media’s ability to advance new 
communication practices that have accommodated users to produce and distribute 
content.  The social media’s “many-to-many” personalized communication is 
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fundamentally different from the “one-to-many” communication accommodated 
by conventional media (see Figure 1.1).  
 
Figure 1.1. 
Example of visualisation of intersecting social media 
 
 
Source: Heer and Boyd (2005, p. 32). 
 
In addition to content, a social network site accommodate features that enable 
users to connect and interact to each other, including to join virtual groups based 
on common interests (Ellison, Steinfield & Lampe, 2007; Boyd & Ellison, 2007). 
Thus, social media become the arena where social networking takes place, which 
eventually changed the ways in which users gather information and make 
decisions.  
 
Through these new communication practices, social media enable the 
accumulation of connected networks of millions of social media users from 
around the world. Social media, consequently, change not only the ways in which 
media content are consumed (Couldry, 2003) but also produced and distributed 
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(Kelly, Fisher, & Smith, 2005; Meraz, 2009; Park & Kluver, 2009).  Thus, social 
media users are characterised by their ability to consume media in new ways that 
potentially engage them in production and distribution, as well as re-consumption, 
re-production and re-distribution, of media content.6  Such features set social 
media apart from conventional media’s mode of consumption, production and 
distribution.  Conventional media draw a bold line between media companies as 
the producers and distributors of media content, and audience/readerships as 
consumers of media content.  The features of conventional media restrain possible 
involvement of media audience or readership in the process of media content 
production and distribution. 
 
One notable characteristic of social media is sociality; because the platforms 
function as integrated tools of cognition, communication and cooperation (Trottier 
& Fuchs, 2015, p. 6).  Furthermore,  
SNS are web-based platforms that integrate different media, 
information and communication technologies and that allow at least 
the generation of profiles that displayed information that describes the 
users, the display of connections (connection list), the establishment 
of connections between users that are displayed on their connection 
lists and the communication between users.   They are communication 
technologies because they are used for communication and 
establishing connections in the form of connection lists.  SNS are 
																																																								
6 Social media users are able to consume media content, comment on the content or post a new 
content and share such content to their networks. As social media can be accessed through 
Internet-connected mobile devices, social media users can engage in the consumption, production 
and distribution of media content anytime and from anywhere. 
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cooperative technologies because they allow the establishment of new 
friendships and communities and the maintenance of existing  
friendships (Trottier & Fuchs, 2015, pp. 6-7).  
 
In electoral contexts, it is social media’s sociality that is assumed to enable users 
to engage in conversations or discussions about politics or public policies, 
although the new Internet platforms are commonly used for reasons other than 
that (Westling, 2007).  Many social media users access the Internet platforms for 
communication and intimacy purposes (Baker & Oswald, 2010; Subrahmanyam 
et al., 2008), entertainment or games purposes (Yee, 2006), and economic 
purposes (selling or buying things) (Mangold & Faulds, 2009).  
 
Social media content is commonly understood as a genuine product of social 
media users (Wofford, 2012). This understanding suggests a common expectation 
in the media and academia over the ability of social media to accommodate the 
development of alternative ideas, including during election periods. In many 
cases, however, user-generated content and discourses are not autonomous from 
content and discourses produced and distributed by conventional, mass media 
(van der Wuff, 2008). In fact, social media are considered to be “push media”, 
referring to the distribution of content from other media, most specifically 
conventional media.  In an era of media convergence, social media content is 
inseparable from conventional mass media. 7   Media convergence encompasses  
																																																								
7 Media convergence refers to the merging of conventional and Internet-based media through 
various digital media platforms enabled by portable and interactive technologies (Grant & 
Wilkinson, 2009; Jenkins, 2006b; Jussawalla, 1999). 
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“the flow of content across multiple media platforms, the cooperation 
between multiple media industries, and the migratory behaviour of 
media audiences who would go almost anywhere in search of the 
kinds of entertainment experiences they wanted” (Jenkins, 2006a, p. 
3).  
 
Such understandings indicate the influence of various forms of media in the 
production and distribution of media content in general.  Thus, it may be an 
exaggeration to expect that the Internet and its various platforms automatically 
breed content pluralism, although the new media foster networks of users in the 
process of user-generated content production and distribution.  At best, what the 
Internet does is increase content quantity, though not necessarily content diversity 
(van der Wuff, 2008).  
 
More importantly, social media operations remain dependent on political and 
media systems as well as other social structures (Meijer & Kleinnijenhuis, 2006).  
As parts of the broader media, social media operations (e.g. production of content) 
are closely connected to the existence and growth of the media industry; and these 
remain concentrated in the hands of private owners and a relatively small number 
of large media corporations (Jenkins, 2006a). In the case of Indonesia, there are 
12 national media corporations. All are old players which have been operating 
since the New Order period, and dominate the media industry across the 
archipelago (Nugroho, Putri, & Laksmi, 2012).  Owners of these corporations, 
which lead media convergence to maintain, strengthen and expand their business, 
often engaged directly or indirectly with politics – particularly during the electoral 
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campaigning period (Nugroho et al., 2012). Therefore, social media share the 
characteristics of the broader media that “use processes of industrialised 
technology for producing messages….to reach large audiences”, including during 
election campaign periods (O'Shaughnessy & Staedler, 2008, p. 4).  In other 
words, while social media operation is not a carbon copy of that of conventional 
media, it remains part of the broader media industry, and therefore subject to 
political and economic interventions.    
    
A second dimension of social media is their commercial nature; a dimension 
which is largely under-discussed in the literature of online electoral campaigning, 
which tends to celebrate the free use of the platforms as a basis of their 
revolutionary effects. It should be highlighted that social media are in fact 
developed and owned by profit-oriented corporations (Fuchs, 2013). Similar to 
conventional media corporations, these corporations rely on advertising for their 
capital accumulation.  The difference is that social media corporations offer more 
effective forms of advertising than those of conventional media.  Targeted 
advertising, based on personal data of social media users, enabled advertisers to 
deliver multiple advertisements customized to the targeted group of users 
(potential consumers). The process of capital accumulation from corporate social 
media platforms started with social media companies seeking capital to produce 
the Internet platforms, which are “not a commodity product that is directly sold” 
but is made available to users for free (Fuchs, 2013, p. 110).  The free use of 
social media generates content from users, which attracts more users to engage in 
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the production and distribution of social media content (Albergotti, MacMillan, & 
Rusli, 2014).  These users spend a certain time to produce “user generated data, 
personal data and transaction data about their browsing behavior and 
communication behavior on corporate social media”, and these data are in fact a 
commodity to sell to advertisers (Fuchs, 2014, p. 110).  Such user-generated 
content signifies “the total commodification of human creativity”, as social media 
users “engage in permanent creative activity, communication, community 
building and content production” (Fuchs, 2009, p. 82). This understanding shows 
an important facet of social media as a product of capitalism – that social media 
operations should not be seen as autonomous from the logic of capitalism: to 
accumulate more and more capital.   
 
These two dimensions of social media have been highlighted as shaping the ways 
in which social media are used in the political sphere, particularly in electoral 
campaigns.  In contrast, some existing studies tend to ignore its commercial 
nature, and focus on other dimensions of social media; such as its technological 
features or sociality. This lacuna is evident in studies detailing Facebook’s 
contribution to the phenomenal victory of Barrack Obama in the 2008 presidential 
election in the U.S. (Robertson, Vatrapu, & Medina, 2010; Small, 2008), or 
YouTube-generated content for minor party candidates in Australia (Gibson and 
McAllister (2011), and Finland (Carlson & Strandberg, 2008, p. 159). Similarly, 
reference to the commercial nature of social media campaigning was largely 
absent in a study on social media’s contribution to potential political change in 
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Malaysia or the Philippines (Karan, Gimeno, & Tandoc, 2009a; Smeltzer & 
Keddy, 2010).  In the case of Malaysia, social media gained recognition for 
facilitating the success of the opposition in bringing substantial change to the 
2008 Malaysian election outcome: the ruling Barisan National lost its two-thirds 
majority in parliament and control of five out of 13 states (Sani & Azizuddin, 
2009). In the Philippines, Karan, Tandoc, and Gimeno (2009b) suggested that 
Bayan Muna, a militant group, strategically used YouTube in its successful 
campaigns to capture the attention of mainstream media and eventually secure 
960,000 of 17 million votes, or the equivalent to two seats, in the Philippines 
Congress through the party-list system in the 2007 election.  In Indonesia, social 
media were also credited with the rise of Joko Widodo, widely known as Jokowi, 
from a mayor in the middle size mayoralty of Surakarta in Central Java province 
to the presidency (Ahmad & Popa, 2014; Suaedy, 2014). Such studies on online 
electoral campaigning demonstrate the lack of consideration of social media’s 
commercial nature and social relations in their discussions on social media and 
political and electoral users.  
 
This dissertation, however, highlights how social media’s characteristics shape the 
ways in which the political campaign industry mediates the use of social media in 
electoral campaigns.  This study focuses on three aspects: the ways in which the 
political campaign industry mediates the campaign teams’ adoption of social 
media; the commodification of social media campaigning; and the impact of 
social media on the electoral process.   
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1.4. Research Methods 
This dissertation is a qualitative study aimed at identifying and understanding 
certain aspects of social media campaigning practices in Indonesia (Morse & 
Niehaus, 2009, p. 15). This case study method involves an in-depth, holistic 
examination of some aspects of the social media campaigning phenomenon. 
According to Yin, a case study is 
“an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used”(Yin, 1984, p. 23).  
 
A multiple-case study was chosen in this thesis, to present numerous sources of 
evidence. Rather than sampling logic, conclusive results were achieved through 
replication that links information from the cases through the theories.  Three cases 
were selected, specifically to examine social media campaigning, and the possible 
impacts in different types of election campaigns in Indonesia.  The cases were (1) 
the gubernatorial election in Jakarta in 2012, (2) the mayoral election in Makassar 
in 2013, and (3) the presidential election in Indonesia 2014 (as shown in Table 
1.2).  These three electoral cases were chosen to examine social media 
campaigning practices in various arenas of contestation in Indonesia. The election 
in Jakarta, the capital of a country, signifies an arena of contestation involving 
vast electoral players more receptive to changes in the context of electoral 
process.  Makassar indicates an arena of contestation under the domination of 
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local political economy elites.  The presidential election is an arena of 
contestation with the largest political economy stakes.  
 
Table 1.2.  
Characteristics of election settings  
 





Eligible voters 6,962,348 (1st round)  




Internet users  3,500,000  
(36.9% penetration) 
 
59 % penetration 
71,000,000 
Number of candidates 6 pairs (1st round)  
2 pairs (2nd round) 
10 pairs 2 pairs 
Source: KPU DKI Jakarta 2012, KPU Kota Makassar 2013, KPU 2014, APJII 2012, 
MarkPlus2013, APJII 2014 
 
Each case study focuses on the use of social media campaigning by the campaign 
teams of the election winners: Jokowi in the Jakarta election, M. Ramdhan 
Pomanto in the Makassar Election, and Jokowi in the presidential election.  
However, it does not neglect social media operations by other candidates in each 
campaign environment. 
 
1.4.1. Data Collection 
The empirical data collected for this study was used to understand two aspects of 
social media campaigning: the ways in which social media information and 
activities were turned into a political campaign business; and the ways in which 
social media campaigning shaped, and was shaped by, power relations.  
Therefore, this study called for two sources of data.  The first data were mined 
from industry professionals, to examine what they actually did with social media 
in the context of electoral campaigning.  The second data dealt with politicians, 
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campaign donors and social media users or activists, to understand why they 
engaged in social media campaigning.   To collect the data in the afore-mentioned 
electoral environments, this study used three methods:  in-depth interviews, direct 
observation, and document analysis.   
 
a. In-depth interview 
This study used the in-depth, semi-structured interview as the main method to 
collect data.  This method was used with the aim of understanding the views and 
thoughts of the interviewees regarding their experiences (Fontana & Frey, 2008).  
Specifically, it aimed to examine the empirical practices of professionals of the 
electoral campaign consulting industry in undertaking social media-based 
electoral campaign consulting services, and the experiences of politicians in 
launching social media-based electoral campaigning in Indonesia. 
 
The interviewees comprised professionals of the electoral campaign consulting 
industry in Indonesia, and politicians, campaign donors and social media users 
who were involved with social media-based electoral campaigning in post-
authoritarian Indonesia. The semi-structured interviews were conducted, each 
averaging an hour in length, with a total of 102 professional campaigners, 
politicians, campaign donors, social media users, members of the media and 
members of the election governing bodies.  All of the interviews were undertaken 
in Indonesian language in Jakarta and Makassar.  They were selected based on 
purposive sampling (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The main goal of purposive 
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sampling is to focus on particular characteristics of interviewees that are the 
interest of the study.  However, purposive sampling is prone to researcher bias.  
Cognisant of such risks, the main criteria for the selection of the interviewees 
(particularly the campaign professionals, politicians, social media users/volunteers 
and campaign donors) in this study is that they had to engage directly or being in 
decision-making positions during the three elections in the case studies. Since the 
election campaigns engaged countless of social media users/volunteers, I focused 
not only those who engaged structurally (establishing or joining volunteer groups) 
in the campaigns but also those whose involvement in the campaigning was 
acknowledged by other volunteers and social media activists who opted not to 
join in the volunteerism.  The interviewees were informed of the nature of the 
research. The confidentiality of the interviews and the interviewees’ identities 
were protected when requested.   
 
b. Direct Observation  
This study also employed direct observation sampling, to "provide a wider 
descriptive framework in multi-method research" (Gilham, 2008, pp. 6-7).  Direct 
observation provided data and information which was unable to be captured 
through other methods, and later proved to have provided some of the study’s 
most important findings, (as discussed in pp. 107-109).  In addition, observation 
played an important part because "it deals not with what people say they do, but 
what they actually do – to the extent that their behavior is open to observation" 
(Gilham, 2008, p. 1).  This study considered the necessity to get “‘something 
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vivid’ and ‘real’ which might not be apparent even from loosely structured 
interviews” with the campaign professionals and politicians, who were the main 
subjects of this research (Gilham, 2008, p. 7).   
 
During sampling, I watched, listened (including considering other languages 
where necessary), and took notes  (Neuman, 2003, p. 381) to capture the key 
details of campaign operations held in candidates’ operation rooms during the 
2013 Makassar election campaign and the 2014 Indonesian presidential election. 
Although recording technologies such as smart telephones, tablet video recorders 
and voice recorders are common tools used during direct observation, I opted not 
to use any of these technologies, in order to facilitate and maintain the trust and 
sense of ease of the subjects of these observations.  In this way I was able to 
sampling using direct observation during two of the three elections that were 
chosen as case studies; however, I was not able to directly observe the 2012 
Jakarta election, because this research begain after that election had concluded.  
 
c. Literature Study/ Documentary Analysis 
This study commenced at the end of 2012, after the conclusion of the Jakarta 
gubernatorial election. Therefore, to understand the social media campaign 
operations in that election, this study relied heavily upon the study of existing 
literature and documentary analysis regarding that poll. Similar documentary 
analysis was also undertaken to obtain additional data from other sources, 
including newspaper articles, electronic articles and publications linked to the 
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Internet and social media use, during the study’s research into the 2013 Makassar 
election campaign, and the 2014 presidential election campaign; as well as when 
researching the history of the political campaign industry and the use of media 
technology in Indonesian electoral campaigns. Such documents are useful to 
complement information captured by direct observation (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003; 
Stake, 1995).  
 
1.4.2. Data Analysis 
The data analysis centres on three themes that become the focus of this study.  
First, the analysis examines the candidates’ relations to the political parties, 
campaign donors and voters that defined the nature of their engagement with 
electoral campaigning.  Second, it analyses the ways in which the political 
campaign industry develops social media campaigning services. Third, it 
evaluates the impacts of social media campaigning upon both the political 
campaign business and associated power relations. 
 
As described above, the data for the case studies in this research derive from 
interviews, direct observation, and document analysis.  The collected data were 
reviewed and classified into the three themes.  The findings from the interview 
data, the observation data and the document analysis data were triangulated to 




1.5. Challenges and Limitations of the Thesis 
1.5.1. Challenges 
Collecting data on campaigning strategies during an actual electoral campaign 
period is not a simple task.  The heightened political tensions often created 
obstacles for researchers, who were expecting to undertake “participant 
observation” of a candidate during the electoral campaigning process. While the 
direct observation sampling during the 2013 Makassar election encountered no 
substantial difficulties, this was not the case during the 2014 presidential election. 
The escalating tensions during the presidential campaign period only allowed this 
researcher to undertake direct observation of the social media campaigning 
operations of candidate Jokowi. The campaign team of his contender, Prabowo 
Subianto, refused such observations. This restriction likely reflected significant 
differences between the two contenders’ campaign styles, which it would have 
been valuable to capture: the ban on access to Prabowo’s social media 
campaigning was most likely due to his very organised and militarised campaign 
organisation and electoral campaigning operations. In contrast, Jokowi’s 
unstructured, if not chaotic, campaigning operations enabled direct observation 
inside some of his social media campaign operation rooms. 
 
1.5.2. Limitations 
This dissertation focuses on the interactions with social media that were 
undertaken by professional campaigners, candidates and political parties, 
campaign donors and social media users, and how these social media activities 
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played out prior to and during electoral campaign periods.  This study focuses 
particularly on the actual political impact of these interactions, beyond the online 
sphere. Consequently, this study is not intended to examine the details of social 
media’s technological features (Ibrahim et al., 2015).  It does not seek to examine 
the behaviour of the voters in engaging in social media conversations during 
electoral campaign period, or to map the social media and Internet use in the 
whole media campaign strategies by the politicians or the political parties 
(Rahmawati, 2014; Yuliatiningtyas, 2014).  Ultimately, this study does not aim to 
examine in detail the symbolic meaning of social media texts, images, videos or 
memes produced and distributed by social media users. 
 
This study focuses upon the use of social media in the 2012 Jakarta election, the 
2013 Makassar election and the 2014 presidential election in Indonesia.  For this 
reason, there would be risks in claiming the findings could be generalized to a 
broader electoral setting or timeframe in Indonesia.  However, the dissertation’s 
findings may expand empirical and theoretical understanding of social media 
campaigning in post-authoritarian states.  
 
1.6. The Structure of the Study 
The dissertation is structured in the following way: 
This chapter, chapter 1, introduces the research problems and explains the 
rationale for examining the roles of the political campaign industry in social 
media campaigning.  It outlines some of the context of the political campaign 
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industry and social media in Indonesia.  This chapter also elaborates on research 
methods used to collect data in three election campaign cases in Indonesia: the 
2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election, the 2013 Makassar mayoral election and the 
2014 Indonesian presidential election.   
 
Chapter 2 examines the roles of the political campaign industry in mediating the 
use of social media in electoral campaigns. It situates the issues within broader 
debates about online electoral campaigning.  It identifies the pluralist, 
constructivist and structuralist approaches to online electoral campaigning, and 
provides an alternative framework to understand the key issues of social media 
campaigning. Drawing upon the Gramsci’s concept of hegemony; Sussman’s 
political campaign consultants, Fuchs & Trottier’s understanding of media and 
society as well as Mosco’s commodification, this framework highlights the 
importance of analysing the fluctuating relations of the elites in the study of social 
media campaigning. This framework enables further enquiry into the under-
studied roles and operations of the political campaign industry in social media 
campaigning in Indonesia, beyond political marketing purposes.  
 
Chapter 3 examines the transformation of electoral campaigning practices in 
Indonesia.  It traces the engagement of the political campaign industry in the use 
of the media in electoral campaigns in three different periods in Indonesia: the 
Old Order in 1955 election, the New Order’s six elections, and the three elections 
in post-authoritarian Indonesia. It argues that the emergence of social media 
	
	 31	
campaigning should be seen as a continuation of the use of the media for electoral 
campaigning. It further argues that the Internet and social media enable new 
arenas, which call for the political parties and politicians to employ new 
approaches to voters; which in turn have enabled new opportunities for the 
expansion of the political campaign industry. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses upon the operations of social media campaigning in the 2012 
Jakarta gubernatorial election; which marked the first social media campaigns in 
post-authoritarian Indonesia.  This case highlights how the emergence of social 
media campaigning –which was widely celebrated for bringing a popular 
peripheral politician closer to the centre of the web of national elites – was in fact 
spearheaded by the profit-oriented political campaign industry.  The industry was 
able to develop new business opportunities out of the increasing number of social 
media users.  However, it was the changes in relations between political players 
that enabled the political campaign industry to assist candidates with their social 
media campaigning.   
 
In Chapter 5, it is argued that social media campaigning was not clearly visible 
during the 2013 Makassar mayoral election. This was not because of a lack of 
social media users in Makassar.  Rather, when compared to Jakarta, Makassar 
constitutes a smaller arena of contestation, under the domination of a few political 
economy elites.  The political campaign industry, therefore, faced limited 
opportunities to employ large-scale social media campaigning services, as the 
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candidates and political parties preferred to use conventional media and 
canvassing for campaigning.  In addition, the local political economy elites’ 
domination of electoral campaigning left leading local social media users with 
little incentive to run social media campaigns. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses the intensified practices of social media campaigning in the 
2014 Indonesian presidential election.  Driven by the political campaign industry, 
social media had gained full recognition from political players as an important 
mode of electoral communication.  Moreover, social media campaigning served 
not only the interests of the politicians and the political campaign industry, but 
also that of medium-sized campaign donors and some social media activists. 
 
Chapter 7 summarizes the arguments of previous chapters.  By valuing the 
contributions of the political campaign industry in the operation of social media 
campaigning, this dissertation finds that social media is a subject of 
commodification, which has enabled the political campaign industry to expand its 
businesses and deepen its significance in politics.  However, contrary to the view 
that such commodification confirms the use of social media for political 
marketing purposes, the findings suggested that such commodification has 







Approaches and Conceptual Framework   
 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to locate this dissertation within the existing 
approaches to research in the field of online electoral campaigning studies.  It 
aims to develop a critical framework for the analysis of social media campaigning 
in the electoral contexts.  The literature related to online electoral campaigning is 
driven primarily by two major developments in society: state formation, and the 
transformation of media technology.  A number of studies, mainly from political 
science and communication science, reflect on what these changes mean for the 
operations of electoral campaigning and broader democracy (Bimber & Davis, 
2003; Chadwick, 2006; Kluver, Jankowski, Foot, & Schneider, 2007a).  
 
This chapter consists of two main sections.  The first section engages with two 
main questions: What are the uses of social media in electoral campaigns? and 
How do key electoral players use social media to advance their interests? These 
questions are discussed through the lenses of the pluralist, constructivist and 
structuralist approaches. This section argues for the applicability of the 
structuralist approach to capture the negotiation and cooperation – as well as the 
tensions and contradictions – that shape social media campaigning.  Unlike 
pluralist and constructivist studies, which position social media as new drivers of 
changes in electoral politics, this structural study considers social media as a new 
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object of capture in electoral campaigning; with such campaigning including both 
the organisation of political persuasion and of relations pertaining to the electoral 
players. 
 
However, as the available structuralist studies on social media campaigning are 
largely limited to institutional aspects, in the second section of this chapter I 
propose an expansion to the structuralist approach to analyse the operation of 
social media campaigning as a persuasion strategy, through which the temporary 
interests of electoral players can be organised during electoral periods. Informed 
by Gramsci’s hegemony and the political economy of communication, this 
framework is receptive to various possibilities regarding the appropriation of 
social media as new media in electoral campaigning. By emphasising the interplay 
of social media and the specific relationships between the candidates’ relations to 
other electoral players, this framework examines social media as a subject of 
capture not only by the electoral players (the candidates and political parties, 
campaign donors, voters) but also by the political campaign industry that aims to 
meet their interests. Thus, this framework enables a more in-depth exploration of 
the roles of the political campaign industry in the operations of social media 
campaigning, during the electoral periods that are the focus of this study. 
 
2.2. Social Media, Electoral Players and Electoral Campaigning 
This section examines the pluralist, constructivist and structuralist approaches to 
the two questions above.  These approaches are taken from the typology 
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introduced by Street (2005) in his book on mass media and politics, and will guide 
this chapter in examining the debates on online electoral campaigning (p. 6). 
Critics have suggested that Street’s typology was flawed in that the three 
perspectives are not mutually exclusive (Corner & Robinson, 2006).  However, 
for the purposes of this dissertation, such a typology is useful to comprehend 
different approaches to the topics of political communication, media political 
economy and media effects. Using Street’s typology, this study attempts to 
sidestep the prominent, yet rather limited, equalisation versus normalisation 
debates in the studies of online campaigning (Bimber, 2003; Margolis & Resnick, 
2000; Ward, Gibson, & Lusoli, 2003).8 
 
2.2.1. The Pluralist Approach 
The pluralist views of media use for electoral campaigning emphasise ideal roles 
of media (both offline and online) in liberal democracy. The pluralist approach 
sees democracy as the rule of the people, which is mediated by and through 
interactions involving political leaders, political parties and interests groups 
(Street, 2011). There are two substantial assumptions underpinning this view.  
First, it considers competing political parties and other interests groups as being 
																																																								
8 The main assumption underpinning the equalisation or mobilisation thesis is that the Internet has 
distinctive technological features as compared to conventional technologies (Hagen & Mayer, 
2000).  This stream of study fostered an idea that the Internet “could help level the electoral 
playing field” due to its ability to form a public sphere alternative to conventional media-generated 
public sphere (Margolis, Resnick, & Levy, 2003). However, further studies found that the Internet 
is nothing more than a reproduction of the offline media sphere, dominated by the views of major 
political forces and media companies.  These studies supported the normalisation or reinforcement 
thesis.  Such studies posited that the Internet benefits political elites the most, particularly in less 
advanced countries (Bimber & Davis, 2003; Margolis & Resnick, 2000; Norris, 2000).  Some 
scholars have attempted to escape the debates, which tend to be unilateral, by offering new 
approaches, such as contextualism, because “the relationship between technology and society is 
complex and dialectical” (Chen, 2010, p. 14). 
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equally positioned.  Second, it considers media to be neutral channels of political 
information that enable the development of the public sphere, a forum where 
citizens discuss civic issues relevant to their lives (Bosch, 2010; Papacharissi, 
2002). The media is therefore nicknamed the ‘fourth estate’ for its roles in 
democracies characterised by deliberation and participation.  
 
a. Electoral Campaigning  
The pluralist understanding of electoral campaigning is based on the idea that the 
state is a set of neutral social institutions mediating various interests.  In a 
democracy, elections are the key event in which political parties, which represent 
different interests, compete for control of the machinery of the state.  This 
suggests that elections are the accepted means by which the political system 
ensures checks and balances over the exercise of power, to prevent the domination 
by any group over others. Election participants (political parties and politicians) 
are required to secure enough votes to win, necessitating that they broaden their 
appeal to different sectional interests.  Based on this understanding, democracy is 
characterised by, among other things, the plurality of competing political parties, 
politicians or interests groups that are of equal standing. 
 
Electoral campaigns are intended to enable competing political parties and 
candidates to win support from voters in the elections.  Therefore, electoral 
campaigns are a period when political parties and candidates inform voters about 
themselves, their programs, ideology and so forth, while voters obtain electoral 
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information to make an informed choice in electing leaders to whom they entrust 
political control. This understanding highlights the nature of electoral 
campaigning as the organisation of political persuasion.  Such electoral 
campaigning is constituted by the employment of different strategies and 
techniques to reach out and persuade voters, including by communicating 
campaign messages through the media.    
 
Given the above, pluralist studies suggest that media play a pivotal role in 
electoral campaigning. Changes in media technologies influence the development 
of electoral campaigning, as shown in studies on the transformation of electoral 
campaigning; which have originated mainly from the experiences in Western 
democracies, particularly the United States (Norris, 2000, p. 137). 9   The 
transformation of electoral campaigning has been driven by modernisation 
“rooted in technological and political developments” (p. 140).  The evolution of 
campaigning in the context of such Western democracies as the United States has 
been characterised by the media-led transformation of electoral campaigning 
practices, which is commonly divided into three stages.10  The pre-modern stage, 
from 19th century democracies until the 1950s, is characterised by straightforward 
campaigning techniques and strategies handled by party leaders, supported by 
																																																								
9 Her study raised concerns over the decline of civic and political participation in U.S. elections, as 
well as criticism of the thesis of Americanisation of election campaigning, referring to the 
replication of US campaigning practices in many established and new democracies (Norris, 2004b, 
p. 2). 
10 Such evolution is commonly divided into three stages of campaign communication stages.  
Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) suggested the stages consisted of the golden age of the parties, the 
television age, and the third age; while Norris (2000) posited that the evolution consisted of the 
pre-modern, modern and post-modern stages. 
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volunteers, and mediated by partisan print press and radio broadcasts.  This age is 
considered a golden period because print media, and to a certain extent radio, 
facilitated substantive political debates that were based on ideological foundations 
(Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999).  The modern or television stage refers to the 
campaigning in the 1950s to mid-1980s, which was marked by the presence of 
national campaign organisations, increasingly professionalised campaigning 
practices and the massive use of television for campaigning. The post-modern 
stage, which started in the 1980s, can be identified through the fragmentation of 
television outlets, the development of the Internet as a mechanism to advance 
party-voter interaction, and political campaigning practices involving campaign 
professionals that continue beyond election periods, or what is referred to as 
‘permanent campaigning’ (Norris, 2000, p. 6).11   
 
Such an American-based understanding of electoral campaigning has been 
reproduced in different electoral settings around the world, although the patterns 
have differed (Danial, 2009; Gainsborough, 2005; Kanungo & Farooqui, 2008).  
Hence, scholars identified the emergence of the Americanisation or hybridisation 
of electoral campaigning – by which they meant the contemporary practices of a 
distinctly American style of electoral campaigning; typified by increasingly 
																																																								
11  Norris (2004b) posited that “[t]he concept of ‘postmodernism” represents a complex 
phenomenon, open to multiple interpretations, yet it is usually understood to include the 
characteristics of greater cultural pluralism, social diversity and fragmentation of sources, 
increased challenges to traditional forms of hierarchical authority and external standards of 
rational knowledge; and a more inchoate and confused sense of identity (p. 7).  Permanent 
campaigning refers to the practices of political parties and candidates to focus on media coverage 
and visibility for the purpose of running or winning the next election rather than on delivering 
successful public policies and outcomes.	
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higher campaign costs, media-heavy and candidate-centred campaigning – in 
different countries (Baines, Scheucher, & Plasser, 2001; Esser & Pfetsch, 2004; 
Gainsborough, 2005; Plasser & Plasser, 2002).  These studies assume that 
modernisation, characterised by, among other things, technological change, drives 
the transformation of the nature and operation of electoral campaigning. 
 
b. The Internet and Social Media in Electoral Campaigns 
The pluralist approach suggests multiple functions of media in electoral contexts.  
For voters, media are seen as a forum enabling them to get political information 
necessary to make informed-choices (Druckman, 2005; Robinson & Davis, 1990).  
Voters who consume more news media are assumed to have a greater probability 
of being civically and politically engaged (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 
2012; Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999).  In the electoral authoritarian countries like 
Malaysia and Singapore, where conventional media have been restricted, voters 
found new media (Internet-based media) to be an alternative space where they 
could access information other than from government sources (Rajaratnam, 
2009).12  Ultimately media is considered a determinant in voting behaviour (Blais, 
2000).13  Therefore, political parties and politicians consider media essential to 
communicate the interests they represent, in the form of campaign messages, in 
																																																								
12 According to Schedler (2013), “Electoral authoritarian regimes practice authoritarianism behind 
the institutional façades of representative democracy.  They hold regular multi-party elections at 
the national level, yet violate liberal- democratic minimum standards in systematic and profound 
ways” (p. 1). 
13 Such a view on why people seek out political information is influenced by rational choice 
theories, commonly adopted in political science.  Some scholars have criticized such a view, 
saying that individual voters’ interests in political information may not always be politically-
motivated (van Zoonen, 2005).	
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their bid to attract voters coming from various social groups (Iyengar & Simon, 
2000; Karan et al., 2009a).  Media campaigning has been employed by the 
competing political parties and politicians to inform and influence voters to win 
elections (Gainsborough, 2005; Karlsen, 2009a; Miner, 2015). 
 
The competition to persuade voters through media outlets accommodates the 
development of political campaign consultancy businesses to provide services to 
assist competing parties and politicians to win elections. Media may be 
considered campaign tools to foster and enlarge the business (Nimmo & Combs, 
1990; Norris, 2000). This particular business’ existence has been sustained by the 
development of media technology; in the sense that, as technology changes, 
political actors need professional support to handle technical issues associated 
with optimising the campaign benefit of constantly evolving media technologies. 
This eventually extends the needs of political actors to engage campaign 
professionals to handle various modes of political campaigning, including 
Internet-based media (Farrel & Webb, 2000; Norris, 2000).14 Norris (2004b) 
suggests that politicians are  
“essentially lagging behind technological and economic changes, and 
running hard to stay in place by adopting the techniques of political 
marketing in the struggle to cope with a more complex 
communication environment, rather than driving this developments” 
(p. 7).   
 
																																																								




These campaign professionals increasingly infiltrate political parties and 
campaign organisations.  Eventually, they are often blamed for establishing 
audiences for media, particularly television, as a new market of electoral 
campaigning; instead of developing electorates with stable party identification 
(Postman, 1985).  Some scholars have suggested that the campaign industry has 
contributed to the professionalisation of politics, referring to the involvement of 
campaign professionals who have gradually replaced the roles of party members, 
thereby increasing professionalisation while also increasing campaigning costs 
(Walker, 2009).15 This transformation is seen as destroying the public sphere, as it 
contributes to the widening gap between voters and politics, increasing 
campaigning costs, and so forth.  
 
Pluralist studies on the Internet and electoral campaigns have been largely 
triggered by fear of the declining public sphere or failure of the media to fulfil 
their role as the fourth estate, both of which are seen as threats to the democratic 
process (Davies, 2008).  The Internet is thought to support “a return to some of 
the more localized and interactive forms of communication that were present in 
the pre-modern period” (Norris, 2000, p. 149).  The Internet’s technological 
features are considered as offering solutions to reduce the barriers to information 
production and exchange crucial for democracy (Thorburn & Jenkins, 2003).   
 
																																																								
15 Negrine and Lilleker (2002) explained that professionalisation of campaigning encompasses 
work with the media (p. 312). Commercialisation is closely related to professionalisation because 
new techniques necessitate huge investments, and thus modify the diverse relations between 
business and politics. 
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Such an understanding was reflected in the early pluralist debates over the roles of 
the Internet in electoral campaigns. Focusing on Internet websites, such studies 
suggested that the Internet supported participatory democracy and its values.  The 
main argument of these studies was that Internet websites had a positive impact 
upon the public sphere, as shown in a number of studies linking the Internet to 
civic engagement (Shah, Kwak, Lance, & Dhavan, 2001; Skoric, Ying, & Ng, 
2009), political engagement (de Zúñiga, Puig-I-Abril, & Rojas, 2009; Willnat, 
Wong, Tamam, & Aw, 2013), increased political news consumption (Tewksbury, 
2006), or increased volunteerism (Jennings & Zeitner, 2003).  Moreover, some 
studies argued that the Internet was particularly useful in allowing fringe or small 
parties and poorly resourced politicians to compete against ruling or big parties 
and well-resourced politicians, to reach out to users (Gong, 2011; Margolis et al., 
2003).  This led to a conclusion that the Internet is a low cost medium without 
editorial control and with a non-hierarchical nature, such that “with relatively few 
skills and resources a minor party can have just as sophisticated a site as a 
governing party” (Ward et al., 2003, p. 22).  A second, rather pessimistic stream 
in pluralist studies found that the Internet does not always facilitate democratic 
discourses.  Some scholars found the emergence of fragmentation and polarisation 
in political discussions and deliberations online, which may weaken the 
democratizing effect of the Internet (Karlsen, 2011; Casteltrione, 2014).  Despite 
this pessimistic tendency, such studies’ point of departure is essentially not 
different from that of the optimists’, regarding the Internet’s technological 
features in facilitating new practices in democracy.  
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The pluralist approach on the roles of websites in electoral campaigns have been 
replicated and amplified with regard to social media.  Such an understanding was 
generated by further development of the Internet technologies, known largely as 
Web 2.0, which enable interactivity as the architecture of participation (Gillmor, 
2006). The technology has been understood to facilitate the increasing 
involvement of the general public in reporting and disseminating news or 
information known as  ‘citizen journalism’ practices (Allan & Thorsen, 2009; 
Sambrook, 2005), or the emergence of “produsers”, which is understood as 
Internet users who are also information producers (Bruns, 2008).  This 
technological development of Web 2.0 enabled Internet users who not only 
consume and distribute but also produce news and information. A study mapping 
36 academic works on social media and political participation noted that the 
majority of the works found a positive correlation between social media use and 
different forms of civic or political participation (Boulianne, 2015). Following 
this approach, these ‘produsers’ are considered as playing an important role in 
electioneering, by producing and distributing alternative information to revive the 
public sphere (Rojas, 2010; Soon & Cho, 2011).  Such studies essentially suggest 
that content produced through social media is autonomous of mass media 
production, which fuels the expectation of the vitality of the new technology in re-
invigorating the public sphere.  In addition to participation, pluralists consider that 
social mediaplays an important role in linking key political actors in elections 
(political parties and politicians) with voters (citizens journalists/ ‘produsers’).  
The new media are praised for their contribution to expanding political 
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information distribution (Karlsen, 2011), or to supporting political mobilisation 
(Yujuico, 2010).   
 
Pluralist studies on social media campaigning focus mainly on the ways in which 
political parties or politicians as communicators use or do not use Facebook or 
Twitter as new campaigning tools (Criado, Martínez-Fuentes, & Silván, 2012; 
Karan et al., 2009a; Vergeer, Hermans, & Sams, 2013); or on voters’ use of social 
media for decision-making (Gueorguieva, 2007; Lev‐On, 2011; Vergeer, 
Hermans, & Sams, 2010; Vitak et al., 2011).  Few pluralist studies link the roles 
of campaign consultants to the use of social media for campaigning, although they 
do briefly mention the existence of such consultants (Hosch-Dayican, Amrit, 
Aarts, & Dassen, 2014; Wilson, 2011). 
 
c. Contributions and Limitations of the Pluralist Approach 
The pluralist studies have shown that electoral campaigns are an avenue for 
competing political actors and candidates to win elections. Electoral campaigning 
is understood as the articulation, during such contests, of a plurality of interests 
pertaining to political actors, candidates and voters, which are assumed to be 
equally positioned.  The operation of electoral campaigning is subject to 
transformation through a process that seems to be natural, and can be driven by, 
among other things, media technology. However, while the media are seen as 
being open to capture or influence from political elites, they are still projected as 
being neutral channels.  Thus, some aspects of the use of media are not properly 
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explained by such pluralist studies, as is shown in the explanation regarding the 
emergence of media as campaign tools and campaign consulting businesses. On 
one hand, media technology such the Internet and social media, being neutral 
channels, were assumed to empower voters and fringe politicians.  However, 
when the Internet and social media were not able to live up to this expectation, 
some pluralist studies suggested that the failure was a result of the 
professionalisation of politics.  Such a flaw was partly due to the approach’s focus 
on the technical aspects of media technology as neutral channels, while paying 
less attention to structural factors that influence the use of media in electoral 
campaigns.  
 
2.2.2. The Constructivist Approach 
While the pluralists believe that media serve as an impartial instrument of the 
political system, the constructivist approach considers that “media "construct" 
[the] political system and the relations between the agents within it” (Street, 2011, 
p. 291).  The basic idea raised in the constructivist studies is that, in the 
increasingly mediated world, a citizen's understanding of politics is, and could 
only be, conceived through the media.  The media’s portrayal of politics 
reconstitutes the ‘political reality’ that abridges citizens’ understanding of politics 
(p. 291).  This view considers media to function not only as the mediator of 
political reality, but increasingly to play determining roles in constituting 
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‘politics’ (p. 24).16  Dahlgren (2001) goes further by arguing that “politics no 
longer exists as a reality taking place outside the media, to be “covered” by 
journalists Rather, politics is increasingly organised as a media phenomenon, 
planned and executed for and with the co-operation of the media” (p. 85).   
 
a. Electoral Campaigning 
In contrast to pluralist studies highlighting media as a neutral channel in electoral 
campaigns, the constructivist posits media in a more powerful position.  Based on 
this approach, electoral campaigning constitutes a battle to influence voters. Such 
contestation facilitates the rise of the media, which become increasingly dominant 
sites of electoral campaigning.  Specifically, in electoral campaigns the media are 
assumed to serve as the sites of opinion engineering. However, the constructivist 
approach also suggests more complex roles for media in society. It does not see 
media solely as the loci of manipulation, as they are also seen as social institutions 
constituting the elites.  
 
The constructivist approach acknowledges inequality among the competing 
interests ruling society, rather than the pluralist emphasis on a plurality of 
competing groups of equal standing. Some of the elites will be more powerful 
than others, whom they will dominate politically.  These powerful and resourceful 
																																																								
16  Media is considered powerful in shaping politics due to its position as the source of symbolic 
representations. “[P]olitics is constituted by rituals, and rituals derive their power from their 
symbolic re-presentations” (Street, 2005, p. 24). 
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elites control the general members of society through manipulation, propaganda 
and so forth, to serve their interests.   
 
The constructivist approach underlines that the contestation in electoral 
campaigning does not implicate political elites only. Such contestation eventually 
constitutes a contest (and alliances) between politics and the media.  The media’s 
particular mediating characteristics tend to make the media more powerful than 
the political actors, especially during the electoral campaign periods (Bachan-
Persad, 2012).  
 
The constructivist approach suggests media exert a power due to their ability to 
mediatise politics. Mediatisation of politics is increasingly constituted by a series 
of media representations (Stromback, 2008).17  Hjarvard (2013) argued that 
mediatisation helps “to understand the process whereby culture and society 
become increasingly dependent on media and their logic” (p. 17).18  He regards 
the media as involved in the processes of mediatisation, by which he means 
																																																								
17 Mediatisation (originally written in American spelling as mediatization) involves four phases, 
starting with the mass media serving as the primary source of political information (Stromback, 
2008).  This is followed by the increasing significance of the media in facilitating electoral 
campaigning and developing relationships with political actors.  The third phase occurs when 
political actors increasingly adapt to media logic; while the last phrase happens when politics 
adopt media logic in the policy making process. Other scholars categorize mediatisation into four 
different phrases: extension, which sees media help overcome boundaries in space and time; 
substitution, where media substitute direct communication activity; amalgamation, which sees the 
merger of media activity with everyday life; and accommodation, where media provide policy for 
actors from other domains if they adapt to media’s requirements of selection, edition and 
transmission of information (Schulz, 2004).  
18 This understanding focuses on the power of the media in mediating reality.  The concept that 
opposes media logic and political logic essentially suggests that both fields employ different 
institutional systems, which determine their respective ways of acting. While the media field tends 
to be “evocative, encapsulated, highly thematic, familiar to audiences, and easy to use”, political 
field tends to show otherwise (Altheide, 2009, p. 294). 
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parties and politicians adapt their practices and messages to formats, deadlines 
and genres that are journalistically attractive (p. 19).  The scholar refers to the 
duality of the process; in which the media have become social institutions in their 
own right as well as the sites for social interaction between institutions in society 
(p. 19).  The mediatisation process is linked closely to the personalisation of 
politics.  It represents the image construction of politicians, which focuses on their 
personality and personal life, being conveyed to their electorates (Thompson, 
1995; van Zoonen, 2005). Electorates are assumed to be able to understand 
politics, and to be influenced more easily through such means because the 
majority of citizens rarely have direct experience of politics. They have to rely on 
news media (Entman, 2004) or entertainment  media (van Zoonen, 2005) as their 
sources of information to make sense of politics.19  
 
There have been various studies examining such increasing personalisation of 
electoral campaigning.  In the Philippines, for example, it is a common sight to 
see celebrities, who largely lack political experience and may have only basic 
education level, participating in political elections and winning (David & Atun, 
2015).  This tendency is not unique to the Philippines; it also happens in 
Indonesia, India, and in advanced democracies like Britain and the United States 
(Hughes-Freeland, 2007; Mukherjee, 2004; Street, 2012; Wheeler, 2012).  These 
studies indicate that the logic of politics increasingly follows the logic of the 
media to woo voters. 
																																																								




It is through this process that the significance of the political campaign industry is 
built.  Assigned by political actors who have a bigger influence than voters in the 
production of media messages during the electoral campaign period, political 
campaign professionals engage collectively to produce such campaign messages 
or content (Negrine, 1994).  The focus of the work of these professionals is solely 
on the short-term goal of winning elections (Germond, 2004).  To meet such a 
goal, the political campaign industry is partly responsible for the development of 
political impression formation, which increasingly reduces political problems to 
simple “political rhetoric, sound bites, appearance characteristics, and perceived 
personality” (Landtsheer, De Vries, & Vertessen, 2008, p. 232). 
 
b. The Internet and Social Media in Electoral Campaigns 
Constructivist studies posit that the presence of websites, and later, social media, 
provide new opportunities for political actors to engage directly with the 
electorates; thus shaping, expanding and strengthening such processes of 
mediatisation and personalisation of politics.  The websites have been used for 
generating news, which eventually shapes the broader media’s news agenda 
(Broersma & Graham, 2012; Machill & Beiler, 2009; Meraz, 2004).  Social media 
enable political actors to produce and increase online visibility to, and 
interactivity with, citizens directly; without going through the established media 
as gatekeepers (Weaver, 2007).  The Internet websites and social media 
increasingly became tools of public relations and impression management during 





Found that in the party-centred Norwegian setting, Enli and Skogerbø (2013) 
suggested that social media technological features “add to processes of 
personalisation” and “expand the political arena for increased personalized 
campaigning” (pp. 757-758).  These researchers argued that social media such as 
Facebook and Twitter “represent semi-public, semi-private spaces for self-
representation where borders between offline personal and online mediated 
relations are blurred” (p. 759).  Social media have been used to convey emotional, 
motivational appeal to present the candidates’ images and messages persuasively 
to users (Bronstein, 2013; Williams, Trammell, Postelnicu, Landreville, & Martin, 
2005).  
 
In electoral campaigning, personality-related aspects of the political parties’ 
leadership or candidates are assumed to determine voter behaviour (McGraw, 
2003).  This relates closely to the development of both persuasive and negative 
campaign messages.20  The production of campaign messages that are constructed 
around symbols, myths and framing often results in personalized or emotional 
messages that put greater emphasis on image (of the personal characteristics of the 
																																																								
20 Campaign messages are under the control of political actors.  In such messages, they (and their 
campaign organisations) could associate their opponent with negative images and, on the other 
hands, associate themselves with positive images (Christ, Thorson, & Caywood, 1994).   
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party leadership or candidates) over substance.21  Image manipulation through 
social media results in users developing more positive sentiment toward 
politicians and political parties in electoral campaigns (Groshek & Al-Rawi, 
2013).  On the other hand, negative campaigns often result in political cynicism 
and the decrease of political participation (Brooks, 2006; Brooks & Geer, 2007; 
Geer, 2006).  However, negative and superficial campaign messages have been 
shown to captivate many voters, in comparison to substantive and deliberative 
messages (Lipsitz, Trost, Grossmann, & Sides, 2005). 
 
More recently, the influence of social media in politics has been evident with 
regard to politicians changing their campaigning behaviours to win the attention 
of social media users.  It has become common in many democracies for 
established politicians to take pictures of themselves (commonly known as 
‘selfies’) using mobile phones, and to distribute these pictures through various 
social media channels (Baishya, 2015; Manolo & Orefice, 2015).  Such strategies 
indicate the increasing significance of social media not only as a new space of 






21 Framing is defined as selecting “aspects of a perceived reality and (making) them more salient 
in communicating a text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993, p. 52).  
Through framing, campaign professionals direct voters on how to judge or form opinions (Lee, 
McLeod, & Shah, 2008).	
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c. Contributions and Limitations of the Constructivist Approach 
The constructivist approach contributes to the notion that the media, including the 
Internet and social media, are not always impartial and merely serve as political 
instruments.  It also suggests that political discourses and public opinion could be 
shaped, instead of being organic. More importantly, the constructivist approach is 
valuable also because its recognises the vitality of the Internet and social media in 
constructing political discourses and public opinions that are not autonomous 
from the political actors that employed the technology, or from conventional 
media, to reach their aim of winning the election (Meraz, 2011; Ragas & Kiousis, 
2010). However, precisely because of its emphasis on the mediatisation process, 
the constructivist approach does not elaborate further upon structural factors, 
including social relations pertaining to the political actors, which contribute to 
media use during electoral campaigns. Or, as Garnham (2000) puts it, “Who can 
say what, in what form, to whom, for what purposes, and with what effect will in 
part be determined by and in part determine the structure of economic, political 
and cultural power in society” (p. 4).  Therefore, this approach’s division between 
media and politics does not recognize the fact that, in democratic societies, the 
politically powerful may use various strategies, including forming alliances with 
each other and with the media, to be able to rule and maintain that rule. It is not 
uncommon for politicians or political parties and the media to build alliances and 
cooperate, in various ways, in contemporary electoral campaigns.  After all, 
democracy is seen as a process, often manipulative, whereby elites consolidate 
their power by co-opting members of society, including the media, to support 
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their interests.  The “compliance” of the politicians and political parties in 
following the media logic during the electoral period can be seen as the political 
actors’ strategy to maintain their rule. 
 
2.2.3. The Structuralist Approach 
The structuralist approach locates the media within the structures of the political 
economy that organises the media. Quoting Garnham, Street (2005) explained that 
the development of media has to be “understood as part of a larger process of state 
formation and capitalist development, and the roles and characters of the media 
are analysed in terms of the particular political and commercial demands and 
interests operating at that time” (pp. 28-29). The main focus of this approach is 
“upon the structural power that allocates resources and constrains behaviour” (p. 
29).  Therefore, the structuralist approach attributes “the causal effect to material 
resources and economic relations” rather than to the new media per se in 
examining the relationships between politics and media (p. 28). 
 
a.  Electoral Campaigning  
According to this approach, political power is concentrated in the hands of a 
relatively small minority of people in societies.  It is used to further the interests 
of the powerful at the expense of the interests of the less powerful. The ultimate 
source of all power in any society is the ownership and control of the means of 
economic production. However, there can be degrees of power.  For example, 
established political parties (which represent various interests, but mainly of those 
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who own and control economic and political resources) are generally more 
powerful than voters, but voters can consign effective limitations upon the way in 
which political parties are able to exercise their power. 
 
This concept highlights the importance of economic sources of power.  Control 
over economic resources enables not only economic power but can also be 
extended into political power, which transmits, to the less powerful, ideological 
messages favourable to the interests of the powerful.  The state, in this respect, is 
never neutral; on the contrary, it becomes an institution that protects the interests 
of the economically powerful over all other elements of society. 
 
The structuralist’s approach on power is reflected in the nature of electoral 
campaigning not only as an organisation of political persuasion, but also of 
various interests that are in play in electoral campaigns. The organisation of the 
interests of the electoral players shapes the organisation of political persuasion, 
including the ways in which media are used for campaigning. 
 
In the structuralist approach, media are seen as campaign tools, but not in the 
same ways as the pluralist approach interprets this.  Apart from the few public 
service media, the majority of media are profit-oriented institutions.  The 
livelihood of the media depends on advertising placed by owners of commercial 
products and services (Jhally, 2014).  Moreover, media companies are owned by 
corporations, which often link to other businesses or political interests (Chomsky, 
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1997; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; McChesney, 2004; Papatheodorou & Machin, 
2003).  In plain words, media constitute the powerful (Davis, 2003).  It could be 
expected that the media would voice the interests of the powerful rather than the 
interests of other members of society (Callaghan & Schnell, 2001; Niven, 2005).  
 
Therefore, the structuralist approach interprets the campaign consulting business 
as emerging not necessarily because of the technological features nor the 
mediating capacity of the media, but rather because of the needs of the powerful 
elites to achieve, maintain and strengthen their power. The emergence of the 
campaign consulting business should be examined through its linkages with 
organised wealth and control of resources (Sussman, 2005). Therefore, it is not 
surprising that this particular business takes root in public relations and 
advertising, two types of business that play key roles in connecting the public 
(masses/the less powerful) to advertisers (basically, the owners of capital).  
Electioneering should not be seen simply as efforts to influence voters to interpret 
electoral news and information from a particular point of view to support and vote 
for certain candidates. It should not been seen as mere ‘spin doctoring’, or efforts 
of campaign professionals or campaign consultants to orchestrate the extensive 
use of media and campaigning techniques in electoral campaigns to achieve a 
victory for their clients.  Instead, it should be understood in a larger, complex web 
of political and corporate interests, which often appear in the alliance of 




b. The Internet and Social Media in Electoral Campaigns 
The structuralist approach acknowledges that online campaigning occurs as part 
of an unequal competition.  Established political actors are considered to have 
better access than their fringe counterparts to campaign resources and media; two 
foundational aspects that contribute significantly to the outcome of election 
campaigns.  Some structuralist studies have found that substantial budgets and 
expertise are required to run online campaigning, such as to construct and 
maintain political campaign websites (Lusoli, 2005; Margolis et al., 2003). 
Amateurs such as individual politicians or their non-professional campaign team 
members are able to do this. However, the resources available to political players 
such as money, bureaucracy, supporter networks or mainstream media restrict the 
ability of minor parties and politicians to conduct online campaigning, such as 
establishing campaign websites, which attract public interest (Gibson, Lusoli, & 
Ward, 2008; Margolis & Resnick, 2000).  Thus, Resnick (1997) concluded that 
“[i]f we ask which political parties and candidates are likely to provide 
sophisticated web sites, the answer is clear: those who command the resources to 
hire the talent to produce them” (p. 63).   
 
More recent studies have examined the involvement of campaign consulting 
professionals in online electoral campaigning.  The use of the Internet in political 
campaigning has been changing over time (Gulati & Williams, 2007).  While 
political election websites tended to be more informative rather than interactive 
(Gibson, 2012; Jackson & Lilleker, 2009; Kluver, Jankowski, Foot, & Schneider, 
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2007)22, recent online campaigns have tended to embrace a more interactive mode 
(Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, & Welpe, 2010).  The case of US presidential 
candidate Barrack Obama’s use of Facebook in his 2008 election campaign 
exemplifies developments in the use of social media.  Obama was not the first US 
presidential candidate to use new technology for campaigning (Myers, 1993; 
Small, 2008), but his online campaign team adopted an innovative approach.  
They allowed users to become involved in producing campaign messages during 
the election campaign by, among other things, encouraging users to create online 
groups to produce, circulate and discuss issues linked to the candidate through 
social media (Carpenter, 2010; Cogburn & Espinoza-Vasquez, 2011; Gibson, 
2012; McGirth, 2008; Talbot, 2008; Thomas, 2010). This strategy was due partly 
to the role of professionals in Obama’s campaign team, who “have done a great 
job in being precise in the use of the tools” and, most importantly, played “a big 
part of its strategy” (Talbot, 2008, pp. 79-80). Obama and his campaign manager, 
David Plouffe, did not consider campaigning through the web and social media to 
be as important as mainstream media campaigning. However, Chris Hughes, a co-
founder of Facebook who become Obama’s online campaign coordinator, 
managed to “become a critically important” figure after the candidate’s loss in the 
New Hampshire primary (McGirth, 2008).   
 
Obviously, the involvement of campaign consulting professionals in online 
																																																								
22 Perceived loss of control to campaign content and lack of resources are identified as two factors 
behind the establishment of political campaign websites that tend to be more informative rather 
than interactive (Stromer‐Galley, 2000). Accommodating interactivity on political campaign 
websites may result in the influx of messages deemed damaging the candidates’ image or 
reputation that their campaign teams attempt to build online.	
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campaigning and, hence, the development of online campaigning businesses 
varies, depending on, among other things, the political and media system 
applicable in different campaign environments.  In countries like Norway, for 
example, the involvement of campaign consulting professionals in electoral 
campaigning is limited, mainly because election campaigns in the country are 
funded by the state (Karlsen, 2009a).  
 
c. Contributions and Limitations of the Structuralist Approach 
This structuralist approach is useful because it acknowledges that broader social 
factors shape the use of social media in electoral campaigning.  More importantly, 
it highlights the economic-based relations within which political actors operate, 
which in turn contribute to the ways in which media are used for electoral 
campaigning. However, the available structuralist studies to media electoral 
campaigning tends to reduce the role of media to institutional factors, without 
paying sufficient attention to the power relations that accommodate such use (see 
Chadwick, 2006).  The ways in which media are used for campaigning actually 
reflect the competing interests of political and economic power.  There are clear, 
widespread disparities of power, even amongst well-organised elite groups.  The 
existing structuralist studies on media and electoral campaigns are unable to 
analyse the ways in which elite groups can monopolize media space to maintain 
their sectional interests, nor the ways in which the tensions within the elite groups 




Another critique is that the structuralist approach to online campaigning assumes 
that pre-Internet power brokers will define the online world autonomously of 
technological change (Anstead & Chadwick, 2008).  This critique is significant 
not only because it shows the importance of the new media capabilities, which are 
different from those of conventional media, but also because of the implications 
of such features for electoral campaigning practices and for broader social 
relations.  Therefore, there is a need to elaborate more on the idea that cyberspace 
“will be moulded by the everyday struggle for wealth and power” (Margolis & 
Resnick, 2000, p. 2). Such a struggle for wealth and power may well be explored 
through the process that mediates the emergence of social media in electoral 
campaigns.  This understanding builds the conceptual framework that will be 
discussed in the upcoming section. 
 
2.3. The Conceptual Framework 
This dissertation understands that electoral campaigning connects the media, 
politics, the economy and civil society (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995; Gurevitch, 
Coleman, & Blumler, 2009; McQuail, 2000; Sussman, 2005). It conceptualises 
social media campaigning as a mode of electoral campaigning enabled by social 
media which shapes, and is shaped by, the candidates relations to political parties, 
campaign donors and voters, in an election characterised by competition for 
access to and the distribution of political and economic resources, authority, and 
legitimacy.  It implies that electoral players are dependent on and influenced by 
one another as a strategy to achieve their own interests and objectives.  Thus, the 
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emphasis of this framework lies not necessarily on institutional aspects, but on the 
relationships between candidates, political parties, campaign donors, voters, 
media and the political campaign industry; which engage in a high degree of 
mutual interdependence during the electoral period (see Sussman, 1999). In 
particular, this dissertation shows that analyzing the fluctuating relationships 
among the electoral players enables further exploration of the ways in which the 
contestation, alliances and fragmentation of their interests are organised and 
structured through social media.  
  
This study situates social media campaigning within “social and economic 
relations [that] are not egalitarian within society today” (Mansell, 2004, p. 3). 
This understanding acknowledges that the contribution of the political campaign 
industry in mediating the use of social media for electioneering in the electoral 
process is characterised by the candidates’ relations to the political parties, 
campaign donors and voters, which are not equal. 
 
This suggests that such concept of social media campaigning provides the basis 
for further enquiry into the roles of the political campaign industry in facilitating 
such social media campaigning, and in facilitating the politics of social media 
campaigning in the electoral process in the digital age in general.  Within the 
context of Indonesia, the framework is particularly useful to balance the 
domination of techno-optimists and techno-pessimists in the studies of online 
electoral campaigning that reiterate the arguments of the pluralist approach 
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(regarding electoral campaigning as a contest involving equal competing political 
actors), and the constructivist approach’s view of electoral campaigning as a 
contest between politics and media. In addition, this framework contributes to 
broader studies of the political economy of communication and specific studies of 
the Internet and electoral politics, which remain understudied in Indonesia (Ufen, 
2010a).  
 
The framework utilised in this study incorporates insights from Gramsci’s theory 
of hegemony and from the critical political economy of communication, mainly as 
represented by the works of Sussman, Trottier & Fuchs, and Mosco.  Gramsci is 
adapted to explain the relations between the political economy elites and the 
media in the electoral process.  This allows for analytical space to explain that 
electoral campaigns are characterised not only by domination but also conflicts, 
negotiation and compromises.  Gramsci is particularly useful to examine the 
contribution of media in the establishment and fragmentation of socio-political 
coalitions competing for power and resources.  In other words, his approach is 
useful to provide an explanation as to why media may engage in the organising of 
temporary interests in election campaigns. The critical political economy of 
communication provides an analysis to understand social structures, not in the 
sense of traditional institutionalism, but as the interconnections of the political, 
economic and industrialized cultural forces that constitute society.  Sussman’s, 
Trottier & Fuchs’ and Mosco’s works constitute a strand in the studies of political 
communication known as the critical political economy of communication or 
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media, which consider “political and economic aspects of communications and 
which are critical in regard to their concerns with the manner in which power 
relations are sustained and challenged” (Hardy, 2014, p. 4). The theories are 
adapted to examine how social relations define the use of social media in electoral 
campaigning, and how the political campaign industry contributes to the process 
that mediates the emergence of social media campaigning. Combining these 
theories, this framework offers an analysis of the relational social media 
campaigning, focusing on broader struggles over power, characterised by 
conflicts, fragmentation and alliances accommodated by the relations between the 
electoral players. 
 
2.3.1.  Gramsci’s Theory of Hegemony 
Gramsci understands the state as a complex web of social, economic and political 
relations, which differentiates it from traditional Marxist theory that sees the state 
as the instrument of the ruling class (Bocock, 1986).  Offering a distinct 
perspective on state-society relations, Gramsci (1971) posits that   
''The historical unity of the ruling class is realized in the state, and 
their history is essentially the history of states. But it would be wrong 
to think that this unity is simply juridical and political, the 
fundamental historical unity, concretely, results from the organic 
relations between state or political society and civil society" (p. 52). 
 
Gramsci posits that political society and civil society overlap, as shown in his 
conception of the ‘integrated state’ as a synthesis of both societies. The two 
societies correspond to one another through coercion (political society) and 
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hegemony (civil society). Therefore, Gramsci understands that power is sustained 
not only through coercion but also through hegemony, as both instruments enable 
the ruling class to maintain its rule and its subsequent political and economic 
interests in a system where a small elite from the ruling class exploit and alienate 
other classes that are far bigger in number. 
 
Gramsci suggests that hegemony is mainly employed by the ruling class to gain 
and maintain consent from the ruled.  However, hegemony may also enable the 
working class to lead.  Gramsci’s hegemony acknowledges possible development 
of cross-class alliances, which are mainly temporary in nature.  Most political 
parties, as representations of ruling class interests, commonly form alliances with 
the industrialists or landowners (Gramsci, 1971, p. 155-156).  But it is not 
impossible for political parties to coalesce with the working class or even 
subaltern groups (Green, 2015).  Such a relationship is commonly not stable. 
Gramsci (1971) explained that the instability was due to internal conflicts within 
the groups or the conflicts between the groups (p. 144).  The ruling class, as 
represented by political parties and business, may sacrifice a fraction of its own 
interests over subordinated groups in its strategy to maintain its broader interests. 
Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony is signified by “the process by which 
alliances and coalitions are made and remade: a process that presupposes not 
merely the articulation but, crucially, the aggregation of interests” (Fontana, 2008, 




This idea distances Gramsci’s hegemony from Lenin’s, which inspired his 
analysis.  Lenin highlights his analysis of hegemony mainly as a political 
orientation (Bates, 1975).23  In contrast to Gramsci who presents hegemony as a 
concept that serves “a tool for understanding society in order to change it”, Lenin 
sees hegemony as a strategy for revolution that the working class and its alliances 
have to employ, to gain the support from the majority in their attempts to topple 
the ruling class (Simon, 1982, pp. 25-26).  Lenin argues that such alliances must 
be temporary, to secure the interest of the working class (Shandro, 2014). The 
emphasis, in Lenin’s hegemony, is on the struggle for working class power to gain 
the leadership of the revolutionary party (Shandro, 2014).  Therefore, Lenin’s 
hegemony tend to see the ruling elite as a relatively solid block that is more 
antagonistic to the working class (see Harding, 1983; Shandro, 2014). Gramsci’s 
hegemony, by contrast, is more open to possible contestation within the ruling 
elites and possible coalitions across classes (Simon, 1982). 
 
An important element of Gramsci’s analysis is the role of the political party in 
maintaining hegemony.  Political parties play a crucial role in maintaining 
hegemony, through which the ruling class is able to lead other social classes. As 
Sassoon (1987) notes, “each moment of hegemony represents a certain 
relationship between class forces” (p. 115).  However, a political party is also a 
social group upholding hegemony.   
																																																								
23 Lenin’s hegemony closely links to Plekhanov’s argument (in the context of the pre-Bolshevik 
revolution in Russia) that the working class needs new strategies to topple the deeply-rooted old 
order (Lester, 2000).  These strategies largely involve political activities to create, control and 
maintain the dominant position. 
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Although every party is the expression of a social group, and of one social group 
only, nevertheless in certain given conditions certain parties represent a single 
social group precisely in so far as they exercise a balancing and arbitrating 
function between the interests of their group and those of other groups, and 
succeed in securing the development of the group which they represent with the 
consent and assistance of the allied groups – if not out and out with that of groups 
which are definitely hostile (Gramsci, 1971, p. 148).  Ultimately, a political party 
plays a crucial role in the maintenance of ruling class hegemony. A political party 
can play a leadership role in developing the collective will for the establishment 
of an ethical state, as suggested by Gramsci (1971), 
“Every state is ethical in as much as one of its most important 
functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular 
cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the 
needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the 
interests of the ruling classes” (p. 258). 
  
This description of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony has highlighted class struggle 
as representing not only political activities but also social, intellectual and moral 
activities or superstructural activities.  Thus, hegemony is both centralized (in the 
state) and diffused (across society) through different superstructures, including the 
media.   
 
Media become the sites of the constant readjustment and renegotiation of 
hegemony, particularly as class struggle always involves ideas and knowledge 
(Gitlin, 1980).  In particular, the media accommodate the contestation of ideas 
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within which the ruling class’ interests are maintained.  The media play a central 
role in developing public compliance through texts, linguistic codes and so on 
(Zompetti, 1997). This understanding highlights the importance of the media's 
content in the contestation of hegemony and, particularly, the establishment of the 
ruling class’ central and dominant ideas and views (Carragee, 1993).  
 
This study considers that such an approach, which highlights the meaning of 
media content, explains the partial contribution of media to accommodate the 
maintenance of contestation of hegemony. This dissertation argues that instead of 
textual analysis, hegemony may also be examined through the production of 
media content. Examining the production and distribution of media content can 
clarify power relations within a society (Golding and Murdoch, 1979).  In the 
studies linking media ownership and politics (Baker, 2006; Herman & Chomsky, 
1988; Walgrave, Lefevere, & Nuytemans, 2009), the political forces used the 
mass media to develop and maintain their interests.  Therefore, the maintenance of 
hegemony through the media is not only autonomous from, but also depends 
upon, the economic forces partly because the media are increasingly profit-
oriented. 
 
In the context of the electoral process, such ideas are useful in order to understand 
that media are subject to capture by the political economy elites.  However, 
Gramsci does not explain further how the political economy elites capture the 
media.  Moreover, Gramsci developed his idea of the media’s contribution in the 
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early 1900s; at a time of print and partisan media.  Since then, the nature of the 
media has changed considerably, becoming more complex and commercial, as has 
the media’s contribution to power and the development of hegemony.  Thus, this 
dissertation adopts the critical political economy approach to communication, to 
complement Gramsci. 
 
2.3.2. Critical Political Economy of Communication  
Media are keys for the ruling elites to be able to maintain the support of the ruled.  
In a contemporary electoral environment, characterised by more dynamic and 
unpredictable media and communication development, this section identifies the 
importance of the critical political economy of communication for understanding 
the ways in which media and communication work, specifically to facilitate the 
economic forces (represented by the political campaign industry) to capture social 
media for their interests, and for the interests of the ruling elites. 
 
Sussman (2005) posits that the emergence of the political campaign industry 
suggested “the extension of neoliberal values into political spaces” that facilitated 
“the successful deployment of power”, which “requires not only material security 
but also a degree of political legitimacy sufficient for regime maintenance” (p. 2). 
Furthermore, “[o]rganizing elections becomes a means of consolidating interest 
group power in the policy arena as well as managing the symbolic utilities and 




In the electoral process,  
“Political consultants play a crucial part in state legitimation.  Their 
job is not only to win elections, which is what makes them marketable 
to other politicians and corporate patrons, but also to build public 
interest or at least consent around specific politicians, parties, and 
hegemonic ideas.  The most important of the hegemonic ideas is that 
the electoral process itself is a legitimate means by which citizens 
engage in a meaningful exercise of democratic enfranchisement and 
register their political preferences.” (Sussman, 2005, p. 58). 
 
Based on this understanding, the media and communication technologies play 
central roles in “the struggles between dominant and competing interests in 
society and socioeconomic classes” (p. 2).  Social media are easily turned into the 
tools of the trade of the political campaign industry, due to their capability to 
mediate different interests in society. 
 
Trottier & Fuchs (2015) posit that there are varieties of media, namely public 
service media, commercial media and civil (or alternative) media.24  Drawing 
from the works of Habermas, Arendt and Murdock, both scholars suggest that the 
different types of media cater to different elements in society, consisting of “the 
socio-political, the socio-economic and the socio-cultural spheres”, and link each 
sphere to the organisational forms of the media – including public service media, 
commercial media and civil/alternative media (p. 13).  These forms of media, 
however, are under “a specific political economy of the media realm that allocates 
																																																								
24Trottier and Fuchs’ relational model of media and society was developed to understand activism, 
crimes, protests and policing in the digital era.  However, the model can also explain the 
interaction of social media and power relations in the electoral contexts.	
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resources to different media types to a different degree, generally putting civil-
society media at a disadvantage, and favouring capitalist media organisations” (p. 
13).   
 
Against this backdrop, media play crucial roles in linking citizens and politics. 
The majority of citizens’ experience and knowledge of politics and political 
processes (parliamentary procedure, political campaigns, political scandal) is 
achieved through the media. Conversely, political parties or politicians’ main 
engagement with citizens is also through the media, either mainstream or Internet-
based media like social media.  The use of social media in politics “means that 
political power and influence, especially insofar as citizens are concerned, will 
spread to platforms that feature integrated social roles, all of which can be entirely 
visible to political actors” (Trottier & Fuchs, 2015, p. 27).   
 
Social media’s capability to link the state, the economy and cultural spheres is 
sustained by the social media’s constitutive features of “integrated sociality that 
converged cognition, communication and cooperation… integrated roles that are 
based on the creation of personal profiles that describe the various roles of a 
human beings life… [as well as] integrated and converging communication” (p. 
15).  The relational nature of social media defines the communication process that 
occurs in social media, as shown in Figure 2.1.  This figure visualizes the 





The process of social media communication 
 
Source: Trottier and Fuchs (2015, p. 16).  
 
The combination and network of a multitude of such processes 
resulted in the integration of different forms of sociality and social 
roles on various social media.  This means that there is a myriad of 
possible social functions that any single platform can serve. Individual 
citizens may use it to communicate with other citizens in the context 
of any number of social roles, as well as for purposes that may 
transcend roles.  They may also communicate with organizations and 
institutions for the same purposes.  They may also simply monitor the 
communication in which any of these social actors are engaged.  
Institutions, including branches of the state and the economy, may do 
all of the foregoing as well (Trottier & Fuchs, 2015, p. 16). 
 
In the context of the electoral process, social media’s ability to connect different 
spheres of society parallels electoral campaigning; as a political persuasion effort 
within which the interests of the political players – comprising the politicians 
(candidates), the political parties, the campaign donors and voters – are connected.  
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Social media gain their significance by enabling the practices of targeted political 
campaigns and other kinds of political communication.  Trottier & Fuchs (2015) 
also suggest “[t]he danger that lies in this development in in contemporary neo-
liberal governance regimes tend to commodify everything that politics become 
public relations, advertising and the selling of an idea, a politician and a party as 
brand” (p. 27).  One implication is that the use of social media as a political 
campaign tool results in “political advertising, point-and-click politics without 
real engagement and discussion – a form of pseudo-participation and pseudo-
voice” (p.27).  
 
The practices of political advertising through social media, however, do not occur 
automatically.  On the contrary, they require complex processes, including the 
commodification of electoral campaigning by the political campaign industry that 
was accommodated by social media. The political campaign industry’s persuasion 
takes place in the civil sphere during the electoral campaigns, which connect the 
political, economic and cultural spheres.  The commodification of electoral 
campaigning through social media goes beyond the ideas of commercialisation of 
politics in the electoral process or the professionalisation of campaigning. 
 
Commodification of social media campaigning can be explained through the 
commodification theory, which focuses on the “study of the social relations, 
particularly the power relations, that mutually constitutes the production, 
distribution, and consumption of resources, including communication resources” 
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(Mosco, 2009, p. 2).25  Communication is defined as “more than the transmission 
of data or information; it is the social production of meaning that constitutes a 
relationship” that embodies issues of competition, production and distribution 
pertaining to power relations (p. 6).  
 
In analysing the complex and changing interactions pertaining to communication 
and power relations, Mosco (2009) suggests that commodification of 
communication provides a departure point to understand “processes rather than 
simply to identify relevant institutions” (p. 129). Rooted in the works of Marx, the 
theory of commodification has been used widely in multidisciplinary studies.26 
Commodification is defined as “the process of transforming things valued for 
their use into marketable products that are valued for what they can bring in 
exchange” (Mosco, 2009, p. 127).27  Provdik (2012) considered commodification 
to be the “processes of transforming literally anything into a privatized form of 
(fictitious) commodity that is exchanged in the circulation process” which he 
regarded as of “fundamental importance for the rise and reproduction of 
capitalism” (p. 274). Such a fictitious commodity refers to intangible information, 
																																																								
25 This approach is also known as the political economy of communications (Wasko, 2004, 
Wasko, Murdoch, Sousa 2011); the political economy of information (Garnham 2011, Mosco & 
Wasko 1988); the political economy of mass communication (Garnham, 1990); and the political 
economy of the media (Golding & Murdoch 1997, McChesney 2008). 
26  Marx’s analysis of commodities and alienation became the basis of the studies of 
“commodification”, a terminology that he did not invent himself (Appadurai, 2005).  
27  Mosco specifically emphasised the necessity “to distinguish commodification from 
commercialization and objectification” (2009, p. 132).  The first referred to “a narrower process 
that specifically focuses on the creation of a relationship between an audience and an advertiser 
e.g. commercialisation of the airwaves means the growth of broadcast advertising and the 
development of programming to deliver audiences to advertisers. The latter is understood as “a 
general process that points to the many different ways dehumanization takes place” (p. 133). One 
of the manifestations of such ways is the process of commodification.	
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news or data.  Therefore, commodification is foundational for capitalist social 
relations and its further expansion and reproduction (Wallerstein, 1983). This 
study considers commodification to be a crucial process that assists the political 
campaign industry in mediating the use of social media as campaign tools, mainly 
because it draws broader social relations “into the structural causes of the existing 
capitalist relations in wider society” (Mosco, 2009, p. 129).  
 
Commodification of social media campaigning involves the transformation of 
information into campaign messages; a process that produces marketable services 
valued directly for political advantages as much as they are for financial ones.  In 
a way, it resembles the commodification of advertising.  Advertising is valued for 
its direct financial advantages to advertisers (producers of the advertised products; 
media companies that sell the time and space for advertisement) and indirect 
financial advantages to broader capitalism (producers of other products and 
services) (Jhaly, 1987). While online campaigning provides financial advantages 
(media companies, companies producing campaign material), it is particularly 
valued for its direct political advantages to advertisers (politicians/parties who 
paid for the services).  Both services are constituted by the media industry, which 
connect their audience/readerships to the advertisers through their media products. 
 
However, it should be noted that the social relations that facilitated the use of 
social media for electoral campaigning are, just like any relations in society, never 
stable. Mosco (2009) underlines that the political economy approach “tends to 
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favour the value of extending democracy to all aspects of social life” (p. 4). What 
he means by democracy is not merely the right to participate in government but 
also a system that is characterised by conflicts in economic, social and cultural 
domains. 
 
Therefore, there are two presuppositions about social media use in the electoral 
process, based on the critical political economy of communication.  Firstly, such 
use has occurred within the backdrop of the qualitative transformation of 
capitalism, characterised by the extensive flows of communication and 
information through most social relations (Provdik, 2012).  This study considers 
that commodification of social media today has occurred within capitalism in 
general, instead of just a specific form of capitalism understood (and variously 
characterised) as ‘information society’, ‘informational capitalism’ or the ’digital 
economy’ (Schiller, 2007). Capitalism has always engaged with the 
commodification of communication/information, albeit never to the extent of 
today (Provdik, 2012).  Secondly, the commodification of social media 
campaigning has occurred alongside changes to democracy that has enabled the 
transformation of electoral campaigning practices.  Commodification analysis 
draws social relations into the electoral campaigning process that is situated 







This chapter has situated this study within the literature of media and electoral 
campaigning.  It has contrasted approaches to the Internet/social media and 
electoral campaigning from the perspectives of the pluralist, the constructivist and 
the structuralist.  It has explained that the structuralist perspective provides a 
valuable point of departure to link social media use in election campaigns and 
political structures.  However, the structuralist approach needs to be expanded to 
explain social media campaigning within the broader power relations in an 
election setting. 
 
Therefore, this chapter proposes a conceptual framework to capture the power 
relations of Indonesian electoral players using social media for electoral 
campaigning.  Using insights from Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and critical 
political economy, this framework explores social media campaigning’s 
connection to broader struggles over power involving civil society and the 
(political and economy) elite. This framework, thus, avoids an examination of 
social media campaigning that reduces it to morality for example whether the 
industry or the media technology contributes to or decreases democratic values.  
 
This framework can be employed to analyse social media and media campaigning 
in any political setting.  The basic assumption of this framework is that any 
change in one electoral player causes changes in the actor’s relations to the other 
players, who try to adapt to the new conditions by redefining their relational 
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strategies to maintain their interests.  In addition, the broader environment in 
which these relations operate is not immune to changes, which can be triggered by 
political, economic and social developments or the emergence of new 
communications technologies such as the Internet and social media. To further 
demonstrate the framework, in subsequent chapters this dissertation proceeds with 





















Tracing the Origins of Social Media Campaigning 
 
3.1. Introduction  
This chapter analyses the transformation of electoral campaigning practices since 
the 1955 election, the first national election after Indonesian independence.  It is 
argued that, while contributing to new practices and approaches in electoral 
campaigning, the use of social media in post-authoritarian elections is a 
continuation of on-going practices of political persuasion that have been shaped 
by the fluctuating relations between the electoral actors.  In other words, social 
media campaigning is not technology-driven or independent of political, 
economic and social developments in the country.  Instead, the use of social 
media for electoral campaigning is part of a complex process that shapes and is 
shaped by relations involving the candidates, political parties, campaign donors 
and voters.  
 
Scholarly works on electoral campaigning in Indonesia identify changes and 
continuity in electoral campaigning practices following the emergence of the 
Internet in Indonesia. Most such studies tend to interpret online campaigning as a 
technology-driven change (Suaedy, 2014).  Since the early use of the Internet for 
political campaigning in Indonesia, studies on this subject have mainly focused on 
the impacts of the new media technology upon democracy (Ahmad & Popa, 2014; 
Alford, 2014; Hameed, 2007; Nurhadryani et al., 2009).  Despite the limited use 
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of the Internet for political campaigning in the early post-New Order elections, 
some scholars suggested the potential of the new technology in Indonesian 
electoral politics (Hill & Sen, 2000; Hill & Sen, 2005; Nurhadryani et al, 2009). 
Increasingly, more recent studies embarked from the premise that the Internet is a 
‘democratic innovation’ enabling self-actualized networking and interactions to 
generate political participation in Indonesia elections (Murti, 2013). 
 
Those studies appear to be fixated by the emerging prominence of the Internet in 
electoral campaigning, particularly after the implementation of direct presidential 
campaigning in 2004.  As a consequence, they have neglected the fact that the use 
of the Internet – and subsequent Internet-based media – in Indonesian electoral 
campaigns never occurs in a social vacuum.  There is no doubt that post-
authoritarian political transformations have contributed to some significant 
changes in electoral campaigning practices. However, post-authoritarian dynamics 
in both the economic and cultural spheres were no less significant in facilitating 
online electoral campaigning practices.    
 
Since this chapter aims to trace the origins of social media campaigning in 
Indonesia, it examines the transformation of media campaigning in three periods: 
the President Sukarno period, the President Suharto period and the post-
authoritarian period.  Media campaigning practices in these periods are discussed 
in three sections. The first section analyses the media campaigning practices in the 
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1955 election. 28  The second section elaborates on the media campaigning 
practices under the rule of President Suharto, and the third section explores the 
development of the electoral campaigning practices in contemporary Indonesia.  
Each section focuses on the use of particular media (outdoor media and mass, 
mainly print, media in the Sukarno period; both print and broadcasting media in 
the Suharto period; and mass media and the Internet-based media in post-Suharto 
period) and the contribution of the political campaign industry in media 
campaigning operations. The discussions also examine the relations between 
politicians, political parties, donors and voters that facilitated the use of media for 
campaigning. 
 
3.2. The President Sukarno Period 
The 1955 general elections were characterised by electoral campaigning under the 
control of political parties and with limited reach from mass media.  The 
combination of both these characteristics resulted in the use of canvassing as a 
main mode of electoral campaigning, which remained reliant on the patronage of 
local political economy elites to mobilise voters at the grass roots.  In this respect, 
media campaigning signified a second-tier mode of electoral campaigning. 
 
However, while some studies suggested that there was no involvement from the 
political campaign industry in the 1955 election (Ufen, 2010b), evidence indicates 
that the communication industry, seen as an integral part of the political campaign 
																																																								
28 Sukarno became a president when Indonesia declared its independence from the Dutch in 1945. 




industry, was visible, albeit to a very limited degree. In fact, the 1955 election saw 
the emergence of the communication industry in electoral campaigning.  Media 
enabled the political campaign industry to profit from the business opportunities 
associated with electoral campaigning. However, the extent of the industry’s work 
was limited to managing technical aspects of the political persuasion through print 
and outdoor media for the political parties and politicians.   
 
Figure 3.1. 
Example of campaign advertisements 
 
 
Source: Majalah Hikmah and Harian Rakyat as quoted by Triyana (2015). 
 
The campaign advertisements, published in newspapers and displayed outdoors, 
(with examples shown in Figure 3.1) suggested the engagement of the 
communication industry (most notably involving advertising and printing) in the 
1955 electoral campaigns. The political parties benefitted from technical 
assistance from the industry to optimise their political persuasion (Feith, 1957), as 
the following discussion illustrates.  
	
	 81	
3.2.1.  The Electoral Campaigns and Players 
The 1955 general election was the only nation-wide election held during the 
presidency of Sukarno, prior to his ousting after 1965. The plan to hold a nation-
wide direct election for the parliament and the Constituent Assembly 
(Konstituante) was partly triggered by internal political conflicts involving the 
parliament and the government (see Legge, 2003). The form of liberal democracy 
adopted by Indonesia was a multiparty political system, but resulted in a lack of 
parliamentary majority, leading to the formation of a series of weak coalitions of 
parties (Feith, 1957, pp. 1-5). Between 1945-1959, the country was ruled by 17 
cabinets.  Such political instability impaired the economy, which was still 
struggling after independence (see Cribb & Brown, 1995; Ricklefs, 1993). 
 
Under such conditions, the first parliamentary elections attracted more than 39 
million Indonesians, representing 91.5 percent of registered voters (Ricklefs, 
1993; Temple, 2001). There were 172 participants, consisting of political parties, 
social organisations and individuals, of whom 28 gained seats in the parliament 










Result of the 1955 parliamentary election  
 
 
Source:  Ricklefs (1993)  
 
The political contestation involved not only political parties but also individual 
contestants.  Political parties won the majority of seats, suggesting their superior 
economic resources and political networks compared to non-party individual 
contestants or social organizations.  
 
To finance party organisation and electoral campaigning, political parties were 
dependent on the donations of their members and sympathizers (Feith, 1957, p. 
Participants Votes Seats 
PNI 8,434,653 57 
Masyumi 7,903,886 57 
NU 6,955,141 45 
PKI 6,179,914 39 
PSII 1,091,160 8 
Parkindo 1,003,326 8 
Partai Katolik 770,740 6 
PSI 753,191 5 
IPKI 541,306 4 
Perti 483,014 4 
PRN 242.125 2 
Partai Buruh 224.167 2 
GPPS 219.985 2 
PRI 206.161 2 
P3RI 200.419 2 
Murba 199.588 2 
Baperki 178.887 1 
PIR Wongsonegoro 178.481 1 
Grinda 154.792 1 
Permai 149.287 1 
PD 146.054 1 
PIR Hazairin 114.644 1 
PPTI 85. 85.131 1 
AKUI 81.454 1 
PRD 77.919 1 
PRIM 72.523 1 
Acoma 64.514 1 
R.Soedjono Prawirisoedarso 53.306 1 
Lain-lain 1.022.433 1 
Total 37.785.299 257 
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27).  The two richest political parties were PKI and Masyumi.  In addition to 
raising party funds partly from its members, Feith (1957) also suggested that the 
PKI gained donations from “individual Chinese businessmen resident in 
Indonesia, and very possibly also from overseas Communist governments through 
their consular and business representatives in Djakarta” (p. 27).  In the case of 
Masyumi, he considered that “it is probable that the greatest part of the party’s 
funds came in large donations from the land-owners, rubber growers and batik 
manufacturers who supported by party” (1957, p. 27).  Other parties such as NU 
also relied on donations from local businesspeople.  Despite the legitimate sources 
of political parties’ finances, party campaigns were also supported by illegitimate 
sources. “As to the sources of the parties’ finances, it is a fact that ministerially 
sanctioned corruption for party campaign funds came to be practiced on a large 
scale in the period of the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet” (p. 27).  One party that 
received such funding was the PNI, which held the finance and economic affairs 
portfolios and the prime ministership at the time.  In addition, the PNI also gained 
financial contributions from “city business interests, Indonesian and Chinese” (p. 
26). 
 
3.2.2. The Political Campaign Industry and the Media 
With stronger political machinery and access to political economy resources, 
political parties were able to control the operations of electoral campaigning.  
Canvassing was the main mode of electoral campaigning, reflecting the powerful 
position of the political parties in organising electoral campaigning 
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(Poesponegoro (2010)29.  Such organisation involved not only campaigning 
operations, but more importantly, the relations between political parties and 
politicians, campaign donors and voters.  
 
In term of mobilising voters, for example, political parties’ strong machinery 
enabled them to deploy their members who were respected in their villages or 
communities to engage in canvassing. Such figures included village leaders, 
religious leaders, landlords, and other patrons based on ethnicity or kinship.  The 
strategy was effective in attracting voters in villages or subdistrict level 
(kecamatan), through a process that required party members to engage directly in 
smaller face-to-face meetings with the villagers.  It also showed a closer bond 
between political parties and the electorates, characterised by strong party 
identification (Feith, 1957). 
 
Canvassing was appropriate not only to attract the attention of voters in the first 
ever election in Indonesia, but also to educate them about the political parties and 
how to cast their votes in the elections.  Therefore, most of the electoral 
campaigning effort was directed at popularising political parties and their 
platforms, rather than issues or ideologies (Feith, 1957).  The scholar found that 
“…a great deal of campaigning concerned itself not with issue-type 
appeals at all but with the things which a party said about itself, 
particularly about its history, its leaders and its ballot-paper symbol...In 
																																																								
29 Villagers were required to spend time and energy to attend the meetings, commonly held in 
areas outside their villages. If they attended mass rallies, their attendance might be motivated by 
social appeals, such as to meet other people, rather than political ones e.g. discussing or getting 
information about electoral politics. 
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appeals concerning individual party leaders the emphasis was also 
frequently on their record as nationalists.  But other attributes were 
also stressed, in particular honesty, expertise, the firm and radical 
approach, and the quality of a bapak (literally, father) who is disegani 
(held in awe) and has a mystical understanding of the people from 
above, or, in some Communist appeals, the quality of being a saudara 
(brother) and kawan (friend) who understands the people from their 
own level” (Feith, 1957, p. 17).  
 
As electoral campaigning was dedicated to popularising political parties, their 
platforms and how to vote, issues pertaining to Jakarta or national politics were 
not considered appealing to the majority of voters, who mainly resided in the 
regions. Direct interaction with the grass roots constituency enabled political 
parties, through their membership, to persuade villagers using communication 
techniques that were familiar.  For example, political parties “naturally considered 
popular legend and belief, and then, realizing the great importance of symbols as 
means of creating effective ties to the party, they each elaborated allegorical 
interpretations of them, attractive in terms of a national or regional cultural 
pattern” (1957, p. 17).   
 
Under this party-controlled campaigning, media campaigning was of secondary 
significance. Mass media, mainly outdoor media and to a lesser extent print and 
broadcast media, served as a medium of campaigning in this period.  The limited 
reach of mass media across the nation was a main reason for the limited use of 
mass media during electoral campaigning.  The combined circulation of 
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newspapers nation-wide only reached 821,000 (Feith, 1957, p. 18), and there were 
only about half a million licensed radio sets in the mid 1950s, although radio 
broadcasts were extensively used for political education (Feith, 1957, p. 24).  In 
this period, the press were largely partisan (Sen & Hill, 2000, p. 82), but 
contributed to electoral campaigning both through news coverage and 
advertisements (Dhakidae, 1991; Hill, 1994). 
 
This relatively limited reach of mass media had implications for voter 
mobilisation.  Rather than radio or print media, it was outdoor media, such as 
wooden or tin billboards, cloth banners, paper pamphlets and flyers, which played 
the more prominent role in electoral campaigning.  These outdoor media were 
used by political parties to introduce party symbols to voters.  Such media 
campaigning was not inexpensive.  It required political parties to employ the 
services of the media industry to conduct such media campaigning. The 
advertising and printing sectors, which this dissertation considers to be an element 
of the political campaign industry, contributed extensively to the production of 
such expensive campaign material, under the full authority of political parties 
(Feith, 1957). 
 
Unsurprisingly, only big parties like Masyumi and PKI were able to spend 
‘extremely large sums’ from campaign funds on the production and distribution of 
iron-sheet billboards (Feith, 1957, p. 27).  In addition, Masyumi also produced 
election films to be screened during mass campaigns. Political parties with 
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smaller campaign funds could not afford to produce films, so relied on more 
affordable paper pamphlets or flyers.30  
 
Based on the description of Feith (1957), it may be surmised that media 
campaigning was already present in this period.  It indicated the emergence of the 
political campaign industry, which was able to profit during the electoral 
campaign period.  The profit-making could be assumed through, among other 
thing, the advertising companies’ work in managing the technical media aspects 
of political persuasion, mainly using outdoor media.  In the 1950s, the 
rudimentary nature of electoral campaigning, which was centralized in the 
political parties, and the limited reach of mass media left few opportunities for the 
industry to employ media more strategically.  
 
The emergence of the political campaign industry in this period stalled shortly 
after the 1955 elections.  There were no further opportunities for the industry to 
develop such business following Sukarno’s decision to end parliamentary 
democracy in 1957. The political campaign industry would only reappear in a 





30 In addition to media campaigning, campaign funds were also allocated for various campaigning 
activities, including mass rallies, community activities such as film screening in the villages, 
carnivals or community feasts, travel for party leadership, and printing of pamphlets and papers to 
conduct practice voting in the villages (Feith, 1957). 
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3.3. The President Suharto Period 
In contrast to political party-controlled electoral campaigning, this section 
illustrates the operation of media campaigning during a period of tight 
government control; during more than 30 years of the Suharto government’s rule 
and the proliferation of mass media.  Both centralised political control and 
national media proliferation contributed to the electoral contradictions that 
facilitated the expansion of the political campaign industry into media 
campaigning.   
 
The military-backed Suharto government used coercion and fear as a means by 
which to consolidate power.  However, being a democracy, the government 
organised regular elections, albeit highly stage-managed, in order to given the 
appearance of public support for its legitimacy. While the New Order 
authoritarian government did not shun dishonest measures in such a highly 
controlled electoral system to ensure its victories, it provided spaces – albeit 
highly limited and not completely free from oppression – for the people to 
participate in elections; and to gain the notional consent of the people. 31  
Therefore, the New Order government’s acceptance of the involvement of the 
political campaign industry during this period, and the employment of various 
strategies in the operation of media campaigning, indicated the necessity of the 
authoritarian government to build and maintain its legitimacy.  
 
																																																								
31 The concept of consent in Gramsci’s hegemony involves a condition where people are willingly, 
or happily, support the ruling class (see Simon, 1982). 
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The necessity of the authoritarian government to balance the tight control over 
electoral campaigning with the need to gain perceived consent from the people 
created an environment that was more receptive to commercial business 
involvement in political campaigns. This supports this dissertation’s argument 
that the media was not the primary driving force behind the transformation of 
electoral campaigning.  While mass media were increasingly employed for 
electoral campaigning, it was the re-configuration of the relations between the 
electoral players that stimulated the political campaign industry to expand its 
business in the evolving electoral process.  
 
The success of the Suharto government’s strategies to employ persuasion in 
addition to coercion can be assessed from the consecutive victories of the ruling 
party, Golkar, in the 1971 election and all five subsequent elections (see Table 
3.2. and 3.3.)32  The massive victories of Golkar in these six New Order elections 
illustrated the Suharto government’s persistent strategy to use these elections to 
build and maintain its (appearance of) legitimacy to further consolidate power, 












32 The Suharto government used Golkar, an initiative of the Army, to balance the influence of PKI 




Result of the 1971 elections 
 
Participants Votes Seats 
Partai Katolik Indonesia       603,740 3 
PSII   1,308,237 10 
NU 10,213,650 58 
Parmusi   2,930,746 24 
Golkar 34,348,673 227 
Parkindo      733,359 7 
Murba 48,126 - 
PNI   3,793,266 20 
Perti      381,309 2 
IPKI 338.403 - 




Result of the 1977 to 1997 elections 
 
Parties 
1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 
Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
PPP 18.743.491  99 48.334.724 94 13.701.428 61 16.624.647 62 84.187.907 11 
PDI 5.504.757  29 5.919.702 24 9.384.708 40 14.565.556 56 25.340.028 89 
Golkar 39.750.096  232 20.871.880 242 62.783.680 299 66.599.331 282 3.463.225 325 
Total 63.998.344 360 75.126.306 364 85.869.816 400 97.789.534 400 112.991.150 425 
Source: Puspoyo, Swantoro, and Suksmantri (2012). 
 
3.3.1. The Electoral Campaigns and Players 
This section demonstrates the nature of the election in relation to the interplay 
between the state and political parties, and between parties and campaign donors 
and voters under the New Order government.  While taking power slowly from 
Sukarno after 1965, Suharto began the de-construction of the political parties.  
The PKI had been known for its powerful machinery, progressive programs and 
determined canvassing approaches in mobilising voters, particularly peasants and 
those in other poor areas, in the 1955 elections (Anderson & McVey, 1971; Feith, 
1957; Utrecht, 1974).  Therefore, the Suharto regime effectively banned the PKI 
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not only from running in elections but wiped out its organisational structure and 
its membership across Indonesia, to eliminate the regime’s most possible political 
opposition.   
 
In addition, in the 1971 election the Suharto government also considerably 
reduced the number of political parties and social organisations that were allowed 
to participate in the elections. This strategy was aimed at controlling political 
parties and possible political opposition to the Suharto government.  In contrast to 
the 172 parties and organisations that had contested the 1955 election, in 1971 
only 10 political parties, including the pro-Suharto Golkar party, participated in 
the election.  Most of these parties were set up during Sukarno’s presidency.33 The 
Suharto government used Golkar, a 1964 initiative of the Army intended to 
counter the influence of PKI, as its political vehicle (see, among others,   Reeve, 
1985; Temple, 2001). 
 
Two years after the 1971 election, the New Order government increased its 
control over the political parties by, among other things, reducing the number of 
parties from 10 to three. While Golkar remained largely unaltered, the 
government forced Islamic-based political parties to fuse into PPP, and other 
religious-based parties and nationalist-based parties to merge into PDI in 1973.  
These amalgamations reflected the New Order’s strategy to control any possible 
opposition that might jeopardize its power (Ricklefs, 1993).  Neither PPP nor PDI 
																																																								
33 Sukarno reduced the number of political parties from 25 to 10 in 1960. Suharto effectively 
banned the PKI from Indonesia in 1965. 
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were permitted to develop branches at lower level administrative units 
(subdistricts or kecamatan and villages) where the grass roots membership 
resided.  Party-political activities were only permitted at these grass roots levels 
during the official election period that lasted for two months.  In 1985, both PPP 
and PDIP were forced to accept the Pancasila as their sole ideology, a further 
move by the New Order to control possible political opposition. 
 
Golkar became the strongest party under the New Order, politically and 
economically.  Bouyed by oil-fuelled economic growth, Golkar’s party funds 
derived from a combination of state funds (through embezzlements and corruption 
in government agencies such as the state oil company, Pertamina) as well as 
donations from the regime’s cronies (King, 1992; Nishihara, 1972).34  Under the 
New Order, large corporate financiers played key roles in funding political 
parties, the bureaucracy and the military in their bid to secure access to resources 
(King, 2000; Nishihara, 1972; Tomsa, 2008b).  The regime’s main cronies 
included Chinese Indonesian conglomerates (King, 2000).35   
 
In the context of electoral campaigns, in comparison to Golkar, other political 
parties had far less access to resources and so had far more limited party funds; 
although the government officially provided campaign subsidies in the form of 
“Rp 10 million, two jeeps and other minor materials” in the 1971 elections 
																																																								
34 The New Order regime was thought to have recorded remarkable economic performances, 
including the rise of GDP per capita to more than fourfold previous levels, a decline in the poverty 
rate, and other welfare indicators, such as a decline in infant mortality rates (Booth, 2000).   
35 Chinese Indonesians were not allowed to engage in politics.  These conglomerates were 
nurtured by the regime mainly to serve as its economic coffers (Liddle, 1992). 
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(Nishihara, 1972, p. 34).  Golkar’s campaign funds were mainly sourced from the 
Home Affairs Department, the General Election Institute, and the Defence and 
Security Department; as well as a “private contribution from” Lt. Gen. Ibu 
Sutomo, president director of the state oil company Pertamina, and “foreign 
companies operating in Indonesia” (p. 33-34).  Some political parties required 
their members to contribute financially to their electoral campaigns (Subekti, 
2014, p. 68), while others sought campaign donations from business interests in 
places like Tokyo, New York and Bonn due to slim domestic resources 
(Nishihara, 1972, p. 34).  In addition to the government campaign subsidies, PPP 
and PDI were only able (and allowed) to secure party and campaign funds from 
their membership and sympathizers, some of whom owned small to medium sized 
businesses. 
 
In developing Golkar and to win the elections, the government combined both 
coercive and persuasion approaches to mobilise voters. All government 
bureaucrats were compelled to become Golkar members; and to vote for the party 
to ensure its victory against nine other political parties in the first New Order 
election in 1971, and two other political parties in later elections (Nishihara, 1972; 
Reeve, 1985).  This strategy was useful to mobilise a core of voters, who were in 
turn then able to mobilise more voters in the villages. This persuasive strategy 
was enhanced by the fact that government bureaucrats usually assumed positions 




The New Order government also engaged the military to intimidate its political 
opponents and their supporters.  Since the 1971 election, for example, the military 
played ‘dirty tricks’ to ensure a Golkar victory.  Nishihara (1972) observed 
several tactics employed by the military. These included: the arrest of a Parmusi 
Central Java chairman Mintaredja over his alleged involvement in an arms 
smuggling case; the search of PNI leaders in Wonogiri on similarly dubious 
charges; the arrest of prominent NU leader Achmad Sjaichu for alleged 
involvement in the 1965 communist upheaval; the obstruction of party campaign 
rallies by Golkar and the military through such means as blocking roads and 
destroying bridges leading to rally sites; as well as prohibiting PNI campaigning 
by Guntur and Rachmawati Sukarno, due to an allegation of possible agitation for 
Sukarnoism (p. 36).36  
 
Voters were also subjected to intimidation by, among other things, the labelling 
those who did not vote for Golkar as PKI supporters, which made them subject to 
possible torture or harassment such as dismissal from government employment 
(Nishihara, 1972).  In addition, Golkar also introduced the system of “Bebas 
Parpol” (literally meaning “freed from political parties”), under which the 
military forced voters in the villages to declare their support for Golkar and desire 
to block other parties from campaigning there (Utrecht, 1974).  The scholar 
concluded that 
																																																								
36 Nishihara (1972) noted that the military pressure and intimidation during the elections indicated 
the Suharto’s government’s intense concern for political order and national consensus (p. 56). 
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“In many villages the Bebas Parpol system could work very well owing to 
strong patron-client relationships.  After Golkar functionaries had succeeded 
in winning over the village authorities and landowners to side with Golkar it 
was not difficult to obtain the support of the rest of the inhabitants of the 
villages... It was the economic dependence on landowners and village 
authorities, who themselves were dependent on facilities granted to them by 
the Golkar functionaries, that made the small farmers – for the greater part 
poor sharecroppers – vote for Golkar” (Utrecht, 1974, p. 85). 
 
3.3.2. The Political Campaign Industry and the Media 
The growing distance between the political parties and the electorates shaped the 
ways in which the political parties engaged with voters in the electoral campaign 
periods. To attract voters to shore up its electoral legitimacy, Golkar introduced a 
new mode of electoral campaigning that was very different from the canvassing in 
the 1955 election.  This new mode of electoral campaigning was characterised by 
very expensive parades across the nation, presenting entertaining performances to 
mobilise voters (Lindsay, 2007; Nishihara, 1972). Golkar also developed mass 
rallies in the form of motorized street parades (pawai) of party supporters during 
the two-month campaign period.  These became known as safari, and were, as 
Nishihara (1972) observed, “a strange, un-Indonesian campaign tactic” (p. 37).37  
The orchestrated campaigning events on the streets (parades) and public spaces 
(mass campaign), which became a hallmark of elections under Suharto, were a 
stark contrast to the canvassing strategy used in the 1955 election.  
 
																																																								
37 Traces of the personalisation of politics appeared in the New Order elections, as indicated by 
Golkar’s conscious efforts to nominate popular candidates to mobilise voters (King, 2000). 
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The New Order regime turned elections into what it dubbed a ‘festival of 
democracy’ (pesta demokrasi) instead of a democratic means of power re-
generation.38  Consequently, electoral campaigning was not aimed at educating or 
persuading voters, particularly at the grass roots, to vote for political parties’ 
programs and ideology.  Instead the New Order designed electoral campaigning as 
popular events to entertain people with little beyond that, because the winner of 
the election had already been determined (1972, p. 37). In addition, Golkar 
introduced another expensive campaigning technique, in the form of the 
distribution of free shirts with the Golkar symbol printed on them (King, 1992; 
Lindsay, 2007; Nishihara, 1972).  Golkar also produced the largest amount of 
campaign material, including posters, leaflets, slides, slogans and brochures.  All 
media campaign material, whether in the form of printed materials, outdoor media 
or conventional mass media, was subject to state censorship.  In one incident in 
1977, the popular dangdut singer with millions of fans across Indonesia, Rhoma 
Irama, who was a campaigner for PPP, was banned from performing on state 
television station TVRI (Nishihara, 1972).39 
 
Such ‘street-appeal’, mass campaigning strategies, under the heavy control of the 
government, turned out to be more receptive to the work of the political campaign 
industry.  Organising hundreds of musicians, comedians and performers, 
																																																								
38  The terminology was introduced by PDI Secretary-General Sabam Sirait during a mass 
campaign in Jakarta in 1977, in his satirical speech to protest against state-sponsored intimidation 
and coercion towards Golkar opponents. 
39 Rhoma Irama is often dubbed the king of dangdut. Dangdut is a music genre that attracted 
millions of fans in Indonesia.  Capitalising on their popularity, some popular dangdut singers 
joined political parties. On this music genre and its social aspects, see Weintraub (2010); Hill & 
Sen (2000); Frederick (1982). 
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including high profile ones, and transporting them in a tour across the country to 
support electoral campaigns required technical support from the media industry, 
because the political parties lacked such skills (Lindsay, 2007).  Increasingly, 
advertising and public relations experts were employed to support electoral 
campaigning.  For example, senior Golkar member and environment minister 
Emil Salim engaged a team of Jakarta-based advertising and public relations 
professionals to support Golkar campaigning in the province of Riau (Danial, 
2009).  Emil was on a specific Golkar mission to improve the votes for the party 
in Riau in 1981 following the decrease of Golkar’s votes from 76.7  percent in 
1971 election to 63.3 percent in the 1977 election there (p. 121).  Two notable 
communication professionals, Alwi Dahlan and Wisaksono Noeradi, were in the 
Golkar electioneering team, developing a research-based public relations 
campaign for the local audience.40   The team suggested Emil not use the top-
down strategy employed by Golkar’s local campaign organisation, which 
consisted of local military officials and bureaucrats.  The professionally-directed 
campaign was considered a success, as the Jakarta-based Emil Salim was able to 
impress Riau voters with his understanding of local circumstances and issues, 
which he addressed in his campaign (Danial, 2009).  
 
																																																								
40 Dahlan, the son of a regent in Padang, set up the first recorded public relations firm in Indonesia 
PT Iscore Zecha, in 1972. He holds a PhD in communication science from the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA.  Dahlan briefly served as a minister of communication in the 
Suharto Cabinet in 1998, before he returned to lecture at the University of Indonesia’s 
communication department, where he gained his professorship.  Wisaksono was the public 
relations manager of Stanvac oil company in Indonesia in the 1970s, and later co-founded a public 
relations firm, Matari advertising company. He was also the founder of the Public Relations 
Association  of Indonesia (Perhumas). 
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The involvement of the campaign professionals in Golkar’s campaign team was 
not autonomous from the development of the communication industries in 
Indonesia.  The establishment of the communication industries, mainly the public 
relation industry, was closely linked to the economic development of various 
sectors under the New Order government, most prominently the extractive or 
natural resources sectors.41  The establishment of foreign companies, particularly 
oil and mining companies, nurtured not only the practices of the public relations 
and advertising but, more importantly, the public relations and advertising 
business (Yudarwati, 2011, 2014).  Both Dahlan and Wisaksono were among the 
first Indonesian communication professionals to establish public relations firms in 
Indonesia. Their involvement in Golkar’s campaign team indicated the business 
expansion of the public relations industry beyond the commercial domain. 
 
As shown above, the increasing involvement of professional communication and 
media specialists in electoral campaigning operations was not particularly driven 
by media technology. Television, a new media technology that increasingly 
expanded its audience, and print mass media were highly restricted during 
electoral campaigning.  In the first five New Order elections, politicians 
representing their parties were allowed to campaign through state television TVRI 
in a highly controlled manner (Danial, 2009). TVRI primarily served Golkar’s 
interests, but was also required to broadcast ‘campaign dialogues’ (kampanye 
																																																								
41 In the 1950s, public relations departments were established at state oil company Pertamina, state 
airline company Garuda Indonesia, and the National Police headquarters. The practice became so 
common in the 1960s – as more state institutions and enterprises (in addition to private 
enterprises) established public relations departments – that the government set up a coordinating 
body for state public relations practices (King, 1992; Nishihara, 1972). 
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dialogis) presenting politicians from Golkar, PPP and PDI.  This form of 
campaigning aspired to copy televised public debates commonly employed in 
Western democracies, but instead such dialogue campaigning lacked any debate.42 
Private television stations, which started to develop in 1987, were also obliged to 
air such campaigning in their prime-time.43  Golkar played a leading role in 
engaging the political campaign industry to support televised electoral 
campaigning, by employing communication and public relations professionals to 
train its politicians before they went on-air for these campaign appearances (Sen, 
2003).   
 
While the government imposed heavy restrictions on the mass media in relation to 
the publication of political and electoral content (Hill & Sen, 2005), the use of 
mass media for electoral campaigning expanded.  This was triggered partly by the 
increasing development of telecommunications and media industrialisation in the 
1980s.  Following the opening up of the television industry to commercial stations 
in 1987, and through to the end of the regime in 1998, there were four private 
national television stations – RCTI, SCTV, TPI, ANTV and INDOSIAR all 
owned by Suharto’s family or cronies – in addition to the state television company 
																																																								
42 This televised dialogue campaigning was so notoriously engineered that it failed to attract an 
audience.  The run down of the televised campaign had been screened by the regime. The regime 
was also involved in the selection of the studio audience (who were allowed to question the 
politicians) and the questions to be asked (Danial, 2009).  
43 Television station management had requested a delay in relaying the campaigning from TVRI 
during prime-time, as it clashed with their high-value programs that attracted commercials 
(Dhakidae, 1991; Hill, 1994). 
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TVRI.  The emergence of these private stations offered alternative information to 
the heavily controlled propaganda broadcast by TVRI.44    
 
Private radio stations were also regulated by the Suharto government through the 
establishment of PRSSNI in 1974, which increased its members from 227 in 1974 
to 717 in 1997 (PRSSNI, 2016).45  Radio had the ability to deliver up-to-date 
information rapidly, as well as interactively through caller participation (Sudibyo 
et al., 2004). Local radio stations fostered interactive communication with their 
listeners, enabling them to express their ideas, sometimes critically, on live 
programs, although such practices were limited to the local level (Jurriëns, 2009; 
Sen, 2003).  Radio’s archipelagic audience reach was larger than print media, but 
it was highly localized, which limited its impact upon national politics. 
 
Being heavily regulated by the New Order, newspapers’ content was so restricted 
“that the Indonesian press did little to influence the floating voters and thus the 
end result of the 1971 elections” (Oey, 1974, p. 33).  Throughout the New Order 
period, newspapers were subject to government regulation.  While some news 
media outlets were able to resist such control through various strategies such as 
investigative journalism (Steele, 2005) or political caricatures/cartoons (Sibarani, 
																																																								
44 Similar to TVRI, state radio RRI channelled government propaganda through programs that 
were relayed compulsorily via local private radio stations across the country. 
45 PRSSNI was the commercial private national radio broadcasters’ association.  The government 
required the association to “help the government in supervising and overseeing commercial 
national broadcasters” in Indonesia (Sudibyo, Andre, Aminuddin, & Simbollah, 2004, p. 216).  
The association was chaired by Suharto’s eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, since 1989; to 
ensure the association’s support to the government.  She stepped down from the position in 1998, 
after the end of his father’s presidency. 
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2001), political campaign advertisements were not allowed in any of these mass 
media.  
 
The real trigger that shifted the emphasis during electoral campaigning to media 
campaigning was an internal PDI conflict, which was orchestrated by the regime 
in 1996 and which resulted in a major riot (Heryanto, 1997; Hill, 1994). 
Following that unrest on the streets, the government issued a regulation, endorsing 
the use of media campaigning and limiting the use of street campaigning (Danial, 
2009). The military had considered endorsing media campaigning since the 
1980s, when street campaigning had led to civil disturbances and clashes which 
were regarded as potentially threatening political, economic and security stability 
(Danial, 2009).  The violence and riots that occurred during such street campaigns 
were seen as a threat to the New Order government. Since 1982, the public 
violence had gradually intensified during election campaigns, in response to the 
government’s tightening of economic policy following a fall in the oil price, and 
consequent increases in the domestic price of oil and electricity (Danial, 2009; 
Hill, 1994; King, 1992). The military’s physical presence became a common sight 
during these elections. Civil opposition occurred in the form of public protests, 
rallies or even violence and riots, although most such incidents were not reported 
in the highly censored press (Dhakidae, 2003).  
 
This, however, did not mean that the political parties gained more freedom in 
using mass media for electoral campaigning.  Hill and Sen (2005) noted that 
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“radio, television, and print media were circumscribed by protocol dictated by the 
Minister of Information” (p. 79).  The parties were allocated particular time slots 
for campaigning through the broadcast media.  Their campaign materials had to 
be screened by the government prior to the broadcasting of the taped campaign 
programs.  
 
The Internet, which was still in infancy with limited infrastructure and access to 
users, escaped such restriction.  However, in the 1997 election, which was the last 
election held under the New Order in 1997, PPP, PDI and Golkar set up official 
websites for political communication (Danial, 2009). Some scholars suggested 
that the impact of the Internet on electoral campaigning, particularly for PPP and 
PDI, remained marginal, although it contributed to the de-legitimation of the New 
Order and the elections (Hill & Sen, 2005).  Regardless, such incorporation of the 
Internet was foundational for the transformation of media campaigning operations 
in the post-authoritarian elections. 
 
These evolving electoral campaigning practices under the New Order government 
showed that media was not the driving force changing electoral campaigning 
methods. As a consequence of New Order government control over the electoral 
campaigns, media campaigning was used mainly for persuasion purposes.  Its 
capability to negotiate interests pertaining to electoral players was not yet evident. 
However, contradictions – such as the government’s highly centralized media 
campaigning and the relaxation of government control over the 
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telecommunication and media sectors, which was transferred to Suharto family 
members and cronies – provided more opportunities for the political campaign 
industry to develop further commercial businesses involved in political 
campaigning. 
 
3.4. The Post-authoritarian Period  
This section will illustrate that, during the post-Suharto period when Indonesia 
experienced the proliferation of a liberalized mass media, political parties again 
controlled electoral campaigning, but in a different way than that under the 
Sukarno period. Such characteristics shaped the operation of media campaigning, 
which saw the rise of the political campaign industry and the increasing use of 
media in the electoral process. 
 
3.4.1. The Electoral Campaigns and Players  
Major post-authoritarian political transformation brought back the elections as a 
mechanism of power re-generation and, once again, it was the political parties, 
instead of the state or the government, which controlled their electoral campaigns. 
Participating in the 1999 election, the first election after the Suharto government, 
were 48 political parties, with 24 in the 2004 polls and 38 in the 2009 elections 
(see Table 3.4.).  In addition, after 2004, Indonesia has held direct presidential 
elections, when the electorate votes for candidates endorsed by the political 





Result of the legislative elections 
 
Year Political Parties Top three winners 
1999 48 PDIP (33.12%%), Golkar (25.97), PPP (12.55%) 
2004 24 Golkar (23.27%), PDIP (19.82%), PPP (10.55%) 
2009 38 Demokrat (26.79)%, Golkar (19.11%), PDIP (16.96%) 
Source: KPU (2010). 
 
Table 3.5. 
Result of the presidential elections	






2004 Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono- Jusuf Kalla 
Demokrat, PKPI, PBB (1st 
round), PAN, PPP, PKB dan 
PKS (2nd round) 
33.57% 60.62% 
 Megawati Sukarnoputri- 
Hasyim Muzadi 
PDIP 26.61% 39.38% 
 Wiranto- 
Salahuddin Wahid 
Golkar 22.15% - 
 Amien Rais- 
SiswonoYudhohusodo 
PAN 14.66% - 
 Hamzah Haz – 
Agum Gumelar 
PPP 3.01% - 
2009 Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono –  Budiono 












 Jusuf Kalla- Wiranto Golkar 12.41% - 
Source: KPU (2010). 
 
The dominance of the political parties in running the electoral campaigning, both 
in the legislative election and the presidential election, however, has been 
weakened by major changes in the post-authoritarian electoral and media systems.  
The post-authoritarian electoral system that accommodated direct elections 
increasingly enabled the candidates to take charge of their electoral campaigning, 
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which eventually transformed their relations with the political parties, campaign 
donors and voters.   
 
The candidates’ increasing involvement in their campaigning is particularly 
visible in elections for presidents or local leaders.  The candidates do not 
necessarily need to be party members to run in elections for president or local 
leaders (Buehler & Tan, 2007).  In such cases, the candidates commonly take 
charge of their electoral campaigning, particularly in campaign fund raising, 
despite retaining some party support.  The increasing campaign costs required the 
candidates to have strong campaign financing. They depended more and more on 
external funding (usually from commercial corporations) to finance their electoral 
campaigning operations (Ufen, 2010a).46   For such candidates, the campaign 
costs were largely expended on media campaigning.47 
 
Since 2001, during the government of President Abdurrahman Wahid, political 
parties were in fact subsidized. Following a 2001 government regulation, the 
government provided a subsidy of up to Rp 100 per vote that the political party 
obtained the national election (DPR). However, in 2005, the government of 
																																																								
46 Mietzner (2008) suggests that in addition to external funding, political parties also depended on 
revenue sourced from members in public offices, in ways that were often corrupt and illegal. 
Corruption, money politics and strong patronage relationships between candidates and voters were 
rampant in local elections (Sjahrir, Kis-Katos, & Schulze, 2013, p. See also). 
47 The political parties or the candidates are required to provide financial incentives for any 
campaigning undertaken by the party members in the grass roots. 
	
	 106	
President Yudhoyono decided to cut the subsidies significantly (Mietzner, 2007), 
which intensified parties’ and candidates’ dependency upon private donors. 48  
 
The 1997 economic crisis and the decentralisation policy after 1998 have shaped 
the roles of campaign donors and the ways they donate to political parties.  Private 
business donors have become more selective, because the demands to donate arise 
not only from parties’ national headquarters, but also from local politicians and 
party branches in the regions where such businesses may be located (Mietzner, 
2007, pp. 244-245).  The campaign donors’ selectivity may also be due to their 
need to ensure that their donation goes to the actual candidates who will assume 
public office, or the political parties that will form government.  More 
importantly, the campaign donors need to be certain that their donations are 
channelled through to the correct party members, so that they get the expected 
returns from their financial assistance, namely the protection of their business 
interests (Mietzner, 2007).   
 
It is not easy to map national and regional level corporate donors in electoral 
campaigns in Indonesia (Mietzner, 2007, 2008). Despite the electoral laws 
requiring candidates (political parties and politicians) to submit their campaign 
financial reports to the election commissions, this obligation has not been taken 
seriously by the campaign teams.  Many listed “phantom donors”, or fabricated 
																																																								
48 Under President Yudhoyono, the government allocated Rp 21 million per seat secured in the 
DPR.  This suggested that the winner of the 1999 election could earn some Rp 35 billion a year in 
government subsidies, based on more than 35 million votes in the 1999 election. By comparison, 
the winner of the 2004 election received less than Rp 3 billlion a year in government subsidies.	
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the donation amounts (Mietzner, 2010).  Generally, however, major electoral 
donors are believed to include politicians’ family members, contractors wishing to 
get contracts funded by local and national budgets, bureaucrats, local and state 
enterprises, private local and national corporations, and even corporations with 
foreign shareholders (Aditjondro, 2010; Buehler & Tan, 2007; Maeswara, 2010; 
Mietzner, 2010; Petriella, 2014; Rochman, 2014). 
 
The electoral campaign donations from private donors were usually channelled 
through the political party’s treasury (Buehler & Tan, 2007; Mietzner, 2010).  In 
more recent elections in Indonesia, campaign donations were not only channelled 
through the party treasurers or party members, but also via payment to campaign 
consulting companies (Mietzner, 2007). Qodari (2010) acknowledged that 
campaign professionals are “taking some significant functions that used to be 
performed by the parties, rather than being merely complementary to them” (p. 
137). 
 
3.4.2. The Political Campaign Industry and the Media 
The contribution of the advertising and public relations industries has rarely been 
discussed in studies of post-authoritarian period political campaigning in 
Indonesia. The advertising industry operates far more broadly then just political 
campaigns, because advertising firms more commonly handle commercial 
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clients. 49  However, since the 1999 elections, advertising businesses have 
increasingly catered for the needs of government and political clients, including 
during election campaigns. For example, in the 1999 election Matari Advertising 
served PKB, Fortune PR worked for PAN, Adikreasi and Wow Production were 
engaged by Golkar, and Adwork!RSCG was employed by PDIP (Riadi, 2015).  
Even more political parties used the services of advertising companies for the 
2004 legislative elections. In that campaign, Golkar employed Wow 
Communication, PDIP used Adwork!EuroRSCG, the Democratic Party used 
Dharma Pena Comm, PAN chose Rumah Ide- Suris Comm, Crescent Star Party 
used Domindo Inko Prabo, PKB used BVM Ad House, PKS selected 25 Frames 
and the Prosperous Peace Party engaged DDB-Advis Indonesia (Danial, 2009; 
Ufen, 2010a). The presidential election also attracted major advertising 
companies: such as Hotline Advertising, which was engaged by Yudhoyono and 
Jusuf Kalla; Adwork!EuroRSCG, which worked for Megawati Soekarno Putri; 
and Hasyim Muzadi, Rumah Ide-Suris Comm, which served Amien Rais and 
Siswono Yudhohusodo, JC & K developed advertising products for Wiranto and 
Salahuddin Wahid (Danial, 2009).  In the 2009 and 2014 elections, political 
parties, presidential and local leader candidates also employed advertising 
companies (Danial, 2009) In the context of the increasingly competitive post-
authoritarian Indonesian elections, advertising services were particularly needed 
																																																								
49 The advertising business, in particular, can be traced back to the Dutch colonial era while the 
public relations sector was nurtured under the New Order.  The national Indonesia Advertising 
Companies Association (P3I) developed from an association of the Jakarta and Bandung-based 
advertising companies in 1949 (Prihandoko, Yasra, & Pram, 2012).  In 2015, P3I included around 
600 advertising agencies employing more than 20,000 employees in total, across 14 provinces in 
Indonesia (Sukotjo, 1999). The total revenue from their clients, who numbered between 8,000 to 
10,000, was estimated at Rp 150 trillion annually (Riadi, 2015).	
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by political parties and presidential or local candidates’ campaign teams to 
increase their candidates’ visibility among voters.  
 
The public relations businesses also contributed to the development of the 
political campaign industry.  In post-Suharto electoral campaigns, public relations 
agencies’ engagements in electoral campaigning were evident with the 
employment of the communication consultancy Soedarto & Noeradi PR by the 
PKB, and Ida Sudoyo & Associates by Golkar in the 1999 election (Danial, 
2009).  The first direct presidential election in Indonesia in 2004 also saw the 
involvement of public relations agencies in the electoral campaigns, as the 
campaign team of Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla employed Inke Maries & 
Associates public relations firm as the coordinator of its media centre, while 
Megawati Sukarnoputri and Prabowo Subianto engaged Ida Sudoyo & Associates.  
While an advertising agency’s main goal in political campaigning is improving 
political parties’ or candidates’ visibility in the media, public relations services 
supporting the campaign teams aimed also to enhance the images of the parties 
and candidates for the public.  One senior public relations practitioner suggested 
that an election was a “public relations war” encompassing a war of 
communication strategies and campaign funds (Ufen, 2010a). 
 
Despite the increasing number of commercial businesses contributing to electoral 
campaigning, it is extremely difficult to qualify the economic size of such 
services. There is no official billing or revenue data on the scale of such 
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business.50  Available studies and anecdotal reports indicate campaign costs in 
Indonesia are growing. Political parties are estimated to allocate at least 30 
percent of their campaign funding to pay for television, radio and print media 
advertising in post-authoritarian Indonesia (Wiloto, 2006).  In the 2009 
presidential election, Mietzner (2008) found that campaign spending on behalf of 
Yudhoyono and Boediono topped US$5.1 million for television ads alone. By 
comparison, the Golkar Party, which supported Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto, spent 
$4.8 million, while the Gerindra Party supporting Megawati Sukarnoputri and 
Prabowo Subianto expended $4.4 million (Mietzner, 2008). Mujani and Liddle 
suggested that Indonesian voters’ exposure and attention to the campaign ads of 
Yudhoyono and Boediono was higher than to the ads of their competitors, 
suggesting a correlation to their campaign spending (Mujani & Liddle, 2010). 
 
In 2014, government officials estimated that the total budget for the presidential 
candidates as well as the legislative candidates at the local and national levels was 
between Rp 85 trillion and Rp 115 trillion (Dartanto, 2014).  The figures 
comprised election funds from the state budget (APBN), local administration 
budgets (APBD), political parties’ campaign budgets, presidential candidates’ 
campaign budgets, and the campaign budgets of the 208,511 legislative 
candidates.  Each of the legislative candidates at the local level was estimated to 
have spent between Rp 250 million to Rp 500 million in their campaign budget, 
																																																								
50 It is difficult to determine the scale of campaign consulting business in Indonesia.  In addition to 
the lack of official data from state agencies or associations, secrecy commonly surrounds clients’ 
identities and billing levels in Indonesia. 
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while their counterparts running at the national level DPR spent between RP 750 
million to Rp 1 billion each (Dartanto, 2014).     
 
Political campaign businesses, along with several industries such as paper, 
printing and paper-based products; textile and clothing; transportation and 
telecommunication; manufacturing; and hospitality, hotels and restaurants, were 
estimated to gain the most from the overall election budget (Mujani & Liddle, 
2010).  Therefore, while there has been no empirical study on the billing of the 
campaign consulting industry in Indonesia, it is clear that the political campaign 
industry is no longer a fringe business (Dartanto, 2014). 
 
a. The Opinion Polling Businesses 
The commercial opinion polling business in post-authoritarian Indonesia can be 
traced back to the New Order period.  Under the New Order government, the 
business potential of opinion polling had not yet developed as an integral part of 
the political campaign industry, due to government constraint. In fact, in a notable 
case that delayed the development of this type of business, the New Order 
government closed down a survey company Survey and Business Research 
Indonesia (known as PT Suburi) in 1972. The New Order authorities were not 
pleased that Suharto’s name was placed at number three in a list of eight national 
figures in a question that sought the public’s perception of their favourite leaders 
in a pre-election survey in Jakarta, West Java, Central Java and East Java (Danial, 
2009; Putra, 1996).  Although the question was a part of a survey for business 
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purposes, a project officer and 13 surveyors of PT Suburi, which had been 
established in 1967, were arrested and questioned by the Attorney General’s 
Office on charges of subversion, after the military authorities (the task force 
intelligence of Diponegoro division of the Indonesian Army) reported them on 
hearing about the survey being undertaken in Semarang, Central Java.  The 
company’s license was subsequently revoked by Home Minister Amir Mahmud, 
which led to its permanent closure in the country (Trihartono, 2014, p. 930).  
(Trihartono, 2012) The government’s response suggested a desire to quash any 
political evaluations that might question its legitimacy. 
 
As commercial polling agencies were not allowed, opinion poll activities were 
carried out by non-commercial, mainly research agencies.  Surveys were restricted 
to issues deemed not directly threatening the New Order government such as 
environmental issues.  Research organisations such as LP3ES had in fact started 
to carry out surveys, using a quick count method, since the 1977 election.  
However, the results were never published, because conducting opinion polling 
on political issues was strictly forbidden by the Suharto government 
(Simanjuntak, 2014). 
Contrary to the situation during the New Order, the commercial opinion polling 
agencies, rather than the communication industry, becomes the flagship of the 
post-authoritarian political campaign industry; although the latter’s contribution is 
no less significant, as shown in the previous section (Qodari, 2010).  This 
development was important because it suggested that the political campaign 
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industry was seen as valuable mainly for political opinion engineering, offering “a 
full range of services needed to secure the victory of a candidate – from strategic 
planning, to conceptualizing a candidate’s ‘vision and mission’, from 
campaigning door to door and designing and organising media campaigns to 
providing poll monitors on election day” (Karni, 2007).  
 
Commercial opinion polling gained its impetus mainly because its services – 
mapping political behaviour of the electorates – fulfilled the political actors’ 
needs to develop new campaigning strategies to woo voters in the new election 
environment.  The first election in the reformasi period, the 1999 democratic 
legislative election, had already demonstrated the contribution of pollsters, some 
of whom were paid commissions from international donors, notably LP3ES, 
Resources Productivity Centre, IFES, Litbang Harian Kompas and KPP-Lab 
Politik UI (Qodari, 2010). 51   
 
However, the opinion polling business really began to thrive rapidly from 2004, 
when the first direct presidential election was held.  It was evident in the 
establishment of a number of commercial pollsters, such as LSI, Soegeng Sarjadi 
Syndicated, and Danareksa Research Institute.  These opinion pollsters initially 
portrayed themselves as a sort of democratisation agent, rather than a commercial 
																																																								
51 LP3ES was born during the New Order regime as a non-profit organisation; IFES is a 
Washington D.C-based development organisation assisting elections in new and emerging 
democracies, Harian Kompas is a commercial newspaper established during the New Order 
period, Resources Productivity Center is a non-profit organisation, and KPP Lab Politik UI is a 
unit of the University of Indonesia. All of these organisations did political polling not for profit or 
commercial purposes.  
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business.  For example, Burhanuddin Muhtadi suggested that the rise of opinion 
polling businesses was due to the need of democratic regimes to devise public 
policies that are closer to public aspirations (Muhtadi, 2009).52  His former senior 
in LSI, M. Qodari, similarly argued that most campaign professionals in Indonesia 
are “independent and unaffiliated”, comprising political experts, academics or 
advertising people with non-party backgrounds (2010,p. 137).  His argument 
essentially highlighted the idea that opinion polling, despite being a commercial 
service, was not a part of opinion engineering that was closely associated with the 
aim of electoral campaigning. 
 
However, a split within LSI in 2005 indicated that opinion polling did indeed play 
a role in engineering victories for particular candidates and political parties in the 
elections.  Mietzner (2009b) described how the split was triggered by 
disagreements over the agency’s business strategy development, as well as the 
conduct, during opinion polling, by LSI’s main figures: Denny Januar Ali, known 
as Denny J.A. and M. Qodari (p. 119). 53   Denny pushed for the establishment of 
LSI as a full commercial political consultancy agency, which provides political 
																																																								
52 Burhanuddin is a Syarif Hidayatullah University academic and a leading opinion polling 
business actor, who used to worked for LSI and later set up his own polling agency, Indikator 
Politik Indonesia. 
53 There are two versions on how LSI was established.  The first version, as told by Denny, 
suggested that he founded LSI following his discussions with activist and PDIP politician Heri 
Akhmadi, who supported him with his networks to access resources (Surdiasis, Yusron, & 
Mathari, 2008).  Saiful was recruited as LSI’s research director. The second version, which came 
from Saiful, considered that both Denny and Saiful established LSI (Mietzner, 2009b). Denny and 
Saiful were PhD graduates from US-based Ohio State University.  Saiful, an academic from Syarif 
Hidayatullah Islamic State University, did his first national survey in the 1999 election, as parts of 
his doctoral work, supported by his supervisor William Liddle and funded by the US National 
Science Foundation. LSI itself was under Yayasan Pengembangan Demokrasi Indonesia, which 
was a foundation registered under the name of Denny, as well as the former dean of the University 
of Indonesia’ Faculty of Economy and Bappenas chairman Djunaedi Hadisumarto, former BPN 
head Joyo Winoto, and entrepreneurs Theodorus Permadi Rahmat and Oentoro Surya. 
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consultancy services in addition to opinion polling services.  In contrast, Mujani 
insisted that LSI focused on opinion polling services only.  Mietzner (2009b) 
suggested that Denny eventually left LSI in 2005, after he was caught engineering 
a poll commissioned by the ministry of social affairs that was done without the 
knowledge of LSI boards. This was, in addition to his decision to become actively 
involved in the 2004 presidential election by supporting Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono; which concerned JICA, the LSI’s main donor (p. 119).54  According 
to Mietzner (2009b), JICA was a donor due to Saiful’s personal connection to 
Takashi Shiraishi, a Japanese academic who helped lobby JICA to provide grants 
for LSI.  However, it should be noted that JICA’s support of LSI was likely not 
unrelated to the he connections held by Heri, as well as Djunaedi, Theodore and 
Oentoro from Yayasan Pengembangan Demokrasi Indonesia, who were members 
of President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Indonesia-Japan Economic Cooperation 
Working Team. 55 
 
Denny later set up Lingkaran Survey Indonesia (or Lingkaran), which branded 
itself as “an election supermarket” and marketed itself as a campaign consultancy 
company (see Mietzner, 2009b).56  It was successful in developing itself into a 
																																																								
54 LSI engaged in commissioned opinion polling.  The results of the polling commissioned by 
domestic and international donors are published, while that commissioned individual, political 
parties or politicians or private organisations are not. 
55 Set up in 2002, the team was lead by then State Corporation Minister Laksamana Sukardi, who 
was also a PDIP senior official.  
56 Saiful developed Saiful Mujani Research Centre or SMRC with former TVOne presenter Grace 
Natalie (Qodari, 2010, p. 131).  LSI senior official M. Qodari, who obtained a Masters degree 
from Essex University in Britain before joining Denny, eventually left Lingkaran to establish Indo 
Barometer polling company. After Saiful’s departure, LSI was under the leadership of 
Burhanuddin, who eventually left the agency to establish Indikator Politik Indonesia in 2013. LSI 
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leading campaign company in Indonesia, establishing a business group consisting 
of several companies offering various campaign services.  In addition to 
Lingkaran, other companies offering political campaign consultancy services 
emerged, such as McLeader (hired to support the campaigning of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono in 2004) and Fox Indonesia (supporting Yudhoyono’s campaigning in 
2009).  These companies, however, were not able to maintain their existence in 
the increasingly competitive market.57 
 
3.4.3.  The Internet Use in Politics 
In their study of the Internet’s early development in Indonesia, Hill and Sen 
(2005) found that  
“the Internet arrived in Indonesia, already valorised as ‘technology of 
freedom’, and became the space where frustrations and aspirations 
excluded from state and commercialized platforms – not all political, 
and certainly not all ‘democratic’ – could be expressed” (p. 34). 
 
As these scholars suggested, the Internet was used by various interests that were 
previously unable to express their ideas, including those offering anti-democratic 
campaigns (Hill & Sen, 2005). However, the general assumption linking the 
Internet with democratisation or democratic developments in Indonesia was partly 
																																																																																																																																																							
is now under the command of Kuskridho Ambardi, a Gadjah Mada University communication 
department lecturer who is also a PhD graduate from Ohio State University. 
57 McLeader was chaired by Hotman Limbong, a media person with close military connections, 
while Fox was managed by Andi Zulkarnaen Mallarangeng, the brother of Andi Alfian 
Mallarangeng, who was Yudhoyono’s minister of sports and youth affairs. Fox won some high 
profile campaign consultancy contracts, such as with Golkar Party candidate Alex Nurdin in his 
campaigning for North Sumatra Governor; the National Mandate Party’s Sutrisno Bachir, who 
hired the company for Rp 120 billion for his presidential candidacy; and Yudhoyono’s son Edhie  
Baskoro Yudhoyono, for his DPR campaign costing Rp 10 billion (Rachmawati, 2015). 
	
	 117	
due to the fact that initially this media technology was used prominently by 
Indonesian pro-democracy activists, journalists and politicians as a tool for 
activism, and as an alternative political communication channel to the highly-
controlled conventional media (Bräuchler, 2003; Hill & Sen, 2002; Lim, 2003, 
2006). 
 
In her study of media dynamics during authoritarian Indonesia, Steele described 
how a group of journalists at Tempo magazine, which had been banned by the 
Suharto government, organised their fights against censorship through the Internet 
(Steele, 2005; Winters, 2002).  Connected to the Internet through dial-in 
technology, the group cooperated with NusaNet (an NGO networking system) and 
Apakabar, a Maryland-based mailing list moderated by academic John 
McDougall.  The Internet enabled a ‘political space’ not only for these activists 
but also for individual citizens to join in the resistance against the authoritarian 
regime (Steele, 2005).58  
 
There have been several cases when Indonesian audiences’ engagement with the 
Internet – and subsequently social media, which required their active participation 
in the production of online content – have stood out in the country’s media space.  
																																																								
58 Hewison (1999) referred to political space as an “arena created through struggle with the state 
and involving activist groups.  It can be created even under oppressive regimes, and may exist 
where civil society is not especially vibrant.  The idea of the struggle for space avoids some of the 
normative assumptions associated with certain ideas of civil society, which could conceivably 
become dominated by groups which, for instance, repress subordinate classes or groups.” (pp. 224-
225).  His idea regarding the struggle for space suggested the flexibility of the political space and 
the vitality of the activists in the creation of the political space.  Activists played a crucial role in 
the struggle and negotiation with the state to expand the political space in Indonesia. 
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The cases were often celebrated by Indonesians as an evidence of the vitality of 
social media as a new media technology, providing their citizens’ with a 
negotiating space within the state (Lim, 2013; Nugroho & Syarief, 2012).59  One 
of the most well known cases was that involving Prita Mulyasari.  In 2008 this 
housewife was reported by Omni International hospital, a private hospital in 
Tangerang, Banten for both criminal and civil lawsuits for writing emails to her 
family and friends complaining about the poor service offered by the hospital; 
emails which later went viral.  She was subsequently detained during the judicial 
process. The authorities charged her under the Criminal Code and the law on 
information and electronic transactions, a newly enacted law widely criticized by 
Internet activists for restricting civil rights.  Indonesian Internet users initiated a 
‘Coins for Prita’ campaign to raise money to help pay her fine in her civil case.  
With support from Internet activists, the campaign turned into a bigger offline 
movement as the story of Prita, a mother of two children, one of whom was still 
being breastfed, attracted the attention of many Indonesian social media users and 
made headlines in the mainstream media.  No less than former president 
Megawati Sukarnoputri paid Prita a visit to show her concern.  The hospital later 
dropped the civil lawsuit.60   
 
Another case involved the Deputy Chairpersons of the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK), Bibit S. Riyanto and Chandra Hamzah.  In 2009 these two 
anti-corruption officials were arrested by the National Police on extortion and 
																																																								
59 Media have been recorded to play a role in social movements in Indonesia (see Jackson & Pye, 
1978). 
60 The Supreme Court later convicted Prita in the case, but sentenced her in probation. 
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bribery charges, in a move widely interpreted as a plot to weaken the 
Commission.  An online campaign, entitled “the Movement of 1,000,000 
Facebookers in Support of Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto” (Gerakan 
1.000.000 Facebookers Dukung Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto), was 
set up soon after the arrest.  The Facebook campaign was started by a lecturer 
based in Bengkulu, Sumatra, wanting to support the commission.  The page 
attracted 1.4 million members (Nugroho & Syarief, 2012).  In addition to this 
group, other similar social media-based groups were set up to support KPK.  The 
online movement progressed offline, with up to 5,000 people joining rallies 
against their arrest in Jakarta and elsewhere in Indonesia.  The authorities later 
dropped the charges against the two men, following a call from President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono urging an out-of-court settlement.  Both Chandra and Bibit 
were also reinstated into their KPK deputy positions. 
 
Another more apparent political movement involving social media was the 
#savejkt or ‘Save Jakarta’ movement. Initiated in 2010 by a group of Jakartans led 
by Singapore-based Indonesian academic Sulfikar Amir, it endorsed independent 
candidates running for the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election.  The group set up a 
campaign team, a concept team and a strategy team.  The group was set up with 
an awareness that their “ideas will never turn into policies unless we have political 
clout” (Susilo, 2010).  The social movement thus turned into a political one, as it 
endorsed Faisal Basri and Biem Benyamin, who were running for the Jakarta 
governorship and deputy position as independent candidates.  In addition to 
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Twitter, the group also used a Facebook website and offline engagements in the 
form of discussions or other face-to-face forums.  Thus, the #savejkt case 
demonstrated another struggle to expand political space.  While the struggle did 
not materialize in the form of a straightforward confrontation (as was the case of 
Prita and KPK), the activists opted to use social media to garner popular support 
for independent candidates running in a local election.  Home to over 10 million 
residents, Jakarta as the capital of Indonesia had been largely seen as poorly 
managed by previous governors.61  The group’s decision not to channel their 
political support to party-backed candidates may be due to an ‘anti-party 
backlash’ in post-authoritarian Indonesia (Sulfikar as quoted by Tampubolon, 
2010). Tan (2002) has suggested that such a backlash was “a result of anti-party 
attitude, the parties’ behavior across the transition, the strong position of the 
parties as set out in the 1999 election laws and the current public opinion toward 
the parties” (p. 484).  The #savejkt group’s use of social media to support a 
candidate in an election campaign should be seen as more than simply the use of 
social media as a political instrument.  Instead, it reflected the ways in which a 
group might use social media as a new communication resource, which enabled 
them to organise themselves in their attempts to endorse candidates. 
 
Arguably, the cases above were the ‘success stories’ of the use of social media in 
the struggle to expand political space, although there are many other examples of 
unsuccessful attempts at organising an online movement across the country (Lim, 
																																																								
61 Jakarta has been dealing with poverty, floods, traffic congestions, and other urban-related 
problems related to developments, although it received one of the biggest budget in Indonesia (see 
Butt, 2011; Mietzner, 2012b). 
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2013; Tan, 2002).  However, the significance of the cases above is not only that 
they have shown a new way for Indonesian citizens to articulate their political 
expression in the new political space, but also that they offer a new way to further 
their political goals. There are elements of the voting public that are increasingly 
able to use media not only to articulate their political expression, but also to 
achieve their political agenda.62  Some scholars have observed that media were 
increasingly made the sites of ideological rivalries by different groups, a 
phenomenon that started to emerge in the declining years of the New Order 
(Danial, 2009; Mietzner, 2009b, 2010; Qodari, 2010, Ufen, 2010a). This 
development highlights that voters no longer consist of passive conventional 
media audiences only but also of active users of social media (and other Internet-
based media). This requires new approaches from the candidates and the political 
parties to mobilise voters, which eventually enabled more economic and social 
opportunities for the political campaign industry.63    
 
3.5. Conclusion 
By highlighting the history and development of electoral campaigning practices 
since the 1955 election, this chapter has demonstrated the changing nature of 
media campaigning in Indonesia elections, and conveys two arguments.  Firstly, 
media campaigning is a persuasion strategy and a way to organise the temporary, 
																																																								
62 In both Old and New Order Indonesia, the media had been used mainly by the political elite to 
mobilise people to maintain the regime’s continuity. For more information on the development of 
education under New Order regime,(see  Leigh, 1999) 
63  The New Order’s development in education, as well as telecommunication and media, 
contributed to the increase in educated, media literate voters in post-authoritarian Indonesia 
(Hadiz, 2010; Mietzner, 2009a; Simandjuntak, 2012). 
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election-specific interests of the politicians and political parties, donors and 
voters, as well as media and the political campaign industry. Media campaigning 
may evolve into different modes, depending on the changing relations and 
interests of the three spheres.  Secondly, the contribution of the political campaign 
industry to such organisation is dependent on media technology.  However, the 
extent to which the industry is able to contribute to campaigning is shaped by the 
dynamics of the relations of the political, economy and cultural spheres, and these 
dynamics vary for each campaign environment.  Thirdly, this chapter shows that 
the employment of different types of media for electoral campaigning requires 
different strategies, suggesting that social media (and other media technology) is 
not merely a dead instrument of politics (Lim, 2013).  Instead, media also shape 
the relations of the political, economic and cultural spheres that were mediated by 
the campaign industry.  These arguments are to be explored further in the 
following three empirical cases about the use of social media for electoral 












The Emergence of Social Media in the 2012 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election  
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the emergence of social media campaigning in the 2012 
Jakarta gubernatorial election, which marked a significant rise in the use of the 
Internet platform in Indonesian elections. Using the framework described in 
Chapter 2, this chapter’s findings describe the contribution of the political 
campaign industry in mediating the use of such social media emergence in a 
major arena of political contestation in Indonesia. 
 
The Jakarta election provides a suitable case study mainly because Jakarta is the 
site of the first acknowledged large-scale social media campaigning in post-
authoritarian Indonesia (Ahmad & Popa, 2014; n.n., 2012).64  In addition, Jakarta 
is the capital of the country, the home of government offices, national parties’ 
headquarters, local, national and multinational corporations’ offices, and local and 
national media outlets (Okamoto, 2014; Okamoto & Honna, 2014).  The Jakarta 
gubernatorial elections may be interpreted as the ‘barometer’ for contests over 
power across the country (Hui & Bhakti, 2012). 
 
Several scholars have examined the roles of social media in the 2012 Jakarta 
election, particularly given the decisive victory of Surakarta mayor Joko Widodo, 
(popularly known as ‘Jokowi’), who challenged incumbent Jakarta Governor 
																																																								
64 There was small-scale social media use in the 2009 presidential election, but this was limited 
(see Nurhadryani et al., 2009). 
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Fauzi Bowo (nicknamed ‘Foke’).  Some analysts argued that social media, and the 
Internet in general, had enabled the development and implementation of more 
sophisticated political marketing strategies to increase Jokowi’s personal political 
brand; crucial for his victory (Ahmad & Popa, 2014, p. 98).  Some other studies 
linked Jokowi’s electoral achievement to the contribution of social media in 
facilitating grass roots, albeit online, political participation and volunteerism 
(Suaedy, 2014). Not only did social media help popularize Jokowi, but new media 
were seen to represent a ‘cyber war site’ that was fundamental for the 
mobilisation and maintenance of Jokowi’s volunteers.65  One such study finds 
that, 
“…cyber war, a term that particularly described the war in social 
media… barely involved Jokowi and Ahok directly; although both 
have Twitter and Facebook accounts, communication was more one-
way than reciprocal.  Both did, and still, use their accounts to inform 
supporters about their programmes or to seek input, but not to 
communicate directly with individuals.  This is where the virtual 
world volunteers stepped in to provide two-way communication with 
fans and critics alike” (Suaedy, 2014, p. 124).  
 
The framework adopted by this dissertation treats such an argument with caution; 
particularly the suggestion that the candidates had only limited involvement in the 
social media campaigning, or that social media political conversations during 
election campaign period were organic or self-directed by common social media 
users or volunteers.  Instead, this chapter confirms that the political campaign 
																																																								
65 Jokowi’s campaigning in the 2012 Jakarta election was characterised by the emergence of 
volunteers, who were attracted by the reputations of both Jokowi and his deputy candidate, Basuki 
Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok (Suaedy, 2014). 
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industry played a crucial part in mediating the use of social media as a new arena 
of contestation during the Jakarta election. It maintains that the emergence of 
social media campaigning in Jakarta was shaped by the candidates’ relations to 
political parties, campaign donors and voters in this post-authoritarian period. 
Some Jakarta-based political campaign industry professionals were able to seize 
the opportunity to employ social media more strategically, for example to shape 
the organisation of temporary interests pertaining to the electoral players, which 
contributed significantly to the emergence of social media campaigning. These 
arguments are explored through an analysis of the candidates’ relations to 
campaign donors and voters and the political campaign industry professionals’ 
penetration to the candidates’ campaign team and the professionals’ social media 
campaigning works.  
 
The chapter consists of four sections. The first section introduces the Internet 
landscape and social media campaigning in Jakarta in the lead up to the 2012 
gubernatorial election.  The second section examines the relations between the 
political players, which paved the way for the adoption of social media for 
electoral campaigning. This is followed in the third section by an analysis of the 
ways in which the political campaign industry employed social media for electoral 
campaigning, opening up the capability of social media to organise temporary 
interests in parallel to its persuasion capability.  The fourth section concludes by 




4.2. The Internet Landscape and Social Media Campaigning in Jakarta 
Social media campaigning in the 2012 Jakarta campaigning indicated the 
emergence of a new media-based arena of contestation, in addition to 
conventional mass media. At the heart of such a development were the social 
media users.  These users were not only increasing in number, but more 
importantly, were known to be amongst the most prolific social media users in the 
world.66  
 
The number of social media users in Jakarta can be measured by the increasing 
number of Internet users in Jakarta, and Indonesia in general, as shown in Table 
4.1. In 2012, the number of Internet users in Jakarta exceeded 3.5 million, which 
was 36.9 percent of the total Jakarta population of around 9.5 million.  Such 
Internet users, albeit not all of them, were amongst 6.9 million registered voters in 
the 2012 Jakarta election.  
 
Table 4.1. 
Total figures of the Internet users in Greater Jakarta and Indonesia 
 
Area Population Internet User Facebook User Twitter User 
Jakarta     9,583,000   3,538,000 7,743,580 n/a 
Bekasi     2,554,000      677,000 n/a n/a 
Depok     1,902,000      502,000 n/a n/a 
Tangerang     1,967,000      371,000 n/1 n/a 
Bogor     1,040,000       273,000 n/a n/a 
Indonesia 244,775,796 63,000,000 43,000,000 19,500,000 
Source: APJII, 2012; BPS, 2012; Semiocast, 2012 
 
The majority of these Internet users were middle-class Jakartans, who were able 
to access social media regularly (Markplus Insight, 2011).  They comprised 
																																																								
66 Jakarta earned the title of the most active Twitter city in the world in 2012 (Semiocast, 2012).    
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mainly young people (17-35 year-old), who were educated (see Utomo, 
Reimondos, Utomo, McDonald, & Hull, 2013). Jakarta-based social media users 
commonly accessed social media through their mobile communication devices, 
meaning that they were able to engage in online conversations with fewer time 
and space restrictions than those social media users who accessed the new media 
through computers.67  In other words, this indicated the emergence of users able to 
access information for a longer period and from more locations than had 
previously been the case with the conventional media audience. These social 
media users favoured politics as a topic of discussion; politics was second only to 
entertainment in gaining the attention of social media users (Rachmawati, 2014).   
 
It should be emphasised that social media conversations and activities during the 
Jakarta election campaign period involved not only social media users residing in 
Jakarta.  Internet users in Greater Jakarta also contributed significantly to social 
media dynamics during the Jakarta election campaign period.  Greater Jakarta 
consists of Jakarta (a special region on a par with a province) and the surrounding 
Bekasi, Depok, Tangerang and Bogor mayoralties.  A significant number of 
residents from these mayoralties commute to work in Jakarta on a daily basis.  
Some of them might not be registered voters in Jakarta elections, but most of them 
were familiar with, and have experienced, Jakarta’s urban problems; such as 
heavy traffic congestion, flooding and environment degradation.   
																																																								
67 There was a dramatic change in the mode of Internet consumption in Indonesia, including 
Jakarta, in 2012.  The number of Internet users accessing the service from homes increased to 47 
percent in 2012 from 23 percent in 2011.  In 2011, most users had usually accessed the Internet 




In addition to Internet users from Greater Jakarta, the Jakarta elections also 
attracted social media users from other parts of Indonesia, most notably Surakarta 
and Palembang, from where candidates Jokowi and Alex Nurdin originated.  
Given Jakarta is the capital of Indonesia, events in the city attracted the attention 
of Indonesians residing across the nation and abroad. Together such social media 
users, irrespective of whether or not they were registered as voters in the Jakarta 
election, contributed to the social media conversations and activities that were part 
of the electoral process in Jakarta. 
 
In the 2012 Jakarta election, all candidates’ campaign teams incorporated the 
Internet and social media platforms, particularly Twitter and Facebook, into their 
media campaign repertoire. As mentioned above, some use of social media during 
electoral campaigning had been evident in the 2007 Jakarta gubernatorial election. 
However, the use of social media, particularly Facebook, was still in its infancy 
during that earlier election, having not yet gained significant public attention 
(Wiguna, 2009).68  It was only in 2012, when Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and 
other social media attracted a greater number of users, that social media 
campaigning generated wide public attention. This contributed to the 
appropriation of social media for electoral campaigning in the election, which was 




68 Facebook opened up its services to the public in 2006, but it was only able to attract users in 
Indonesia from mid-2008 (Wiguna, 2009).  Before Facebook, Indonesians were more reliant on 
the now-ceased Friendster. 
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4.3. The Candidates and Their Relations to Other Electoral Players 
This section examines the ways in which the political campaign industry 
penetrated the candidates’ campaign teams, as a first step in the use of social 
media in electoral campaigning. The analysis focuses on the candidates in relation 
to other electoral players who were also engaged in the political campaign 
industry’s use of social media campaigning.  This section shows that the relations 
between electoral players determine the ways in which the political campaign 
industry penetrated the campaign teams and employed social media for electoral 
campaigning. These findings differ from those of studies of the adoption of social 
media in the electoral process, which have focused on technological, institutional 
and system factors (Chen & Smith, 2010; Gulati & Williams, 2011; Williams & 
Gulati, 2012). 
 
The liberalised political system enabled elites at the lower levels of the New 
Order’s formerly vast system of patronage to re-organise and re-invent themselves 
through democratic means (Hadiz, 2003). In the newly refurbished environment, 
these peripheral elites were able to climb up the political ladder through various 
means, including through new media. Based on this observation, the post-
authoritarian elections were increasingly characterised by the struggle of these 
peripheral elites wishing to climb up to the top of the elite structure.  Such 
struggle, however, should not be seen as a straightforward battle between the 
progressive outsiders pursuing reform and top elites seeking to maintain their 
positions. Instead, it is characterised by negotiation and cooperation among these 
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peripheral and top political elites, who relate closely to the elites from both the 
economic and cultural spheres. This is in line with Gramsci’s hegemony that 
acknowledges possible contestation within the ruling elites and possible coalitions 
across classes (Simon, 1982).  This further highlights the importance of 
examining the candidates’ relations to other electoral players: the political parties, 
campaign donors, and voters. 
 
There were six pairs of candidates competing in the first round of the 2012 Jakarta 
election, as shown in Table 4.2.69  They consisted of both party-backed and 
independent candidates. 70  In comparison, the 2007 Jakarta election attracted only 














69 The election was conducted in two rounds.  The first round was conducted on July 11, 2012, 
with 6 pairs of governor and deputy governor candidates.  The second round was on September 
20, 2012, with 2 pairs of governor and deputy governor candidates.  The electoral campaign period 
ran from June 24 to July 8, 2012, with a second round for two days from September 14 to 
September 16, 2012.   
70 Independent candidates were permitted to run following a 2008 law on elections, which allowed 
the acceptance of candidates in regional elections without the need for affiliation with a political 
party or a coalition of parties. 
71 The first direct Jakarta election in 2007 involved two pairs of candidates: Adang Daradjatun, a 
retired Police Commissioner General and former Deputy Chief of Indonesian Police; and Dani 
Anwar, a senior member of PKS; as well as Foke and Prijanto, a retired Army Major General.  The 
first pair was supported by PKS, while the second pair was supported by 19 other parties, which 




Jakarta election’s candidates and political supporters  
 

















Golkar, PPP, PDS, 
several non-seat parties 
18 seats, or 19.1 percent 
of total DPRD seats 





PKS, PAN (percentage 
of seats in DPRD) 
18 seats, or 19.1 percent 
of total DPRD seats 




PD, PKB, PAN, Hanura 
and scores of non seat 
parties  
41 seats or 43.6 percent 
of total DPRD seats*** 
PD, PKB, PAN, PKS, 
PDS and Golkar  
77 seats, or 81.9 percent 
of total DPRD seats 






17 seats, or 18.1 percent 
of total DPRD seats****  
PDIP, Gerindra 
17 seats, or 18.1 percent 
of total DPRD seats 
Rp. 27.5 billion 
Source: Adapted from Ahmad and Popa (2014); KPU DKI Jakarta (2012). 
   * Independent candidates were required to secure support from a minimum of 3 percent of 
Jakarta voters, or 407,345, as evidenced by copies of supporters’ ID cards.  Party-backed 
candidates were required to gain support from a party or a coalition of parties that secured 15 
percent of the total seats in the Jakarta council, or 15 percent of votes in the last election. 
             ** Data on campaign funds for the second round are not available, as unlike in the first 
round in the second round the campaign teams were not required to declare this information. 
   
 
As shown in Table 4.2, Foke secured the biggest support; from the coalition of 
parties which together controlled over 40 percent of the total Jakarta DPRD seats 
in the first round and over 80 percent in the second round. It is therefore not 
surprising that opinion polling conducted by major Indonesian pollsters predicted 
that Foke would win the election in the first round (Hamid, 2012). However, the 
prediction was proven later to be inaccurate; as his closest rival Jokowi, although 
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supported by only a coalition of two parties with mere 18 percent of DPRD seats, 
won both the first and second rounds of the elections (See Table 4.3.). 
 
Table 4.3. 
Result of the Jakarta 2012 gubernatorial election 
 



































Source: KPU DKI Jakarta, 2012. 
 
4.3.1. Joko Widodo   
In the 2012 gubernatorial election, Jokowi’s campaigning was characterised by its 
decentralized, if not chaotic, nature; as shown in the establishment of a number of 
campaign teams in addition to the official campaign team led by PDIP.72  The 
decentralized nature of his campaign teams made Jokowi’s camp more open to the 
contributions of the political campaign industry, and also provided the opportunity 
for the industry to employ social media strategically for electoral campaigning.  
																																																								
72 KPU requires a candidate to register his or her official campaign team.  The campaign team is 
known as the official campaign team of the candidate.  For party-backed candidates, the campaign 
team always consists of, and is led by, party members.  However, it is a common practice in 
Indonesia for a candidate to set up one or two unofficial campaign teams, which are usually led by 
the candidate’s relatives or trusted friends or colleagues.  In the case of Jokowi, in addition to 
PDIP-led campaign team, his personal campaign team accommodated the establishment of a 
number of smaller teams for different campaigning purposes.  For digital campaigning, for 




The political campaign industry’s participation in Jokowi’s campaign teams in the 
2012 Jakarta election, and the industry’s employment of social media to support 
his campaigning, were shaped largely by the contradictions in Jokowi’s relations 
to the political parties, campaign donors and voters. 
 
Jokowi’s popularity ahead of the Jakarta election had contributed considerably to 
his unexpected victory. Jokowi was a ‘media darling’, a profile that he had been 
building since he began serving as mayor of Surakarta in 2005.  Supported by his 
communications team, he successfully built an image as a clean, humane and 
humble leader in the Indonesian political scene, in stark contrast to the more 
common image of corrupt politicians.73   
 
However, popularity was not the sole factor that defined his successful media 
campaigning in Jakarta and contributed to his victory.  Jokowi media campaign 
strategies, including the use of social media by industry professionals who 
supported his campaigns, were determined by his relations to various political 
parties, which eventually shaped his relations to campaign donors and voters.  
Jokowi’s relations to other political players were not always smooth.  On the 
contrary, his relation to Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP), the main 
political party that supported him, was marred by friction within the party elite 
pertaining to his nomination, which subsequently defined his relations to other 
																																																								
73 His popularity was achieved by his media team, which initially built his public image as a 
reformist, clean and humane leader in Surakarta. In fact, his trusted media team, led by Surakarta 
veteran journalist Anggit Nugroho, continued to work for him not only during political campaign 
periods but also after he was in office, as mayor, governor and as president (Saputra, 2012). 
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political players.74  Such friction was not uncommon in the electoral process.  In 
the case of Jokowi, it centred on him not being a member of the PDIP, the major 
party that nominated him.75 He was a furniture entrepreneur from Surakarta 
mayoralty in Central Java who became a mayor in 2005; with the full support of 
PDIP headquarters following the endorsements and personal guarantee of 
Surakarta PDIP Chairperson FX Hadi Rudyatmo.  At best, Jokowi was a PDIP 
cadre. 
 
PDIP Chairperson Megawati Sukarnoputri’s decision to endorse Jokowi was 
shaped by her personal conflict with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. 76  
She rejected a proposal to pair PDIP member and former Army major general 
Adang Ruchiatna Puradiredja as the deputy governor candidate to Foke, because 
Yudhoyono endorsed the pair (Anonymous senior PDIP member, personal 
communication, November 2013). Megawati opted to nominate Jokowi, following 
intense lobbying not only from members of the PDIP elite, but from former 
Golkar Chairman and former Vice President Jusuf Kalla (see Dewi & Aritonang, 
2013; Witoelar, 2014). Kalla’s endorsement was made following the request of 
																																																								
74 Megawati founded PDIP in 1999, shortly after the fall of Suharto, whose government forced her 
out of PDI leadership in 1996 (see Lay, 2010; Mietzner, 2012a).  
75 A political party or a party coalition commonly nominates party members, particularly those in 
the leadership, to run in the election.  However, the nomination of a non-party member by a 
political party or a coalition of political parties is possible under the post-authoritarian Indonesia 
electoral system.  
76 Megawati appeared to be unable to move on from her failure in the 2004 Indonesian presidential 
election to her former minister Yudhoyono.  Megawati considered this former minister 
“untrustworthy” and ceased her personal relations with him.  Therefore, she did not endorse 
Adang as Foke’s deputy candidate although it was her late husband, adviser and senior PDIP 
member, Taufik Kiemas, who had cut the deal with Yudhoyono over Adang’s nomination 
(Anonymous senior PDIP member, personal communication, 2013). This information was 
confirmed by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, who ran as Jokowi’s deputy governor candidate.  Ahok 
suggested that Megawati’s insistence to endorse him had created tension between her and Taufik 
(see Aziza, 2016).  
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Djan Faridz, a PPP senior member, who opposed the candidacy of Foke.  Kalla, 
who barely knew Jokowi, lobbied Megawati through his long-time partner, 
Sofyan Wanandi (Dewi & Aritonang, 2013).  He also lobbied Gerindra Chairman 
Prabowo Subianto, as PDIP needed to form a coalition to be able to endorse 
Jokowi.  Prabowo’s agreement was related to his ambition to run in the 2014 
presidential election. 
 
Megawati’s decision disappointed the PDIP elite in Jakarta (Boy Sadikin, 
personal communication, October 2013).77  One of the reasons was because 
Jokowi, who was based in Surakarta mayoralty, had made no contribution to 
developing the party in Jakarta. Moreover, some members of the PDIP elite 
considered themselves to have better access not only to political and economic 
resources but also to the networks in Jakarta that were necessary for winning the 
election.  
 
This internal PDIP friction stalled Jokowi’s electoral campaign plans 
considerably. A Javanese, Jokowi expected to run in the Jakarta election with 
popular movie director/actor and Betawi native Deddy Mizwar as his deputy 
candidate (Huda, 2012).  However, Megawati opted to approve Prabowo’s 
proposal to endorse lesser known Christian politician of Chinese descent Basuki 
Tjahaja Purnama (known as ‘Ahok’), in return for Prabowo’s commitment to fund 
																																																								
77 Sadikin, who chaired PDIP in Jakarta, admitted that Megawati’s decision to endorse Jokowi 
disappointed him, as a PDIP member for over 20 years.  He eventually resigned as PDIP chairman 




their campaign (Dewi & Aritonang, 2013).78  Prabowo’s endorsement of Ahok 
reflected his strategy to soften his image in his preparation to run in the 2014 
presidential election, after his alleged involvement in the 1998 anti-Chinese racial 
riots.79  
 
The disappointment of some members of the PDIP elite contributed to their rather 
indifferent support in generating campaign funds, particularly in the first round of 
the election.  Jokowi himself was not without resources.  However, his personal 
funds were supplemented by donations from the PDIP and a few senior PDIP 
members.80  Gerindra, which promised to cover the campaign expenses, actually 
used more of their campaign funds to produce outdoor and mass media campaign 
advertisements supporting Prabowo than Jokowi (Boy Sadikin, personal 
communication, October 2013).  Moreover, campaign donors were not easily 
found, because of a general inclination to support Foke as the incumbent 
governor.  However, with the help of his trusted confidante, retired army general 
																																																								
78 Ahok was an entrepreneur before he turned to politics.  He once joined PPIB, a new party 
founded by the late economist and politician Sjahrir, and served as member of DPRD Belitung 
Timur, before becoming regent of Belitung Timur, a small regency in Sumatra in 2005.  He later 
joined Golkar and become a member of the DPR.  Ahok had attempted to run as an independent 
candidate in 2012 Jakarta election, but was unable to gain sufficient public support.  He then 
approached Gerindra for endorsement, through Prabowo’s brother, Hasyim Djojohadikusumo. 
79 Prabowo was a former chief of the Army Strategic Command assigned to ensure Jakarta’s 
security in 1998.  However, Prabowo was in fact dismissed from the military in 1998, due to his 
role in the kidnapping of some pro-democracy activists, some of whom remain unaccounted for 
today.  His last military rank was lieutenant general. Prabowo had indicated his intention to run in 
the presidential election in 2014. 
80 Jokowi personally provided Rp 8 billion rupiah for his campaigning, which was ridiculed as 
paltry by PDIP senior members.  They estimated the ideal campaign budget in Jakarta was 
between Rp 50 to Rp 100 billion (Boy Sadikin, interview, 2013). 
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and former Minister of Trade and Industry Luhut B. Panjaitan, Jokowi was still 
able to attract substantial campaign funds from some high profile donors.81     
 
The combination of weak political support and limited campaign funds influenced 
Jokowi’s mobilisation of voters in Jakarta.  To be able to reach out to the 
electorate, the party needed to run its political machinery effectively.  The party 
machinery, however, would not work successfully without sufficient funds (Boy 
Sadikin, personal communication, October 2013). Under such conditions, it was 
crucial to maximise the attraction of Jokowi’s popularity in order to mobilise 
voters in Jakarta.   
 
Under the conditions described above, Jokowi was unable to entrust his electoral 
campaigning to PDIP and Gerindra.  In response, he set up and led his personal 
campaign team, consisting of his trusted supporters from Surakarta – a number of 
professionals from the political campaign industry as well as former generals like 
Luhut – to support his campaigning.   This personal campaign team of Jokowi’s 
was more receptive not only to the participation of the industry professionals, but 
also to those industry professionals employing new media, including social media, 
to support his campaigning. The political campaign industry professionals, in turn, 
gained more opportunities and incentives to experiment with social media for 
electoral campaigning. 
																																																								
81 Luhut founded an energy and plantation company after he retired as a minister.  He was able to 
gain donations from his network in the industry for Jokowi’s campaign.  Jokowi’s main donor was 
a Surakarta royal, Mooryati Soedibyo, who is also the founder a major Indonesian cosmetics 
company and other companies in the property and hospitality sectors. 
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Jokowi involved and coordinated such members of the political campaign 
industry from the first round of the election.  Among the members were Andrinof 
Chaniago, director of the polling agency Cirrus Surveyor; Eep Saifullah Fatah, 
director of the political consultancy agency PolMark; Sonny Subrata, director of 
advertising and marketing agency CDA/Arwuda; Kartika Jumadi, director of 
lobbying company Spin Doctors Indonesia; Jose Rizal, director of Politicawave; 
and Deddy Rachman, director of Katapedia.  These last four professionals were 
heavily involved in Jokowi’s social media campaigns.   
 
The industry professionals had foreseen business opportunities enabled by social 
media.  For example, prior to the Jakarta election, Sonny Subrata, who owns a 
company specializing in the social media marketing field, joined forces with PT 
Mediawave to establish Politicawave, which focuses on social media monitoring 
services for politics. Similarly, Deddy, who founded Katapedia for commercial 
social media marketing purposes, considered that the increasing number of social 
media users provided new business opportunities (Deddy Rachman, personal 
communication, October 2013).   
 
These professionals to Jokowi’s campaign teams was able to engage in his social 
media campaigning either due to their previous professional experiences or 
personal connection. Sonny, who has close ties to PDIP had approached Jokowi 
individually long before the election campaign period.  He was involved in 
lobbying Megawati to endorse Jokowi in the Jakarta election (Kartika Jumadi, 
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personal communication, November 2013). 82    Lingkaran Survey Indonesia, 
which was recruited to Jokowi’s campaign in the second round of the election, 
also engaged its digital media division to support his social media campaigns 
(Reza Yunanto, personal communication, November 2013). On the other hand, 
Deddy joined Jokowi’s campaign team through the recommendation of a relative 
of Jokowi.   Apart from Andrinof, none of the professionals was paid for their 
services by Jokowi.83  Importantly, their campaigning efforts, particularly those 
through social media, were not funded by Jokowi either.  This condition affected 
how social media were employed for his campaigning, which will be discussed in 
the next section. 
 
4.3.2. Fauzi Bowo  
In contrast to Jokowi, Foke produced a far stronger electoral campaign.  His 
campaign, including its media aspects, was largely centralized inside the 
campaign team, which comprised members of the relevant political parties and the 
political campaign industry. Such a centralized campaign team is no less 
welcoming to the political campaign industry than is decentralized one.  However, 
it provides limited incentives for the employment of experimental social media 
campaigning, due to the stable relations between the candidates, the political 
parties, campaign donors and voters.  
 
																																																								
82 Sonny, along with other professionals such as Andrinof, Jokowi’s main pollster, were involved 
in lobbying Sukarnoputri to endorse Jokowi in the Jakarta election. 
83 Organised by PDIP and Gerindra, the professional campaigners working for Jokowi’s campaign 
teams were professionally compensated by the political parties. 
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Unlike Jokowi, Foke was a seasoned Jakarta-based bureaucrat and politician, who 
was assumed to retain the strongest campaign resource base in the capital. His 
profile as a candidate was impeccable. He held a doctorate in engineering from a 
noted German university, had served the Jakarta administration for more than 30 
years, including as a deputy governor, and was a member of the ruling Democrat 
Party (PD).  
 
However, Foke’s candidacy was not without problems.  The major impediment 
that undermined Foke’s campaign was rooted in the internal conflicts operating 
within the political parties that supported him. PD was in the midst of major elite 
party conflict.  Prior to the election campaign period, PD Chairman Anas 
Urbaningrum and its Advisory Board Chairman and Indonesian President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono had engaged in a clash, spurred by Anas’ victory as PD 
chairman against the will of Yudhoyono in the party’s national convention in 
2010.  The latter, who had founded the party and remained the core figure within 
it, had guaranteed the position to his trusted ally: spokesperson and Minister of 
Youth and Sports Andi A. Mallarangeng (Manafe, 2012).  To tone down 
Yudhoyono’s disappointment, Anas chose as his secretary general the President’s 
inexperienced son Edhi Baskoro Yudhoyono, who was later implicated in a 
corruption case (Buehler & Tan, 2007; Tarigan, 2011).84  In addition, PD was not 
																																																								
84 The friction between the elites increased until Anas was forced to step down from his position in 
February 2013 (see Honna, 2012).  Anas was later jailed for 14 years in a high profile corruption 
case over the loss of more than Rp 450 billion. Senior PD allies of Anas were jailed for corruption, 
including Angelina Sondakh (for 10 years) and M. Nazaruddin (for 4 to 7 years in multiple 
corruption cases). Both Angelina and Nazarudin were on Anas’ campaign team in the PD election 
in 2010. However, Mallarangeng was also jailed for 7 years in a related graft case.  
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able to form a coalition with PDIP or PPP.  Eventually, Foke accepted Nachrowi 
Ramli, the chairman of PD Jakarta branch and former chief of LSN, to become his 
deputy governor running mate.  
   
Foke’s fractured ties to PPP’s influential senior member and Yudhoyono’s Public 
Housing Minister Djan Faridz also created a major problem. Foke’s alliance with 
Djan, who had been one of his major campaign donors in the 2007 election, broke 
down (Dewi & Aritonang, 2013).  Their relationship ended after the Jakarta 
administration took over a shopping centre in Tanah Abang, Central Jakarta, 
operated by one of the Djan’s companies. The conflict resulted in PPP offering 
only partial support for his nomination. PPP also supported their alternative 
candidate, PPP cadre Nono Sampono, who was nominated as the running mate of 
Golkar’s gubernorial candidate Alex Nurdin.  However, the major problem for 
Foke was not simply PPP’s partial support for his candidacy.  Rather, because the 
problem was that the conflict had motivated Djan to lobby Jusuf Kalla to find a 
strong challenger for Foke; which led to Djan supporting Jokowi (Dewi & 
Aritonang, 2013). 85 
 
Despite the complex problems experienced by those political parties that 
supported him, Foke was able to generate the largest amount of campaign funding 
in the election; an achievement that was not unrelated to his position as the 
incumbent governor (see Table 4.2).  His campaign donors consisted mainly of 
																																																								




national property businesses. In addition, other national and local businesses 
operating in Jakarta supported his campaigning, as did various enterprises owned 
by the Jakarta administration (Budi Siswanto, personal communication, 
November 2013).  His position as the governor also facilitated greater campaign 
reach to the grass roots of Jakarta.   
 
Under Foke’s campaign team, the political campaign industry functioned to 
maintain and increase his visibility in public to win the election.  This explained 
the ways in which professionals from the political campaign industry were 
recruited into his campaign team.  Those hired by him included scores of high 
profile campaign professionals such as Ipang Wahid of FastComm, Ratih 
Hardjono of Mirah Sakethi Consultancy, Widdi Aswindi of Jaringan Survey 
Indonesia, Saiful Mudjani of SMRC, and Denny J.A. of Lingkaran Survei 
Indonesia.86 
 
Not only were the political campaign members recruited professionally, their 
media campaigning was fully funded by Foke’s campaign team.  This explained 
the Foke’s team’s preference for mass media, particularly television and 
newspapers. Mass media campaigning remained a major mode of electoral 
campaigning to support Foke, not only due to its vast reach but also due to the 
																																																								
86 Ipang Wahid, or Irfan Asyari Sudirman, is the executive director of Fastcomm.  He graduated 
from the Jakarta Institute of Technology and the Art Institute of Seattle in the United States.  Ipang 
is the son of Salahuddin Wahid, who is the brother of the late former president Abdurrahman 
Wahid.  Ratih is known most widely as a former journalist and spokesperson for Abdurrahman 
Wahid, who later set up her communication agency.  Widdi is a former director of LSI, an ITB 
graduate and former 1998 student activist.  
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team’s relative control over the campaign messages produced and distributed 
through mass media. This issue was raised by the secretary of Foke’s campaign 
team: 
“Most social media users were young people. You would not know 
what they would post about.  We need to be careful as it might 
backfire against our campaigning. It’s different to campaign ads.  Our 
campaign messages that we developed for the ads are the ones 
published on television or newspapers.” (Budi Siswanto, personal 
communication, November 2012). 
 
Some members of the political campaign industry in Foke’s teams preferred to 
engage with mass media campaigning for other reasons: because it was proven to 
be sustainable and profitable. Some industry professionals tended to consider 
social media campaigning to be a complementary service to the more profitable 
forms of mass media campaigning (Heryanto, 2012). Social media users in Jakarta 
were assumed to consist of mainly the young middle class who were perceived to 
be disinterested in politics, and not easy to mobilise (Ratih Hardjono, personal 
communication, October 2013).  
 
Such attitudes shaped the Foke campaign team’s strategies in using the Internet 
and social media for his campaigning.  The industry professionals working for 
Foke tended to employ online campaigning as one-way communication, similar to 
mass media.  His campaign team preferred to control the channelling of any 
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campaign messages through online media, although his campaigners did also set 
up his official social media accounts.87   
 
4.3.3. Alex Nurdin  
The incorporation of political campaign industry professionals into Alex Nurdin’s 
campaign team shared similarities to the situation with Foke.  Alex’s electoral 
campaigning was centralized in his campaign team, which comprised both 
political party members and political campaign industry professionals.  His 
strategy of centralized campaigning also limited the incentives for industry 
professionals to employ social media strategically. 
 
Alex, a senior Golkar member and South Sulawesi Governor, was nominated by 
his party.  However, due to friction with Golkar, his nomination did not guarantee 
his party’s full support. Although Alex was endorsed by Golkar Chairman 
Aburizal Bakrie, his nomination was not supported by the majority of Golkar 
members. The Golkar branch in Jakarta considered endorsing Prya Ramadhani, its 
chairman and father in law of Bakrie’ youngest son Ardiansyah Bakrie, as well as 
senior members Tantowi Yahya and Azis Syamsudin (see Witoelar, 2014).88  
Some Golkar members challenged Alex’s nomination, mainly because he was not 
																																																								
87 The industry professionals working for Foke came from different companies and expertise.  
Their collaboration in support of Foke was not always smooth.  During the first round of the 
elections, for example, Irfan Wahid was given the highest budget from Foke to run his media 
campaigning. However, other professional campaigners disagreed with his decision to allocate 
most of that budget to produce campaign ads for television (Anonymous professional campaigner, 
personal communication, December 2013).  Such disagreement indicated the rivalry between the 
industry professionals. 
88 Bakrie-owned PT Bakrie Sumatra Plantation Tbk ran 120,000 hectares of plantations in 
Sumatra, some of which were located in South Sumatra. 
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popular in Jakarta and was still on his South Sumatra gubernatorial services until 
2013 as South Sumatra governor. Alex teamed up with Nono Sampono, a PPP 
cadre.  However, Alex could not expect much political support from the PPP, 
because that party had also endorsed Foke in the election.89  Similarly, while he 
had some support from PDS, this party was both small and internally divided, 
split between factions supporting Foke and Alex.    
 
Regardless, it was Golkar that was in charge of organising Alex’s electoral 
campaigning.  Alex, however, set up a second campaign team in addition to his 
official Golkar-led campaign team.  He placed his son Dodi Reza at the head of 
the second campaign team.  Both teams were financed mainly by Alex, although 
Golkar did donate to fund his official campaign team operations (mainly in the 
form of campaign materials like campaign shirts) (Ade Komaruddin, personal 
communication, November 2013).  
 
Alex was able to raise more than Rp 24 billion (see Table 4.2) with the help of his 
campaign donors, which included some plantation and mining companies in South 
Sulawesi (Anonymous member of Alex campaign team, personal communication, 
October 2013).  Suharto’s daughter, Titik Suharto, also supported his campaign 
by lending her house in the wealthy suburb of Menteng, Central Jakarta free of 
charge (Asril, 2012). 
																																																								
89 Nono had initially approached PDIP to get the party endorsement to run for governor.  However, 
he later decided to switch to Golkar, as PDIP could not guarantee his nomination.  The Jakarta 
branch of PPP had endorsed its senior member, who was also a Jakarta gangster leader, Abraham 
Lunggana (popularly known as Haji Lulung), to run as Alex’s candidate for deputy governor. 
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Moreover, unlike Foke, as the Governor of South Sumatra, Alex was unable to 
optimise the benefits of his networks and patronage of office.  This situation was 
capitalised on by the campaign industry professionals, who saw an opportunity to 
employ social media in Alex’s electoral campaigning for their own benefit.  As 
with Foke’s campaign team, Alex’s campaign teams recruited both political 
campaign industry firms and individuals, including LSI and Giga Communication, 
led by former journalist M. Sulhi Rawi.  However, although Alex’s campaign 
strategists employed online campaigning, they focused more on online media 
(through paid advertisements) instead of social media; although the team also set 
up some official campaign accounts on Facebook and Twitter (M. Sulhi Rawi, 
personal communication, November 2013).  
 
4.3.4. Hidayat Nur Wahid 
The electoral campaigns of Hidayat Nur Wahid, a former chairman of both PKS 
and MPR, was also centralized within the party that supported him: PKS.  The 
main difference between his campaigning and that of other party-backed 
candidates was the level of support from the party.  PKS not only supported 
Hidayat politically; it also organised, financed, fund-raised and operated his 
campaigning.  Such party-centralized campaign organisation provided little 
opportunity for the political campaign industry to contribute in his media 




PKS was known as the best and most effectively organised party in the country. 
However, while Hidayat’s nomination was fully endorsed by his party, he was not 
able to maximise the benefit of the political support from PAN, whose senior 
member, Didik J. Rachbini, ran as Hidayat’s running mate in the election. PAN 
officially endorsed Foke, although some members insisted on supporting 
Rachbini’s campaigning (Qodir, 2012). 
 
Consequently, Hidayat’s campaigning relied mainly on funds raised by PKS.  The 
party was able to attract funds from its members, many of whom owned small and 
middle size business in Jakarta (Dedi Supriyadi, personal communication, 
November 2013). Therefore, it tended to spend its campaign funds in ways that 
distributed more benefits to such members.  In the case of social media 
campaigning, for example, PKS was supported by a number of campaign 
professionals who were PKS cadres (Boy Hamidi, personal communication, 
October 2013).90  PKS social media campaigning was mainly supported by its 
members and sympathizers, most of whom were familiar with the Internet and 
social media. However, precisely because of that, Hidayat’s social media 
campaigning was strictly limited to PKS members and sympathizers and, as a 
result, was unable to attract common social media users (Boy Hamidi, personal 




90 PKS also recruited communication company Fortune to support its mass media campaigning 
(Boy Hamidi, personal communication, October 2013). 
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4.3.5. Faisal Basri  
In contrast to the campaigning strategies of party-backed candidates, independent 
candidate Faisal Basri was the central initiator of his campaign. Without political 
party support, he took charge of his own electoral campaigning.  This opened up 
more possibilities for the political campaign industry to become involved in his 
campaigning, including through social media. However, and despite his limited 
campaign budget, the campaigners working for Faisal focused on mass media 
campaigning.  
 
As a lecturer of University of Indonesia’ School of Economics, as well as a 
researcher, activist and founder of PAN, Faisal relied heavily on his personal 
networks to support his campaigning. The networks of his deputy candidate, Biem 
Benyamin, who was a member of DPD, owner of a private local radio station, and 
son of Jakarta’s popular performing artist the late Benyamin S, were not as vast as 
other party-backed candidates. 
 
Faisal was forced to finance his campaigning himself, as he was unable to raise 
substantial campaign funds from other major donors. 91   Consequently, his 
campaign team’s strategy to pay for expensive advertisements through mass 
media, most prominently television and newspapers, was aimed at raising his 
visibility in public.  While known among some middle class in Jakarta, Faisal was 
not a familiar figure amongst the general public.  Regardless, his campaign team, 
																																																								
91 Faisal sold one of his properties to finance his campaigning (Setyadi, 2012; Sobri, 2012). 
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which comprised mainly industry practitioners who were not employed 
professionally by Faisal, was well prepared with social media campaigning. His 
campaign team, which included some of his friends with media expertise such as 
Santosa and Reiza Azhari, was able to generate Rp 1 billion in campaign funds 
through online fund-raising (Reiza Azhari, personal communication, November 
2013).   
 
4.3.6. Hendarji Supanji 
Like Faisal, independent candidate Hendarji Supanji also personally directed his 
campaign team, which included some former colleagues and professional 
campaigners, including former television presenter Ida Parwati.  The retired Army 
Major General who was paired with Riza Patria, a senior Gerindra member and 
middle level entrepreneur, was not able to generate much funding and had limited 
resource networks.  
 
Hendardji’s campaign team also used mass media as a main campaigning tool, a 
strategy that took a significant part of his limited campaign budget (Ida Parwati, 
personal communication, December 2013). His team’s employment of online 
campaigning, which was not specifically budgeted, was seen as an initiative of a 
member of the team who had some media industry experience.  The main reason 
he failed to mobilise voters was his lack of finances (compared to party-backed 
candidates), which limited his capacity for online, and offline, campaigning (Ida 
Parwati, personal communication, December 2013). 
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4.4. The Political Campaign Industry and Social Media Use 
This next section argues that the use of social media in the Jakarta election was 
not organic. The emergence of social media use was a consequence of the 
involvement of practitioners from the political campaign industry, who developed 
and sold social media campaigning services to their clients (mainly the political 
parties and the candidates).  This finding supports the idea that commercial means 
increasingly play crucial roles in constructing public opinion, particularly in the 
electoral context (Sussman, 2005). More importantly, it also supports the view 
that social media have been used for commercial purposes in the context of 
electoral competition (Trottier & Fuchs, 2015). 
 
In addition to the nature of social media, there were crucial commercial incentives 
for the industry to build social media campaigning as profitable services.  Firstly, 
there was a lack of regulation on social media electoral campaigning.92  The 
existing law regulating the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election did not refer to 
online electoral campaigning through the Internet or Internet-based platforms.93  
The law merely regulated electoral campaigning through conventional media, 
which were obliged to provide free and balanced coverage to all candidates in 
electoral campaigns.  The lack of regulation suggested that social media, unlike 
																																																								
92 Electoral campaigning in local elections is regulated in 2015 following the issuance of Undang-
undang No. 8 Tahun 2015 tentang Pemilihan Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur, Bupati dan Wakil 
Bupati serta Walkiota dan Wakil Walikota, also known as the law on local elections. Online 
electoral campaigning is regulated in 2015 following the issuance of KPU Regulation No 7/2015 
on Local Election Campaigns. 
93  Direct local elections were regulated by Undang Undang No 32 Tahun 2004 tentang 
Pemerintahan Daerah, or the law on local administrations.  Direct local elections were later 
regulated by Undang-undang No. 22 Tahun 2007 tentang Penyelenggaraan Pemilihan Umum, or 
the law on general elections.  The 2007 Jakarta election become the first local election regulated 
by the law.  The 2012 Jakarta election was held under the same law. 
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conventional mass media, were not considered official campaign channels during 
the 2012 Jakarta election, and thus that the Internet platforms escaped any such 
requirements set by law.  Secondly, social media have the potential to mobilise 
users; a crucial factor that can be developed into a new service as an alternative to 
established forms of mass media campaigning. The general perception that 
campaigning through social media is cheaper than the more expensive forms of 
mass media contributed to the development of social media campaigning as a new 
competitive service.  This is not to suggest that social media campaigning services 
are free. After all, social media campaigning services were developed by 
commercial enterprises for profit, particularly because this development required 
particular technical expertise that the political parties or politicians do not have.  
Such development of social media campaigning services represented media 
commodification as suggested by Mosco (2009). 
 
Those industry professionals who were ready to initiate social media campaigning 
were those who were optimistic about its prospects in the political campaigning 
market.  Most of these industry professionals involved in the Jakarta elections 
were working for Jokowi (Kartika Jumadi, personal communication, November 
2013). In these Jakarta elections, despite their sometime indifferent attitudes to 
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In the case of all contestants in the 2012 Jakarta elections, the use of social media 
for campaigning was initiated and operated by the campaign professionals.  
However, this chapter argues that economic factors drove the emergence of social 
media campaigning (Sussman, 2005); rather than the trigger being the lack of 
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expertise of the political parties or candidates to engage with the technical aspects 
of media technology (Norris, 2000).   
 
However, the involvement of practitioners from the political campaign industry in 
the electoral campaigning operation did not occur automatically.  It was initiated 
by the development of social media campaigning services, including the 
managing of content, audience or users, and labour.  These three aspects defined 
the significance of social media campaigning services in the electoral process. 
4.4.1. Social Media Content 
The production and circulation of campaign messages became a main focus for 
the campaign industry.  The findings of this dissertation contradict arguments that 
social media articulated a genuine expression of social media users (or volunteers) 
in the 2012 Jakarta election (Suaedy, 2014).  While the findings did not contradict 
arguments that social media content reflected textual contestation and 
manipulation (Sadasri, 2016), it found that application of social media to generate 
content can actually provide a new business opportunity for the industry. 
 
Social media content consists of text, images, videos or memes that are passed 
from one user to another.94  Social media content is significant not only because it 
is a subject of consumption, but also, more importantly, production and 
distribution (as well as re-production and re-distribution) by social media users 
(see Dean, 2005; Fuchs, 2009).  Therefore, the main purpose of social media 
																																																								
94 Social media content ranges from regular text to complicated images, videos and memes, 
highlighting the time, skills and energy dedicated by users to producing them, mainly for free. 
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campaigning is to make campaign issues go viral.  Virality refers to a many-to -
many, mass-personal communication shaped by various factors, from the 
characteristics of networks to human attention (Nahon & Hemsley, 2013). This is 
the point where the political campaign industry can contribute: generating content 
that attracts as many users as possible to engage in the production and distribution 
of the campaign messages.  
 
However, the work of the political campaign industry did not focus on the 
creation of social media content per se. Instead, their main task was sourcing, 
curating and managing campaign issues, to maintain the flow of social media 
content production and distribution throughout the electoral campaign period, 
until the day of the election.95  These tasks were to support the strategies dubbed 
positive and negative campaigning. This refers to electoral campaign messages 
that highlight the strengths (achievements or personal characteristics deemed 
supportive of image development) of the candidates, known as positive content; 
and its converse, the negative content that focuses on campaign messages 
promoting the weakness (failures or personal characteristics deemed detrimental 
to image-making) of the contenders.96 
 
																																																								
95Social media campaigning firms provide a series of services commonly adopted in the field of 
marketing; from setting the campaign objectives, to determining key selling propositions and 
statements, to conducting research, planning, execution and evaluation.  
96 Some scholars have condemned negative campaigning as the malaise of democratic politics, 
while others argue that negative campaigning is a legitimate and necessary part of a democratic 
discussion, because it provides citizens with essential information about the issues and choices at 
stake (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994; Mayer, 1996). Indonesian campaign professionals also 
acknowledge a strategy known as “black” campaigning, referring to fictitious issues or rumours 
against the candidates’ contenders aimed at reducing their electability or popularity.  
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The significance of the positive and negative campaigning was to encourage users 
to amass campaign content through social media (see Dean, 2005).97 It is the 
interplay between the positive and negative aspects of the candidates that becomes 
the ground from which the whole electoral campaign is played out in social 
media. Through positive and negative campaign issues, the industry was able not 
only to mobilise users to generate content, but more importantly to highlight the 
visibility of social media content carrying issues during the election that fell into 
the two categories: supporting the candidates and denouncing their contenders.  
 
During the 2012 Jakarta election, Jokowi became a target of negative 
campaigning drives which culminated during the second round of the election 
(Kusumadewi & Sodiq, 2012).  Most of the issues against him revolved around 
false accusations about his Muslim credentials or his Javanese background.  In 
contrast, the issues against Foke were mostly those focussing on the failure of his 
administration to handle urban problems such as traffic jams and flooding 
(Haryanto, Theo, & Malik, 2012). 
 
4.4.2. Mobilising Users 
The political campaign industry professionals sought to mobilise social media 
users to engage in the production and distribution of social media content.98  
																																																								
97  The ability of social media to amass content is a particular media phenomenon which one 
scholar named “the fantasy of abundance” (Dean, 2009).  It refers to the accumulation of content 
on the Internet which, instead of proliferating discourses, depreciates its meaning. The abundance 
of social media content often hides or buries the substance or the messages. 
98 Political campaigners commonly target specific group of voters as a strategy to divide voters 
into “ours” and “theirs”.  The target voters may be defined by geographical location, ethnicity, 
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Analysing and categorising interest groups within an electorate is a routine task 
for political campaign professionals, who seek then to sell candidates to those 
targeted voters.  Mobilising voters through social media requires “a highly 
individuated and partisan political climate in which politicians speak through the 
electorate largely through sound bites that their pollsters’ data identify as safe, 
memorable and marketable” (Sussman, 2005, p. 41).    
To mobilise social media users in the proliferation of campaign content 
supporting their clients, Jakarta-based professional campaigners categorised users 
into supporters of the candidates, supporters of the contenders, undecided voters 
and journalists (Kartika Jumadi, personal communication, November 2013).  In 
conventional campaigning, supporters of other candidates were not targeted; due 
to the assumption that they will never convert their preference.  Conventional 
campaigning through mass media was mainly designed to influence undecided 
voters and reinforce the supporters of the candidates. The opposite, however, has 
happened in social media campaigning (Suaedy, 2014, p. 124). Campaigners 
target supporters of the contender not necessarily to convert them, but rather to 
engage them in a cyber campaign war.  Such a war (involving the proliferation of 
social media content that either supports or denounces certain candidates) is 
important for purposes such as opinion reinforcement, mobilisation, donation and 
activism targeted at the candidates’ supporters.   
 
Central to what the campaign teams dubbed the ‘cyber war’ is online activism, 
																																																																																																																																																							




which aims to convert interested but passive social media users into activists.  
This was introduced prominently by professionals working for Jokowi, 
particularly in the second round of the election in August 2014.  The professional 
campaigners working for Jokowi set up Jokowi-Ahok Social Media Volunteers 
(JASMEV), a loose volunteer group.  This group turned into the first visible 
online volunteer group during the electoral campaign period in Jakarta. These 
volunteers comprised mostly students and office employees, who were trained by 
the professionals to engage in social media campaigning.  The training provided 
meticulous guidance for the volunteers to engage in cyber wars, aimed at both 
encouraging Jokowi’s supporters and provoking supporters of his contenders to 
join in these cyber wars.99  The campaigners not only prepared campaign issues 
for the volunteers to discuss on social media, but also instructed them on how to 
produce social media content based on such issues; and when to post this content.  
The guidance also outlined how to respond to social media content degrading 
Jokowi and his deputy candidate. 
 
Several campaign teams, including those of Foke and Alex, opted to pay a number 
of social media users to drive the majority of social media users in their 
campaigning.  Another way of steering social media users to join in social media 
campaigning was through political party machinery.  However, during the Jakarta 
election, only PKS was able to implement such a strategy.  Social media 
campaigning by Hidayat’s team relied heavily on PKS members; however, this 
																																																								
99 The professionals’ work involved developing campaign issues, monitoring the behaviour of 
social media users, and guiding the volunteers to engage in cyber campaign wars.  
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failed to attract the attention of other users, partly because they only connected to 
fellow PKS members on social media.  In addition, professionals working for 
Hidayat did not specifically guide their members on how to engage in social 
media campaigning (Boy Hamidi, personal communication, October 2013).  
 
Specifically, such “cyber war” was aimed at maintaining the enthusiasm of social 
media users to continue to produce and distribute electoral content throughout the 
one month campaign period. The industry’s employment of hash tags on Twitter, 
for example, reflected its ‘cyber war’ strategy of inviting users to join in the social 
media electoral campaign.  The first acknowledged Twitter hash tag used in the 
2012 Jakarta election was #ReplaceTitleSongWithJOKOWI to support Jokowi, 
which became a trending topic in Indonesia during the Jakarta election (Amri et 
al., 2013).100  The use of such a strange and politically irrelevant hash tag was 
aimed at attracting users to participate in social media campaigning, whether 
consciously or not.  This highlights the attempts to engineer content on social 
media, aimed specifically at mobilising voters to participate in the production and 
distribution of content about Jokowi.  
 
4.4.3. Managing Labour 
This study found that social media campaigning generated labour that require the 
political campaign industry to manage.   The finding contradicts the assertion that 
social media campaigns which supported candidates were generated by genuine 
																																																								
100 ‘Trending topics’ refers to a number of topics, using the particular hash tag symbol #, that are 
the most discussed on Twitter over a particular period.   
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social media volunteers, or, to put it differently, that all social media users were 
volunteers of the candidates (Suaedy, 2014).   
 
The main concerns of this section are the ways in which social media 
campaigning has enabled new players to enter the campaign consulting business.  
The industry is a ‘fluid” one, which welcomes new players with the necessary 
expertise (Hamburger, 2001; Thurber & Nelson, 2001).  However, the findings of 
this chapter also suggest that the fluid nature of the industry not only 
accommodates regular players, such as ICT or communication professionals, but 
also the likes of unidentified ‘buzzers’ or influencers running pseudonymous 
social media accounts to conduct smear campaigns against the candidates. 
 
Social media campaigning introduced new form of campaign labour, such as 
‘buzzing’ and social media monitoring.  Buzzing refers to the distribution of 
campaign issues through social media by users with a large network (for example, 
with a large number of followers on Twitter or ‘friends’ on Facebook) 
(Paramadhita, 2013).  Such buzzers are perceived to be influential due their ability 
to reach out and to distribute content to many social media users.  In the 
commercial marketing sector, these users, mainly celebrities with a large number 
of Twitter followers or Facebook ‘friends’, often receive financial incentives from 
advertisers to endorse commercial products. However, such users are not always 
celebrities or famous people.  In the context of electoral campaigning, such 
individuals have become known as buzzers.  
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In fact, there were two types of buzzers identified during the Jakarta election.  The 
first category was buzzers unpaid by a campaign team; these weremainly popular 
celebrities and social activists who supported the candidates.  This group 
commonly supported either Jokowi or Basri.  The second category was paid 
buzzers, who were recruited mainly by the campaign teams of Foke and Alex. 
 
a. The Emergence of Pseudonymous Buzzers 
In particular, the 2012 Jakarta election marked the emergence of the popular 
pseudonymous social media buzzers @triomacan2000 or @kurawa, who drew 
hundreds of thousands followers, as political buzzers on Twitter.101  The account 
of @triomacan2000, for example, was run for financial purposes by a number of 
people led by individuals identified as Raden Nuh and Abdul Rasyid, who were 
graduates of Sumatra Utara University (Yusron, 2012). Raden once served as a 
commissioner of state-enterprise PT Asuransi Berdikari. Rasyid was on the expert 
staff of the Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs, Hatta Radjasa, who was 
both PAN chairman and father in law of the youngest son of President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. The account administrators reportedly threatened Ahok’s 
campaign team that they would buzz smear campaigns against Jokowi and Ahok 
if the team did not use their buzzing services for Rp 1 billion. The offer was 
																																																								
101 The first recorded popular pseudonymous Twitter account, which posted political issues and 
gossip on Twitter, was actually @bennyisrael, whose account was set up in 2010.  This account 
garnered the attention of Twitter users because it often tweeted “behind the door” while readers 
would understand the meaning of this, the colloquial expression with which readers would be 
familiar would be ‘behind the scenes’ stories related to some controversial political and securities 
issues (Reza, 2011). 
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rejected (Amri et al., 2013). 102  During the election campaign period, 
@triomacan2000 was hired by Foke’s campaign team in the second round of the 
election (Anonymous campaigner, personal communication, November 2013).  
This account focused on attacking Jokowi’s personal life (Sadasri, 2016). 
 
Twitter account @kurawa, on the other hand, joined the campaign team of Jokowi 
in a voluntary capacity, organised by JASMEV. This twitter account was run by a 
man identified as Rudi Sutanto.103 In comparison to @triomacan2000, @kurawa 
focused on uncovering the failures of the Jakarta administration under Foke 
(Sadasri, 2016).    
 
b. The Establishment of Social Media Monitoring Services 
Mobilising social media users required the industry to monitor the behaviour of 
social media users closely during the electoral campaign period.  The emergence 
of social media monitoring services fulfilled such a need; tracing not only social 
media users’ behaviour and candidate preferences, but also their possible changes 
in behaviour and preferences.  Such information enabled the political contenders 
to develop a social media campaign strategy and monitor the social media 
components so as to win the ‘cyber campaign war’.   
 
This service represented immanent commodification (see discussion in chapter 2), 
																																																								
102 The account was active up to the 2014 presidential election. 
103 Sutanto identified himself as a forensic auditor.  His account supported the administration of 
Ahok, who became the Jakarta governor after Jokowi, who relinquished that office on winning the 
2014 presidential election. 
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which is defined as “how commodities produce their own new commodities, and 
how new commodities are produced through the association among different 
commodities” (Mosco, 2009, p. 141). Social media monitoring is on a par with the 
significance of audience ratings in the commodification of conventional media, 
which “demands the use of measurement procedures to produce commodities and 
monitoring techniques to keep track of production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption” (p. 141). 
 
A social media monitoring service is enabled by a search engine trawling through 
a mass of content from the Internet and social media.  The machine commonly 
uses certain keywords relevant to the candidates to mine millions of items of 
social media.  It is able to analyse this big data to extract the information 
necessary for social media campaigning strategy making (Table 4.5).  During the 
2012 Jakarta election, it was only Jokowi’s personal campaign team that 
employed such services.  The companies that provided the services were 
Katapedia and Politicawave.104  Their services involved presenting the results of 
social media monitoring regularly (daily, weekly or during a certain period prior 
to crucial times such as televised gubernatorial debates) to other strategists tasked 
with managing campaign issues.  
 
																																																								
104 Politicawave and Katapedia; which were among the first Internet monitoring companies in 
Indonesia to service a political candidate, when they worked for Jokowi in the 2012 Jakarta 
election. Politicawave is led by Jose Rizal, while Deddy Rachman chaired Katapedia. Both Rizal 
and Rachman were ITB-educated engineers.  These companies developed software to monitor the 
Internet and social media content.  Their businesses initially catered to commercial campaigning, 
but then expanded to political campaign online monitoring.   
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These companies were among the first Indonesian Internet monitoring companies 
to become involved formally in a political campaign.  This particular service of 
social media monitoring gained public attention following their accurate 
prediction that Jokowi would win the election, which was against the forecast of 
conventional pollsters in the first round of the election.105 
 
Table 4.5. 
Social media measurement methods  
 
Method Function 
Sentiment index  To measure and compare the sentiment of social media users 
toward candidates  
Unique user  To measure the number of unique accounts involved in a 
social media conversation about a certain brand (or candidate) 
during a certain period of time.  This is equal to ‘media reach’ 
in conventional media as an effectiveness measurement 
Buzz  To measure the number of social media conversations about a 
brand (or candidate) during a certain period of time 
Trend of awareness  To measure the level of buzz about all candidates during a 
certain period of time 
Candidate electability  To measure the position of a candidate compared to other 
candidates during a certain period of time 
Share of awareness To measure the percentage of buzz of every candidate during a 
certain period of time 
Earned media of 
product  
To measure the share of sentiment in conversations about a 
brand (or a candidate) against other brand (or other candidate) 
during a certain category (or election) 
Share of citizen  To measure the percentage of unique users involved in social 
media conversations about every candidates 
Source: Politicawave (2014). 
 
Such a service is essentially a form of immanent commodification, referring to 
commodities that may produce their own new commodities (Mosco, 2009). The 
most popular example of immanent commodification in conventional media is 
audience rating, which refers to a measurement of viewership of a particular 
																																																								
105  IndoBarometer (M. Qodari), Lingkaran Survey Indonesia (Denny JA), Jaringan Survey 
Indonesia (Widdi Aswindi) and Sugeng Sarjadi School of Government (Sugeng Sarjadi) predicted 
that Foke would win the election. 
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television program.  
 
4.4.2.  Assessing Impacts of Social Media Campaigning 
This section analyses the significance of social media to the electoral process in 
Jakarta.  It focuses on the social media’s significance to the development of the 
political campaign industry, and the extent to which social media contributed to 
the electoral campaigns. 
 
The existence of social media enabled the political campaign industry to build 
social media campaigning services to serve the interests of the candidates to win 
elections.  However, these social media campaigning services also served the 
business interests of the practitioners; quite separately from the electoral function.  
Most of the media industry strategists and professionals involved were affiliated 
with other commercial communication businesses areas, such as advertising or 
public relations.  In the case of Jokowi, for example, the industry professionals 
provided pro-bono social media campaigning services.  However, such pro-bono 
services should be seen as a part of encompassing strategies to get wider access to 
the economic resources available in Jakarta, including in the form of commercial 
projects from the Jakarta administration.  
 
Three industry practitioners who volunteered for Jokowi’s social media 
campaigning operation in the 2012 Jakarta election, for example, chaired 
enterprises specializing in communication.  PT Spin Doctor Indonesia, as one 
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example, gained several commercial projects from the Jakarta administration 
under Governor Joko Widodo (Kartika Jumadi, 2013). 
 
Social media also enabled the political campaign industry to play strategic roles 
in the electoral campaigning.  As shown in the case of Jokowi, the professionals 
were able to use social media campaigning to mobilise campaign donors and 
middle class activists strategically.  The loose nature of JASMEV facilitated 
Jokowi’s campaigners to access and benefit from middle level donors.   
There were two types of campaign donors identified inhe 2012 Jakarta election.  
The first type were the high-profile donors; comprising, for example, major 
national companies.  The second were the middle level donors, such as the owners 
of middle level companies, and officials or directors of both government and 
Jakarta administration offices. The donations from high-profile donors were 
mainly in the form of money, use of their vehicles (from cars to jet planes) and 
office space (for campaign rooms), and payment for campaign advertisements.  
This left little room for the middle donors to contribute towards the elections, 
particularly because these middle level donors were cautious about donating 
through political party members, some of whom embezzled campaign donations 




106 There were several known cases where donations channelled through party members did not 
reach the party treasurers.  Some members may have used the funds for purposes other than 
campaigning (Mietzner, 2007). 
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Within this line, social media campaigning enabled a space for these middle level 
donors to contribute to Jokowi’s social media campaigning.  One middle level 
donor to Jokowi explained, 
“I am lucky to find this group to help his campaign.  I did not know 
much about social media, but if the volunteers needed paper, 
telephone credit, or anything that I could help with, they always came 
to me. I didn’t expect anything in return, but I am glad Pak Jokowi 
acknowledged my contribution.” (Anonymous campaign donor, 
personal communication, December 2013). 
 
Their donations, albeit not as great as those of high-profile donors, were deemed 
significant to support Jokowi’s social media campaigning, covering not only 
expenses for telephone credit, but also food and pocket money for the volunteers 
who were the main implementers of his social media campaigning. In return for 
both their financial contributions and network largesse, these middle level donors 
expected not only business opportunities and protection but also protection and 
support for their careers.  This finding showed that the elite’s alliances with other 
social groups were necessary in the development of hegemony as suggested by 
Gramsci.  
 
Thus, this is not to suggest that social media as a new media technology helped an 
outsider politician level the competition he faced against established politicians.  
On the contrary, Jokowi was understood to be a stepping stone from which these 
middle level donors could gain wider access to political and economy resources. It 
should be underlined that Jokowi was considered to be the closest contender to 
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Foke, because of his popularity. Riding on that popularity, those who joined in 
Jokowi’s volunteer groups expected to gain something in return for their 
campaign donations.  This explained their preference for Jokowi, instead of 
independent candidate Faisal Basri, who was able to form a relatively clean image 
but lacks popularity. 
 
These middle level donors could not compete against high-profile donors, who 
were mostly channelling their donations to a candidate who was predicted to have 
the greatest chance (as validated by opinion pollsters) to win the election.  These 
high-profile donors, however, contributed smaller amounts to other candidates 
who requested it.  According to one high-profile donor, 
 “In every election, we donate to all candidates through their trusted 
people.  They could be party members, their assistants or siblings.  We 
always give the most (donation) to the one who will win the election 
based on (opinion) surveys.” (Anonymous national property company 
director, personal communication, 2013). 
 
Social media campaigning also attracted middle class activists to volunteer for 
Jokowi (Nuswantoro, 2014; Sembiring, 2014). The findings reported in this 
section, however, do not support the argument that the involvement of such 
activists in social media conversations was a form of deliberative participation 
and volunteerism (Nuswantoro, 2014). This dissertation found instead that such 
involvement was facilitated partly by the middle class’ decreasing tolerance 
towards urban issues that have substantially reduced their rate of increase in living 
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standard.  It is in line with Gramsci’s idea that the ruling class may form alliances 
and cooperation with the ruled. 
 
Indeed, Jakarta’s middle class did engage in social media conversations about the 
elections.  However, the middle class in Jakarta employed social media to voice 
their concerns over certain specific issues associated with access to productive 
resources, life quality, and security – including basic education fees, health care, 
traffic jams, public transportation, flooding and bureaucracy (Prisma, 2012).  In 
short, their grievances revolved around Jakarta’s major urban problems (Simone 
& Rao, 2012). 
 
Jakarta’s middle class largely represents the broader middle class in Indonesia, 
which developed during the Sukarno presidency and expanded during the New 
Order and post-authoritarian periods.  This middle class consists of “the skilled 
workforce of capitalism”, including managers, technocrats, marketers and 
financiers (Robison & Goodman, 1996, pp. 8-9).  Journalists, university students 
and lecturers, artists, lawyers, non-governmental organisation (NGO) activists are 
also parts of the middle class (Heryanto & Mandal, 2003, p. 27). According to 
Robison & Goodman,  
 “Clearly the middle classes represent a new set of social interests that 
regimes must take into account.  What now becomes critical for these 
new social interests are living standards that include high levels of 
consumption and a greater emphasis on leisure; a greater concern for 
education as a central mechanism for securing position and wealth; a 
desire for predictability and certainty of laws; and access to 
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information and analysis.” (Robison & Goodman, 1996, p. 11). 
 
While often demanding, such a middle class is generally not interested in joining 
a political movement; instead they tend to form alliances with capital owners or 
other social groups that share the same interests (p. 8).  In line with such an 
understanding, this dissertation suggests that middle class Jakartans joined in 
social media conversations during the Jakarta election period not necessarily 
because of their interest in participating in electoral volunteerism or activism, but 
rather because social media provided an avenue for expression of grievances that 
aligned well with the Jakartan middle class lifestyle. 
 
In addition, this group’s participation of social media users during the 2012 
election was facilitated by their better access to the Internet, compared to that of 
the lower classes.  Facebook and, particularly, Twitter offered a convenience for 
the middle class to vent their concerns and frustrations over the perceived decline 
in quality of living in the capital under the administration of Foke.  The new 
technology enabled them to make their voices heard, particularly during the 
electoral campaign period, without having to leave the convenience of their air-
conditioned houses, offices and vehicles.  
 
Unlike conventional media, Facebook and Twitter have no restrictions upon 
anyone expressing their opinion. The mediated nature of conventional media 
requires a complex process to publish every-day complaints from audiences.  In 
newspapers, for example, it requires the editorial board to approve the complaint 
	
	 170	
letter from a reader before this can be published (see Setianti, Hafiar, & Koswara, 
2005). The newspaper space dedicated to such a purpose is commonly very 
limited. Therefore, use of such a relatively complicated conventional avenue to 




This chapter has explored the contributions of the campaign consulting industry in 
the use of social media for electoral campaigning during the 2012 Jakarta 
Gubernatorial Election. It has argued that such use of social media was 
determined by the relations within and among the candidates, political parties, 
donors and  middle class social media users.  This enabled the campaign industry 
to expand its commercial interests through the commodification of content, 
audience and labour.  
 
As the country’s capital, Jakarta was a major arena of electoral contestation, 
characterised by complex social relations among the many electoral players, even 
beyond its geographical boundary. In particular, the Jakarta election reflected the 
contradictions inherent in such relations.  The candidate-party relations, which 
shaped their immediate relationships with campaign donors and social media 
users, became a major force in the strategic use of social media campaigning by 
the political campagn industry supporting Jokowi. The contribution of the 
																																																								
107 The middle class in Jakarta rarely went to the street to express their demands. Their 
engagement with political parties was limited.  During the 2007 and the 2012 elections, it was the 
lower classes that dominated the vote count (Sultani, 2014). 
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campaign donors and social media users to Jokowi’s social media campaigns 
supported him to enter the epicentrum of national politics in Jakarta. 
 
 The ability of the political campaign professionals to employ social media 
strategically contributed to the increasing visibility of social media in Jakarta’s 
election.  Such campaign efforts led not only to the engagement of social media, 
but also the entrenchment of the political campaign industry, which had its own 
interests in expanding its business opportunities, in the electoral process.  
Eventually, the industry-led social media campaigning enabled Jokowi to widen 
the base of the candidate’s campaign sources to middle level donors and networks 



























Chapter 5  
The Use of Social Media in the 2013 Makassar Mayoral Election 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the use of social media in the 2013 mayoral election in 
Makassar, the capital of South Sulawesi province in eastern Indonesia. This 
represents a smaller arena of contestation than the previous Jakarta example, with 
smaller stakes characterised by stable relations between the electoral players 
under the control of just a few members of the political economy elite. In contrast 
to the situation in Jakarta, such stable relations presented less pressure for the 
candidates to innovate during their campaigning.  Consequently, there were few 
incentives for the political campaign industry to exploit social media strategically 
as a new profitable campaigning service; and this resulted in their limited roles in 
mediating the use of social media during this election and eventually the overall 
social media campaigns which did not gain strong support from campaign donors 
and leading local social media users. 
 
This situation was driven partly by the fact that the existing modes of 
campaigning, such as canvassing and mass media campaigning, were adequate to 
channel the candidates’ persuasive efforts to reach voters. However, social media 
were used in the 2013 Makassar mayoral election as a new mode of campaigning, 




Central to the discussion of this case is the implementation of post-authoritarian 
decentralization reform in Indonesia, which granted greater autonomy to local 
leaders. The policy dispersing authority to the district level was expected to 
strengthen local administration to deliver prosperity to local people (Buehler, 
2010). However, the post-authoritarian local elections in Indonesia had yet to 
fundamentally transform local power relations, despite new election laws lifting 
the restriction on common citizens joining in the democratic process of power re-
generation. Instead, local elites found direct local elections to be “new 
opportunities to reinvent themselves according to the exigencies of change and to 
survive and thrive yet again” (Hadiz, 2010, p. 143).  In simple terms, local 
elections were captured by local elites to maintain their power in the regions.  
Such a capture of local elections by local predatory interests was visible in 
Makassar, in both the physical and virtual space.   
 
A few families, including the Yasin Limpos, the Halids, and the Kallas, were 
especially influential, gaining control of the local political economy in South 
Sulawesi (see Tomsa, 2008a).  From the end of the Suharto government, the 
influence of these families on local politics and businesses in the province became 
increasingly visible.  These families were able to build their power through local 
direct elections enabled by the decentralization policy (Kenawas, 2013). The 
circumstances in South Sulawesi illustrated the capture of elections as a 




Hadiz (2010) suggests that the elite’s capture of the electoral process was often 
facilitated by practices such as money politics and political violence.  This 
chapter, however, demonstrates that such elite capture of the elections was not 
only achieved through such predatory behavior in the real world, but also 
achieved in the virtual world, through the employment of media – most 
prominently the Internet and social media.  It essentially supports Gramsci’s 
hegemony over the necessity of the ruling class to maintain their rule through 
non-coercive methods.. The political campaign industry’s contribution in the 
employment of social media for electoral campaigning was seen as a way of 
expanding the elites’ influence, using a new mechanism for obtaining popular 
support; with the adoption of the new features of social media providing new 
networks of users, interactivity and real-time communication (see Abdillah, 
2014).   
 
This chapter comprises three sections.  The first section explores the online 
landscape and the use of social media for electoral campaigning in Makassar.  The 
second looks into the relations between local candidates, to understand the nature 
and operations of electoral campaigning during these elections.  The third section 
examines the ways in which the local campaign industry employed social media 
for electoral campaigning, and the impact of such social media campaigning upon 





5.2. The Internet Landscape and Social Media Campaigning in Makassar 
Unlike during the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election, the use and impact of social 
media appeared to be minimal in the 2013 Makassar mayoral election.108 At a 
glance, the reason for this seems to have been the Internet infrastructure. 
Makassar is a mayoralty located in eastern part of Indonesia, which is less 
developed overall than the capital. Moreover, the 2013 Makassar election 
represented the lowest level of direct political election in Indonesia involving 
political parties and government Electoral Commission oversight; with smaller 
number of voters and fewer resources available.109  
 
The number of voters in Makassar approached 1 million, while the number of 
Internet users was estimated to be around 472,000; out of a total population of 
nearly 1.3 million people in 2012 (Kominfo, 2013).  In comparison, in 2012 
Jakarta had nearly seven million registered voters and about 3.5 million Internet 
users, out of a total Jakarta population of some 9.5 million.  Internet users in 
Makassar consisted of residents who accessed the Internet from home, office, 
school and other wireless-connected public spaces. The number of subscribers to 
mobile Internet broadband alone in Makassar in 2013 exceeded 110,000.  Central 
Statistics Bureau (BPS) data for 2010 showed that the number of Makassar 
																																																								
108 The use of social media for electoral campaigning in Makassar was not completely invisible to 
the public.  In fact, social media campaigning had been reported in the mass media (see Rudhy, 
2013).  
109 Indonesia also undertakes village level elections.  However, there is no formal involvement of 
political parties at this lowest level, because candidates for village head do not require any backing 
from political parties.  Nor do village level elections involve election authorities such as the 
Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum/KPU) and Election Supervisory Committee 
(Panitia Pengawas Pemilu/Panwas). 
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households with Internet access reached 130,000, out of a total number of some 
300,000 (BPS, 2010).  As with the 2012 Jakarta elections, the 2013 Makassar 
election also attracted the attention of users from other cities, in this case mainly 
in South Sulawesi province. In 2010, there were over 300,000 households in 
South Sulawesi, out of a total of 1,626,629 households that had access to the 
Internet (BPS, 2010).  
 
Makassar Internet users, similar to their peers across Indonesia, went online 
largely to access social media (APJII, 2014).  A study revealed that 87 percent of 
Internet users in Indonesia accessed social media (APJII, 2014).  Most users, 
including those in Makassar, comprised young middle class people between 17-35 
years old, who shared similarities with social media users in Jakarta.  Makassar 
Internet and social media users were enthusiastic users, with many joining and 
participating active in various online communities (Abud, 2012). 
 
The increasing number of social media users in Makassar has facilitated the use of 
social media as a new site for campaigning.  Prior to the 2013 Makassar mayoral 
election, there were only a few examples of social media use for electoral 
campaigning in Makassar and South Sulawesi in general. In one example, the first 
direct Makassar mayoral election in 2008, which was the first Makassar mayoral 
election that accommodated independent candidates, included the use of blogs for 
campaigning.1 At that time, the blogs were not developed professionally; because 
this form of campaigning was merely an experiment by the campaign teams, some 
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of which were supported by university students with familiarity with social media 
(Abdul Haris Awie, June 2014). The 2013 South Sulawesi Gubernatorial Election, 
which was held in January or some six months before the Makassar mayoral 
election, had also witnessed the use of social media for campaigning, including 
Facebook and Twitter (Azhar, 2012).  Use of social media in the gubernatorial 
election had engaged local industry professionals.  However, given the slow 
impact of the use of social media in the electoral process in Makassar, further 
examination of the relations between the local electoral players in the election is 
warranted, to understand the extent to which local political campaign industry 
professionals employed social media campaigning. 
 
5.3. The Candidates and Their Relations to other Electoral Players 
The 2013 Makassar mayoral election was not immune to political party internal 
conflicts pertaining to the candidates’ nomination process.  However, unlike in 
Jakarta, Makassar’s local elites had sufficient numbers of candidates from within 
their inner circles who were popular enough to compete in the election. The 
candidates running in the 2013 Makassar mayoral election were largely linked 
strongly to the local political economy elites.   
 
The elites, particularly the few privileged families, had strong local political 
networks and relations with local media, the two most important means for 
canvassing and mass media campaigning.  Therefore, in contrast to Jakarta, the 
dominance of the local elites in Makassar presented less need for the candidates to 
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innovate their campaigning strategies. The limited extent to which the local 
political campaign industry used and benefited from social media campaigning 
during this election was influenced by these local dominance relations.  
 
Ten pairs of candidates competed in the 2013 Makassar election, as shown in 
Table 5.1.  The 2013 Makassar mayoral election was the second election in 
Makassar that accommodated independent candidates.110  
 
Table 5.1.  
The candidates and political support in the 2013 Makassar mayoral election 
 
Source: KPU Kota Makassar (2013). 
   * Independent candidates were required to secure support from a minimum of 3 percent 
(53,493 people) out of the total registered voters in Makassar, as proved by copies of ID cards of 
the supporters.  Party-backed candidates were required to gain support from a party or a coalition 
of parties that had secured 15 percent of the 100 total seats in the DPRD council, or 15 percent of 
																																																								
110 The participation of independent candidates was made possible by a 2008 law on elections 
permitting candidates to run in regional elections without a political party or party coalition 
support. The 2008 Makassar mayoral election attracted six pairs of candidates, including three 
pairs of independent candidates.  
Candidates Political Support Votes 
Adil Patu- 
Isradi Zainal 
6 PDK, 3 Gerindra, PKB (not represented) 
9 seats, or 18 percent of the total DPRD seats 
  14,556 
Supomo Guntur- 
Kadir Halid  
11 Golkar, 2 PDIP 
13 seats, or 26 percent of the total DPRD seats 















    5,489 
Tamsil Linrung- 
Das’ad Latief 
5 PKS, 3 Hanura, 1 PBR 
9 seats, or 18 percent of total DPRD seats 
  93,868 








9 Demokrat, PBB (not represented) 
9 seats, or 18 percent of total DPRD seats 
182,484 
Irman Yasin Limpo- 
Busrah Abdullah 
5 PAN, 3 PPP 
8 seats, or 16 percent of total DPRD seats 
114,032 
Apiaty Amin Syam- 
Zulkifli Gani Otto 
21 non-seat parties 
 
    7,326 
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votes in the last election. 
             * Data on campaign funds are not available, as the KPU Makassar did not make this 
information public.  
 
Although there were five independent candidates among the total of 10 candidates 
running in the 2013 Makassar election, none was a complete outsider from the 
political economy elite in Makassar and South Sulawesi.  All the independent 
candidates were either local politicians or had some experience in politics.  Most 
had decided to run as independents after they failed to secure party endorsement. 
Consequently, while in Jakarta Jokowi was able to present himself as a new figure 
who could bring in changes, none of the candidates in Makassar was able to 
present themselves as such; the impacts of which will be discussed in the later 
section. 
 
As has been mentioned briefly in the introduction, the elections in South Sulawesi 
were highly influenced, if not controlled, by a few influential families, most 
notably the Yasin Limpos, the Kallas and the Halids (Tomsa, 2008a).  In the 2013 
Makassar election, the families of Yasin Limpo111 and Halid112 in particular 
engaged actively in the process.  Another influential family, the Kallas, did not 
																																																								
111 The Yasin Limpo family’s influence in local politics in Makassar and South Sulawesi was  
initiated by the father, M. Yasin Limpo, a retired military colonel who helped established the 
Golkar party in South Sulawesi.  He later assumed several positions, including as regent in both 
the Gowa regency and the Maros regency.  His wife Nurhayati served as a DPR member 
representing Golkar.  The couple’s seven children were all groomed by their parents to enter 
politics, and included: Syahrul Yasin Limpo, South Sulawesi Governor; Haris Yasin Limpo, a 
Golkar councilor in Makassar; Dewi Yasin Limpo, a DPR member representing Hanura Party; 
Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo, who chaired the Gowa council; and; Ichsan Yasin Limpo, a regent of 
Gowa regency.  The grandchildren of the late Yasin Limpo also engaged in politics, representing 
different parties. 
112 The Halid family consisted of 10 siblings, with Nurdin Halid acting as the patron.  Halid family 
members who entered politics included: DPR member representing Hanura, Andi Rahman Halid; 
DPR member representing Golkar, Andi Kadir Halid; and Rismono Sarlim, a DRPR Bone 
councillor.  Nurdin himself was a DPR member for Golkar before he chaired PSSI.  He and his 
other brother, Abdul Waris Halid, who chaired INKUD, were once implicated in a graft case.   
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engage directly in this election because none of their family was competing in the 
election; family members having become more embedded at the national level of 
politics.  Fatimah Kalla, who chaired a Kalla’s company and was the sister of 
Jusuf Kalla, rejected endorsements offered by several parties to endorse her.  
Younger members of the Kalla family tended to focus on managing their 
established businesses.113  
 
In addition to these families, the Sirajuddin family, to which Mayor Ilham 
belongs, is another influential political elite family, albeit smaller in size than the 
three families above, in Makassar mayoralty. The mayor – who is a son of Arief 
Sirajuddin, a former police colonel who became a Gowa resident from 1976-1985 
during the authoritarian period – was the most influential member of the 
Sirajuddin family (Berita Kota, 2014).  His wife, Aliyah Mustika, was a DPR 
member representing PD. His brother, Syamsu Bachri Sirajuddin is a former 
chairman of the National Democratic Party (Nasdem)’s campaign team in South 
Sulawesi while his sister, Nurhani Sirajuddin, is also a PD member. 
 
The electoral campaigning in Makassar was largely centralised, either in the 
political parties or the candidates themselves, as will be elaborated below.   This 
factor defined the ways in which the political campaign industry penetrated the 
																																																								
113 Although some joined the Golkar party, the younger members of the Kalla family have yet to 
show interest in competing for local leadership seats, as they tend to focus on managing and 
enlarging their sprawling businesses across the country. However, Jusuf Kalla indicated his 
personal support for candidate Danny.   
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candidates’ campaign teams, and the employment of social media for 
campaigning. 
 
5.3.1.  Adil Patu 
The centralised nature of Adil Patu’s electoral campaigning was shaped by his 
influence in the Democratic Nationhood Party (PDK), the political party that he 
chaired. Adil was a seasoned local politician.  His political career started in 1999, 
when he represented Golkar in the South Sulawesi council; a position he held 
until 2004.  He left Golkar to join and chair PDK in 2004.  Both Adil and his wife, 
Erna Amin, had served as DPRD South Sulawesi councillors representing PDK.  
The candidate who ran as his deputy mayor, Isradi Zainal, was a local dockyard 
entrepreneur and the chairman of the Gerindra Party in the nearby town of 
Bulukumba. 
 
Adil was supported by a coalition of PDK, Gerindra and PKB.  While PDK was 
not represented nationally in the DPR, the party was considered a medium sized 
party in Makassar.  It achieved this size partly due to Adil’s influence, mainly in 
those parts of the electorate around the outskirts of Makassar.  In contrast, while 
Gerindra and PKB were represented in DPR, these parties were only small in 
Makassar.  Adil’s campaign fund, therefore, derived mainly from PDK and 
himself.  Adil’s imprisonment for two and a half years, for his involvement in a 
corruption case that cost the state Rp 8.8 billion in 2008, might suggest a source 
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of his campaign funds (Putra, 2015). The corruption case also involved another 
PDK councillor, Mudjiburrahman, who chaired Adil’s campaign team.114 
 
Adil’s campaign team recruited a number of individual professional campaigners 
to support his media campaigning. Organised and directed by PDK, his electoral 
campaigning was focused more on canvassing and mass media campaigning to 
reach out to voters. His campaign team did not consider social media to be an 
important mode of electoral campaigning, due to its limited reach in Makassar. 
According to a PDK member, 
“We hired campaigners to do our media campaigning, but you cannot 
rely on mass media campaigning or social media campaigning here.  
Of course, we also use social media for campaigning, but it is only for 
young people.” (Mudjiburrahman, personal communication, 
September 2013).  
 
Consequently, Adil’s campaign team did not specifically employ campaign 
industry professionals to run his social media campaigning. PDK’s members 
operated Adil’s campaigning accounts on Facebook and Twitter. The employed 
industry professionals opted to focus on profitable canvassing and mass media 
campaigning. The industry professionals’ participation in the production and 
distribution of campaign messages through social media was considered as simply 
a supplement to their main work, and was not budgeted. 
 
																																																								
114 The corruption case involved the South Sulawesi provincial administration’s of social funds in 
2008.  Adil was found guilty of masterminding a series of fake social projects, which were carried 
out by Mujiburrahman, to embezzle the money.    
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5.3.2.   Supomo Guntur 
Supormo gained the largest political support in the 2013 Makassar mayoral 
election.  As chairperson of Golkar in Makassar and the incumbent deputy mayor, 
he appeared most likely to win the election.  Moreover, his running mate, Kadir 
Halid, who was a Golkar councillor in DPRD Makassar, was the brother of 
Nurdin Halid, who also led South Sulawesi’s Golkar campaign body.   
 
However, Supomo’s nomination was a result of an internal rift within Golkar 
involving rivalry between members of the Halids and the Yasin Limpos, triggered 
by the nomination process in Golkar. The party decided initially to endorse its 
chairman and incumbent deputy mayor of Makassar, Supomo Guntur, based on 
Golkar’s nomination procedures; and remained undecided on the deputy candidate 
(Harris Yasin Limpo, personal communication, September 2013).  However, 
without the knowledge of South Sulawesi Golkar Chairman and Governor 
Syahrul Yasin Limpo (who was then abroad), Nurdin Halid endorsed his younger 
brother Kadir Halid, a local entrepreneur, to run as Guntur’s deputy candidate.  As 
the Eastern Indonesia coordinator of the Golkar party’s national headquarters, 
Nurdin Halid had no problem securing the party national headquarters’ 
endorsement for his brother.   
 
In response to Nurdin Halid’s unexpected move, Governor Syahrul decided to 
endorse his brother, Irman Yasin Limpo, who chaired the South Sulawesi 
Investment Body, to run in the election.  Irman eventually ran for the election 
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with PAN Chairman Busrah Abdullah (Koran Tempo, 2013).  This created an 
awkward situation for Haris Yasin Limpo, who was Supomo’s deputy in Golkar 
Makassar.  With Governor Syahrul’s blessing, Haris continued his roles in support 
of Supomo’s campaigning (Haris Yasin Limpo, personal communication, 
September 2013).115  
 
This rivalry caused significant damage to Supomo’s electoral campaign.  While he 
himself was an incumbent deputy mayor, his campaign was not supported by his 
supervisor, Mayor Ilham Arief Sirajuddin, who chaired the Democratic Party 
(PD).  Supomo’s campaign funds, therefore, relied heavily on the Halid family 
instead of the Golkar Party (Haris Yasin Limpo, personal communication, 
September 2013).   
 
Moreover, given such an internal conflict, Golkar Makassar could not optimise its 
political machinery, which was in fact the strongest in Makassar.  In addition, 
Supomo’s leadership in Golkar Makassar was not sufficiently strong, and he 
failed to unite the party in Makassar.  Instead, his influence was increasingly 
weakened by a faction supporting Governor Syahrul, led by Golkar Makassar 
senior member Farouk M. Beta (Lutfi, 2013). 
 
																																																								
115 Golkar headquarters sacked a number of Golkar members in Makassar, who supported Irman 
Yasin Limpo’s candidacy, immediately after declaring its endorsement of Supomo.  However, 
Golkar did not dismiss Syarul Yasin Limpo.  Nurdin Halid was eventually appointed as the 
caretaker of Golkar in South Sulawesi, replacing Syahrul (Aziz, 2016) 
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Therefore, while some industry professionals managing Supomo’s media 
campaigning were able to penetrate his campaign team due to their relations with 
the Yasin Limpo family, they relied on the Halid family to finance the media 
campaigning for Supomo.116 Mass media, particularly print media and television, 
remained the most favoured channel for distributing campaign messages. The 
politicians appeared to be sceptical of the reach of social media in Makassar, in 
comparison to mass media’s reach. This reluctance by politicians made it more 
challenging for local political campaign professionals to develop social media 
campaigning into a new, profitable service. According to a local professional 
campaigner, 
“Social media are very useful for our work, but we need more time to 
convince them [candidates and political parties in the decision making 
process]. Media workers need to present actual results like campaign 
advertisements or news reports. These reached a vast audience.  Social 
media campaigning may not reach as large an audience, but the users 
are all educated and opinion makers in their networks.  This is 
something we need to help them [the politicians] understand more”. 
(Akbar Abu Thalib, personal communication, September 2013). 
 
As a result, similar to some political campaign industry professionals working for 
Adil, the local Makassar political industry professionals working for Supomo 
were not specifically compensated financially to run Supomo’ social media 
campaigns.  However, unlike for Adil, Supomo’s social media accounts were 
																																																								
116  Some industry professionals, including Suherman Madani and Akbar Abu Thalib, had 
previously experience in supporting Haris Yasin Limpo’s campaigning and that of his nephew, 




operated and maintained by the industry professionals working for him.  They 
considered their social media campaigning to be a (free) complementary service 
to the paid-work, more-expensive mass media campaigning (Akbar Abu Thalib, 
personal communication, September 2013).117  
 
5.3.3.  Rusdin Abdullah 
The political campaign industry’s contribution to the electoral campaigning of 
independent candidate Rusdin Abdullah was limited.  Despite his restricted 
campaign budget, Rusdin was able to recruit a few professional campaigners.  
However, his mass media and social media campaigning was modest in scope, 
due mainly to his limited campaign budget.  
 
The deputy treasurer of South Sulawesi’s Golkar Party, Rusdin decided to run as 
an independent candidate in the 2013 Makassar election.  He openly declared his 
disappointment that his services to Golkar were not reciprocated by party support 
for his candidacy (Lutfi, 2013).  He was an experienced campaigner, having been 
involved in the campaign team of Governor Syahrul in the 2007 South Sulawesi 
gubernatorial election, as well as Mayor Ilham in both the 2008 mayoralty 
election and the 2012 South Sulawesi gubernatorial election.   
 
																																																								
117 Akbar did not state the exact amount required for the social media campaigning service. 
However, to fund the social media campaigning for Supomo, he took a small portion from the 
budget of the mass media campaign. The expenditure for social media campaigning was mainly to 
buy phone credits, which was deemed little as compared to television airtime or newspaper 
advertisement space.   
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Rusdin’s campaign team was organised, funded and led by him. His running 
partner, Idris Patarai, although he headed the Makassar’s planning agency, was 
not able to support the campaign team financially.  Therefore, Rusdin mainly 
funded the campaign himself, with some help from a few of his fellow local 
entrepreneurs (Hamzah Abdullah, personal communication, September 2013). 
Rusdin was not able to make use of Golkar machinery to support his campaign, 
because he was eventually expelled from the party by the Jakarta headquarters 
following his declaration to run in the Makassar election.   
 
Similar to other candidates in both Jakarta and Makassar, Rusdin focused on 
canvassing to reach voters, particularly in Makassar’s urban poor areas.  However, 
his campaign teams also engaged in social media campaigning, at the initiative of 
a few individual campaigners (Umar Laumma, personal communication, 
September 2013).  While the campaigners were not able to profit from their social 
media campaigning works, they envisioned not only a long term cooperation with 
Rusdi but also expanding their networks in Makassar’s political domain.118 
 
5.3.4.  Herman Handoko 
The electoral campaigning of independent Herman Handoko, a local entrepreneur 
of Chinese descent and former chairman of PKPI, did not engage any professional  
campaigners (Herman Handoko, personal communication, September 2013).  He 
led his own campaign, assisted by his running partner Latif Bafadal, a local 
																																																								
118 Umar considered that while social media campaigning was not a profitable service, it was a 
way to build a record of his experience in running a media campaign in the electoral period. 
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entrepreneur, together with their families. These two candidates had practically no 
base in the electorate, except for some sections of the urban Chinese-Indonesian 
community. Their media campaigning was very limited.  Herman’s social media 
campaigning through Facebook was managed, amateurishly, by his sons (Herman 
Handoko, personal communication, September 2013). 
 
5.3.5. Erwin Kallo 
Erwin Kallo is a Jakarta-based property lawyer and confidante of Hutomo 
Mandala Putra, the youngest son of Suharto.  His running candidate, Hasbi Ali is 
the dean of private local Universitas Muslim Indonesia’s School of Law.  Kallo 
funded, organised and run his electoral campaigning by himself.  He did not 
recruit any political consultants. However, he did recruit a few young people to 
manage his social media campaigning. 119   These young people had degrees in 
information technology engineering, but no experience in electoral campaigning 
(Erwin Kallo, personal communication, September 2013). 
 
Erwin’s social media campaign cost him around Rp 100 million (AUD$9000), 
which included the hardware, hosting fees and operators’ salary.  This amount 
was considered petty in comparison to conventional media campaigning, as Erwin 
spent Rp 500 million for print advertisements alone (Erwin Kallo, personal 
communication, September 2013). 
 
																																																								
119 Erwin recruited two young men who were, like him, graduates of Indonesia Islamic University 
(UII) in Yogyakarta.  Erwin’ social media campaign was operated in a room of his house, which 
was made his campaign headquarters. 
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5.3.6. Tamsil Linrung 
Tamsil Linrung was a PKS senior member, a deputy chief of DPR’s budgetary 
committee.  His running partner was Das’ad Latief, a local preacher and a lecturer 
of Hasanuddin University School of Political and Social Sciences.  Tamsil’s 
electoral campaigning was highly centralised in PKS.  His campaign funds were 
provided mainly by the party central board, with support from campaign donors; 
who were mainly local members of PKS who ran medium sized businesses in 
Makassar.  His connection to voters was dependent on the PKS machinery. 
 
Similar to tHidayat’s campaigning in the 2012 Jakarta election, Tamsil’s online 
campaigning was conducted by his party.  PKS in South Sulawesi recruited some 
of their members and cadres, who owned communication or digital 
communication businesses, to support their social media campaigning (Muttaqien 
Yunus, personal communication, September 2013).  One of the companies 
recruited was Win & Wise communication, the only social media monitoring 
company in Makassar, which was owned by PKS cadre Anwar Abu Gaza.  The 
company provided their services for free; however, Anwar expected a long term 
gain from his cooperation with PKS. 
 
5.3.7. Siti Muhyina Muin 
Unlike other independent candidates, Siti Muhyina Muin did not face difficulties 
in raising campaign funds, mainly because of the support of her mother, Najmiah 
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Muin.120  Siti Muhiyna Muin was a councillor of DPRD Makassar council 
representing Pakar Pangan.  She is the daughter of Professor Muin Liwa, Rector 
of Sulawesi Barat University and Najmiah Muin, a local property mogul and a 
former chairperson of South Sulawesi Chapter of Barindo, an organisation set up 
by former Golkar Chairman Akbar Tandjung.  Muhyina took over the chair of 
Barindo South Sulawesi from her mother in 2008.  Her running partner, Syaiful 
Saleh, was a former head of the Makassar administration’s fisheries and maritime 
agency and a former vice rector of Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar.  
 
Although her electoral campaigning was managed by her family, Muhyina was 
able to recruit scores of campaign professionals, including high profile Jakarta-
based PolMark led by Eep Syaifullah Fatah, to help her campaigning.  However, 
her strategy focused more on canvassing, mass campaigning and mass media 
campaigning.  The political campaign industry professionals were not able to 
employ social media strategically because her campaign team disapproved, having 
“limited understanding of social media campaigning” (Blontank Poer, personal 
communication, September 2013).121 
 
																																																								
120 Najmiah was well known for spending Rp. 1,8 billion to build a local police precinct office 
(Rastika, 2012).  She was named as a suspect in an illegal reclamation case, but her status changed 
into a witness within 24 hours, suggesting her political and economic influence in Makassar (Arm, 
2013).  In May 2016, Najmiah passed away.  Later, her son reported to the police that she was a 
victim of a fraudster in East Java.  She reportedly handed over some Rp 200 billion to the fraudster 
in the hope to get this amount multiplied (Hajramurni, 2016).  
121 Blontank is a Surakarta-based former journalist and a prominent blogger in Indonesia.  He had 
engaged in various electoral campaigns, handling both media and social media campaigning.  
Blontank was not a permanent employee of PolMark, however; he was recruited by PolMark to 
support its campaigning project in Makassar. He helped  PolMark to be able to engage in Jokowi’s 
campaigning in the 2012 Jakarta election. 
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5.3.8. M. Ramdhan Pomanto 
M. Ramdhan Pomanto, who was better known as Danny, had his campaigning 
organised and centralised in his campaign team, led by the Democratic Party 
(PD).  The team recruited professional campaigners, mainly linked to Mayor 
Ilham, to undertake specific campaigning tasks, including media and social media 
campaigning.   
 
Similar to Jokowi in the 2012 Jakarta election, Danny was not a core member of 
the Makassar elite, for two reasons. Firstly, he was a Gorontalo, a minority in 
Makassar, whose residents were mainly of Bugis and Makassar descent.  
Secondly, he was not a party member; a crucial prerequisite to get party support.  
Yet, like Jokowi, he won the election. 
 
While sharing similarities to Jokowi’s situation – including not being part of the 
core elite – Danny did not share the same strategy as Jokowi in representing 
himself as an outsider while at the same time embedding with the elites.  On the 
contrary, to do so could be detrimental not only for his campaigning but also his 
candidacy. To win the election, Danny needed to capitalise on his relations to the 
influential patron he had become close to, Mayor Ilham; who not only chaired PD, 
which had endorsed his nomination, 122 but also held control over the Makassar 
																																																								
122 Ilham was a long time Golkar member before exiting the party two years after he won the 
Makassar mayoralty election in 2010 (Tempo.com, 2010).  Ilham left the chairmanship of the 
Golkar party in Makassar to join and chair PD, after Golkar opted to endorse Syahrul Yasin Limpo 
in the South Sulawesi gubernatorial election in early 2013, which was eventually won by Yasin 
Limpo. It is useful to note that it is not uncommon for politicians in Makassar, like their colleagues 
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bureaucracy, which played a crucial role in his campaigning. 123  The mayor was 
an elite figure in Makassar, supported primarily by Makassar residents and the 
local media partly, due to his massive development programs.124  Therefore 
Danny – an architect whose firms designed a number of prestigious infrastructures 
commissioned by the Makassar mayoralty – needed to highlight his close relations 
to the mayor in his campaigning.  
 
Danny’s nomination was not possible without the full personal support of Mayor 
Ilham; who risked opposition from his own party members by appointing Danny 
to run as the mayoral candidate in the election, with PD member Syamsu Rizal 
appointed as his deputy candidate.   However, Mayor Ilham was able to contain 
the conflict due to his popularity and vast access to campaign resources.  The 
endorsement of PD, which formed a coalition with the PBB (which did not hold 
any seats in the council), paved the way for Danny to run in the elections with the 
full support of the party.  Under the support of the mayor and PD, it was not 
difficult for Danny’s campaign team to raise funds from campaign donors; mainly 
local entrepreneurs (Selle K. Dalle, September 2013).125   More importantly, the 
support from Mayor Ilham enabled him to access both the mayor’s networks and 
PD’s machinery to mobilise the electorates.   
																																																																																																																																																							
across Indonesia, to jump from one party wagon to another to maintain and further their political 
careers and power (Kompas, 2013). 
123 There were also traces of the Makassar bureaucracy’s involvement in canvassing for Danny at 
the grass-roots level (see Damayanti, 2014b) 
124 Ilham Arief Sirajuddin has been elected twice as the Makassar mayor since 2007. 
125 In 2016, Ilham was sentenced to four year in prison in a corruption case investigated by KPK.  
Ilham was found guilty of marking up water maintenance and rehabilitation projects, involving a 




Danny’s campaign team, which centred on Mayor Ilham, influenced the 
recruitment of professional campaigners who supported his campaigning.  The 
team recruited those with close relations to Mayor Ilham.  For example, in 
addition to SMRC, which was hired to do opinion surveys, Danny’s team 
recruited Batu Putih Syndicate, a local political consultancy owned and run by 
Mayor Ilham’s brothers, Syamsu Bachri Sirajuddin and Hendra Sirajuddin.  For 
media campaigning, Danny’s campaign team recruited Irwan Ade Saputra, who 
had also been engaged to support Ilham previous campaigning. The strong 
influence of Mayor Ilham provided limited opportunities for the political 
campaign professionals on the team to profit from social media campaigning, 
because canvassing and mass media campaigning were considered more effective; 
particularly due to the Mayor’s vast networks in the mayoralty (Irwan Ade 
Saputra, personal communication, September 2013).  Therefore, of the 10 staff 
employed to support the media campaigning, Irwan only assigned one to handle 
social media campaigning (Thalib, 2016). 
 
5.3.9. Irman Yasin Limpo 
Irman Yasin Limpo was serving as head of the South Sulawesi administration 
industry and trade agency, at the time that he was nominated as a Makassar 
mayoral candidate. Irman’s running mate was Busrah Abdullah, a deputy 
chairman of DPRD Makassar and a National Mandate Party (PAN) Chairman 
(Koran Tempo, 2013).  Irman’s campaigning was centred within his campaign 
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team, which, despite being supported by PAN, was highly dependent on his 
family, particularly his oldest brother Governor Syahrul.  Governor Syahrul’s vast 
patronage networks in Makassar and South Sulawesi enabled him to mobilise both 
funds and voters to support Irman’s campaign. 
 
Given the situation, while the political campaign industry professionals in Irman’s 
campaigning played a crucial part in his campaigning, they also had limited 
opportunities to develop social media campaigning services, due to reliance on 
canvassing and mass media campaigning.  Irman’s campaign team recruited his 
political consulting agency, Adhyaksa Supporting House, as well as media 
professionals such as former journalist Sultan Rakib, who had worked previously 
for Syahrul’s campaigning. 
 
Sultan’s media team, in charge of his media campaigning, employed mainly 
television and newspapers to distribute campaign messages, relying on their vast 
reach. Social media were considered important in order to address and reach a 
faction of young voters in Makassar (Henny Handayani, personal communication, 
September 2013).  In addition, social media were employed to distribute negative 
campaign messages (Thalib, 2016).  Regardless, Sultan’s team did not assign any 
staff to specifically address social media campaigning, making it merely a 





5.3.10. Apiaty Amin Syam 
Similar to other independent candidates, Apiaty Amin Syam largely controlled his 
own campaign strategies. Her campaign struggled with limited funding and 
involved few campaign professionals. As she struggled to fund her campaign, 
social media campaigning was overlooked; with Apiaty the only candidate in the 
2013 Makassar election who did not incorporate any social media in her campaign 
repertoire. 
 
A former Makassar administration civil servant, Apiaty is the wife of former 
South Sulawesi Governor Amin Syam.  Her running mate, Zulfikli Gani Otto, was 
a journalist who served as the Commissioner of PT Media Fajar Group, one of the 
largest media groups in Makassar. He also chaired the Indonesian Journalists’ 
Association (PWI) branch in South Sulawesi.  
 
Apiaty’s campaign funds were derived predominantly from her family’s personal 
wealth. Although her husband was a former governor, Apiaty did not have a 
specific electoral base from which to draw support (Haerudin, personal 
communication, September 2013). Focusing on canvassing and mass media 
campaigning, her campaigners regarded social media as unprofitable. 
 
5.4. The Political Campaign Industry and the Use of Social Media 
This section demonstrates the limited commodification of content, audience and 
labour, driven by the stable relations between the electoral players, which affected 
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the financing of the new campaigning service by the emerging local political 
campaign industry, and which limited the number of local professionals operating 
in social media campaigning.  As discussed, in the Makassar political campaign 
industry its members employed mainly social media campaigning, and their 
strategies in commodifying social media in the 2013 election were unable to 
appeal to many of the leading social media users who played important roles in 
creating viral social media campaigns.  This finding, in relation to the Makassar 
elections, and as elaborated below, suggests that the political campaign industry’s 
limited commodification of social media campaigning services prevented it from 
mediating the use of social media that resulted in the sudden eminence of social 
media campaigning, such as that identified earlier in the Jakarta gubernatorial 
elections.  The finding shows that media commodification is dependent on the 
structural factors (Mosco, 2009). 
 
The author’s interviews with members of the campaign teams of the six 
candidates suggested that the use of social media for electoral campaigning was 
initiated and operated by campaign professionals, rather than by candidates or 
party members.  This does not to challenge earlier studies, which suggested that a 
lack of expertise by political parties or candidates to engage with the technical 
aspects of media technology contributed to the involvement of professional 
campaigners in the electoral campaign operation (Norris, 2000).  However, such 
initiatives by political campaign industry professionals to employ social media, 
reflecting the economic significance of the new media technology for the political 
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campaign business, do not always end up flourishing (Sussman, 2005). 
 
Table 5.2. shows that, with the exception of Apiaty Amin Syam, most candidates 
employed political campaign industry professionals and ran social media 
campaigning in the Makassar election.  
 
Table 5.2. 
Makassar election’s candidates and mode of campaign  
 










































































































As in the 2012 Jakarta election, the main driver for the political campaign 
industry to develop social media campaigning into a profitable service to offer to 
political clients was the lack of regulation of social media electoral 
campaigning.126  The 2013 Makassar mayoral election was conducted under Law 
No. 22 Year 2007 on General Elections; the same law that regulated the Jakarta 
election. This law requires media to provide free and balanced coverage to all 
candidates in electoral campaigns.  However, the law only applies to conventional 
media, not the Internet or other Internet-based platforms. In addition, the visibility 
of the use of social media in the 2012 Jakarta election had increased the incentives 
for local political campaign professionals in Makassar to employ social media 
campaigning.  
 
However, as described, social media were not favoured by the candidates and 
their campaign teams, mainly because of the new media’s limited reach. 
																																																								
126 Electoral campaigning in local elections is regulated in 2015 following the issuance of Undang-
undang No. 8 Tahun 2015 tentang Pemilihan Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur, Bupati dan Wakil 
Bupati serta Walikota dan Wakil Walikota, known as the Law on Local Elections. Online electoral 































Candidates and their teams tended to prefer mass media, particularly newspapers 
and television, for campaigning. The adoption of media campaigning in the 
Makassar electoral process was facilitated by the emergence of the political 
campaign industry in Makassar after the issuance of the direct local election law 
in 2008.  The law changed the rules of the game for local political contestation.  
Not only does the law accommodate independent candidates, it also requires 
candidates to get the most popular votes to win the election.  Such a new form of 
election created promising market opportunities for the political campaign 
industry. 
 
The political campaign industry’s growth in Makassar was evident in the increase 
of local opinion polling and political consultancy agencies.127  The emergence of 
local campaign industry firms appeared to respond to the behaviour of candidates 
and political parties in post-authoritarian elections in Makassar, and South 
Sulawesi in general, to hire Jakarta-based professional campaigners to support 
their campaigning (Tribunnews.com, 2013).  
 
Media campaigning services gained ground in part due to the increase in local 
media outlets after the post authoritarian liberalisation of the media (Morell, 
2003).  Such proliferation of local media outlets “…is a clear indicator that there 
																																																								
127 By 2013, there were an estimated 40 local opinion polling and political consultancy agencies 
(Firdaus Muhammad, personal communication, September 2013).  The flourishing industry was 
partly fuelled by increasing demand, as one campaigner (organisation or individual) could only 
handle one client. Moreover, the business opportunities was not restricted to Makassar, but 
extended to other electorates in South Sulawesi province and other provinces of Sulawesi, and 
even across eastern Indonesia (Herman Heizer, personal communication, September 2013).   
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is an increasing demand for information on local politics and society” (Tomsa, 
2008a, p. 136).128  The emergence of media campaigning in local elections was 
paralleled by the argument that “elections have become to a far greater extent than 
before exercises in communication and public relations” (Sussman, 2005, p. 5).129   
 
Massive political advertisements through conventional media such as local 
newspapers and, particularly, television during the two-week campaign period in 
Makassar suggested not only the instrumentality of conventional media in local 
campaigning but, more importantly, the reliance of the candidates on the media to 
reach voters. The use of conventional media, which have broader audience reach, 
in local elections had been something of a regular campaigning practice since the 
end of the Suharto government (Hill, 2009).    
 
Interviews with members of political parties who were involved in the electoral 
campaigning showed that media campaigning was always allocated a specific 
budget by the campaign teams.  According to a member of PAN and Irman’ 
spokesperson, 
“Campaigning through television and newspapers is a must.  These 
media reached many voters whom we cannot reach through door-to-
																																																								
128 As with elsewhere in the country, some new media outlets in Makassar, which were set up 
shortly after the end of the authoritarian government, did not survive the strict competition 
(Morell, 2003). However, Makassar continues to be a vibrant centre of media activity (Tomsa, 
2008b). Established media groups in Makassar were successful in adapting to the new situation, 
and even took the lead in competition against new media outlets and local-edition of national 
newspapers. They included Media Fajar Group and Bosowa Media Grafika, both of which were 
closely linked to the Kalla family. The Yasin Limpo family invested in Harian Cakrawala, which 
was a new daily paper. 
129 Such elections require politicians to “learn how to deal in a more skilled way with the 
media…” (Negrine & Lilleker, 2002, p. 312).	
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door or mass campaigning.  They are not cheap, but we always have a 
budget for media campaigning.” (Henny Handayani, personal 
communication, September 2013). 
 
In contrast to well-budgeted media campaigning, the majority of the campaign 
teams did not allocate a budget specifically for social media campaigning in the 
2013 Makassar election.  Therefore, while the political party’s concerns over the 
control of the production and distribution of campaign messages were absent, 
unlike in Jakarta very few political campaign industry professionals could 
manoeuvre to employ social media campaigning.  Without a specific budget for 
social media campaigning, the Jakarta-based industry professionals in the 
Makassar election could do little to employ social media campaigning.  The 
majority of local industry professionals opted to employ social media 
campaigning as a supplement to their profitable mass media campaigning 
services.  
 
5.4.1. Generating Content 
As in the 2012 Jakarta election, the political campaign industry in Makassar built 
social campaigning services through organising campaign issues to generate 
content.  However, in contrast to the 2012 Jakarta election, in the 2013 Makassar 
election there were no substantial issues that could potentially unite users.  The 
incumbent mayor, who was not allowed to contest as he had been in the office for 
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two terms, largely held positive rapport with the public.130  In addition, as has 
been discussed in the previous section, none of the candidates were able to present 
themselves as a reformer, or at least, none were unconnected to the local political 
and economic elite. 
 
Regardless, as with Jakarta, professional campaigners in Makassar employed 
positive and negative campaign strategies for social media campaigning. As noted 
in the previous chapter, positive and negative campaigning refers to messages that 
highlight the strengths of the candidates, and its converse, their weaknesses.  This 
underlined the argument that social media do not provide space for civil discourse 
only; but also for political persuasion strategies, which often can be offensive.   
 
The professional and personal life of the candidates became the main subjects for 
positive and negative campaigning. It is particularly necessary to determine the 
candidates’ campaigning positions.  Each campaign team determines the 
candidate’s position, based on issues deemed the most appealing to voters.  
Supomo’s and Danny’s campaigning, for example, highlighted the candidates’ 
contributions in the Mayor Ilham Arief Sirajuddin’s administration.  The industry 
professionals highlighted Supomo’s experience in the Makassar administration 
(Akbar Abu Thalib, personal communication, September 2013), while Danny’s 
campaign team opted to focus on his achievements in building and renovating 
																																																								
130 Tempo Magazine named him as one of 10 Best Local Leaders (10 Kepala Daerah Terbaik) in 
2008.  He gained acknowledgement for renovating Lapangan Karebosi, a neglected public space 
that had become a scene for prostitution and social disturbances.  Throughout his tenure, he gained 
168 awards from national and international bodies (Sumardi, 2013). 
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several major locations in Makassar, such as the Floating Mosque and the 
Rotterdam museum (Irwan Ade Saputra, personal communication, September 
2013).  
 
Social media were mainly used to distribute negative or ‘black campaign’ 
messages, which were restricted in both conventional media campaigning and 
canvassing, prior to the election campaign period from September 1 to 14, 2013 
and during the ‘quiet week’ (when no campaigning is permitted) before election 
day on September 18, 2013.  Most industry professionals felt the need to highlight 
the negative sides of opposing candidates (as had been the tactic of their 
colleagues in the 2012 Jakarta election). Therefore, industry professionals in 
Makassar tended to organise and curate negative issues against other candidates, 
in the hope of boosting the popularity of their clients.  One of the industry 
professionals considered that 
“Negative campaigning is best channelled through social media.  It is 
not regulated and users are always attracted to such things.  Besides, 
negative campaigning is actually useful for voters to get to know the 
shady sides of the candidates.  For example, we highlighted that None 
(the nickname of Irman Yasin Limpo) became a candidate simply 
because he is a part of the political dynasty in Makassar. It’s a fact 
that was rarely addressed on newspapers.” (Irwan Ade Saputra, 
personal communication, September 2013). 
 
Another notable difference from the situation in Jakarta was that the professional 
campaigners in Makassar engaged directly in the production and distribution of 
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campaign messages through social media.  The professional campaigners in 
Jakarta mainly worked on campaign issues; to generate campaign content through 
the participation of social media users in the production and distribution of such 
content.  Makassar campaigners engaged with campaign message production, 
mainly in the form of texts, messages and video.  Most of this content was in the 
form of straightforward campaign messages, appealing to social media users to 
join the campaign on behalf of the candidates.  Such strategies, which aimed to 
get social media users to consume (rather than to produce and distribute) 
campaign content, impeded the mobilisation of voters and the generation of viral 
campaign messages.131   
 
5.4.2. Mobilising Audience 
Unlike the 2012 Jakarta election, when the campaigners mobilised common social 
media users to engage in the production and distribution of campaign messages, 
the professional campaigners working in the 2013 Makassar election employed 
conventional mobilisation methods to support their social media campaigning.  
This partly confirmed that,  
 “Political actors are increasingly attempting to use the Internet to 
enhance their presence and legitimize their activities in ways that are 
genuinely new but which still have affinities with older media 
strategies long ago designed for traditional print and broadcast media” 
(Chadwick, 2009, p. 2). 
 
																																																								
131 Political campaigners commonly target specific groups of voters as a strategy to divide voters 
into “ours” and “theirs”.  The target voters may be defined by geographical location, ethnicity, 
demography (such as age, sex, religion, social class), life styles, values or attitudes.  
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The online users’ mobilisation method focused on offline avenues, such as 
political party membership and getting paid supporters to mobilise candidates’ 
supporters to support social media campaigning. To disseminate campaign issues, 
for example, the campaign team supporting Tamsil engaged PKS members from 
outside Makassar to support its social media campaigning.  For this purpose, PKS 
Makassar’s communication department formally requested its headquarters in 
Jakarta to support its social media campaigning, which contributed to the trending 
Twitter topic of the PKS #Nassami campaign.  The hashtag recorded 102,000 
posts, thus becoming the topic that garnered the most content during the 2013 
Makassar election (wwcomm, 2013).  
 
Another avenue to mobilise social media users was by persuading some 
prominent Makassar bloggers to buzz for the candidates, in return for financial 
incentives.  However, unlike in Jakarta, the campaign industry was not able to 
persuade many of them (to which we return in the next section).  Moreover, while 
in Jakarta the campaign industry professionals recruited, trained and organised a 
number of paid buzzers to generate the systematic production and distribution of 
campaign messages, such practices were uncommon in Makassar.  On the 
contrary, the work of the paid buzzers in Makassar was largely disorganised, 
without particular strategies to generate campaign messages on social media.  
Therefore, unlike in Jakarta, exchanges of social media texts involving ordinary 
social media users with different voting preferences, dubbed ‘cyber wars’ as 
discussed earlier, were not employed to increase the proliferation of campaign 
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messages online.   
5.4.3. Managing Labour 
As in Jakarta, social media campaigning in the Makassar election facilitated the 
penetration of local ICT professionals and buzzers into the political campaign 
industry. It reached out to technologists capable of providing not only 
infrastructure but also data for Internet-based media strategies.  This was not 
surprising, as post-authoritarian local elections increased the desire of local 
politicians to employ media practitioners to support their electoral campaigning 
(see Hill, 2009, p. 251).   
 
However, Makassar lacked sufficient local ICT professionals wishing to become 
involved in the political campaign industry.  As a consequence, Jakarta-based 
professional campaigners, including IT professionals, encroached on the 2013 
Makassar election. Several campaign teams, such as that of Irman Yasin Limpo 
and Danny, employed Jakarta-based IT professional to assist their campaign.  The 
Jakarta-based IT professionals were hired to help with the social media 
campaigning (text campaign messages spread through mobile devices) and vote 
counting.  The tasks of these professionals also included conducting training for 
local campaign team members to operate the software (Aswandi, personal 
communication, September 2013). 
 
In addition to the ICT engineers, the practices of social media campaigning in 
Makassar also led to the emergence of paid buzzers.  The paid buzzers comprised 
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university students, fresh graduates or former student activists (Selle K. Dalle, 
personal communication, September 2013).   They were commonly recruited 
through personal relations with the professional campaigners, who were often 
their seniors in the university or the student associations attended by the 
buzzers.132 This is different from the situation in Jakarta, where the university 
students or office workers who were recruited did not share a personal connection 
to the campaign professionals (from advertising and public relations companies).   
 
a. Social Media Monitoring  
Similar to the 2012 Jakarta election, the involvement of social media monitoring 
companies in the 2013 Makassar election was limited. The campaign team 
supporting Tamsil Linrung was the only team to employ a social media 
monitoring service.  This was conducted by win and wise communication, 
otherwise known as wwcomm, a company whose chairman Anwar Abugaza was a 
PKS cadre.  Similar to the Jakarta social media monitoring companies, wwcomm 
was concerned mainly with observing and analysing social media users’ 
behaviour during the electoral campaign period.   
 
In 2010, electrical engineer and former student activist Anwar Abugaza and local 
journalist Burhanuddin Moenta established the only social media monitoring 
company involved in the 2013 Makassar election.  It has 10 employees, including 
																																																								
132 Several opinion survey organisations in Makassar were founded by former employees of 
Jakarta based pollsters. They were assumed to have sufficient knowledge of conducting opinion 
polling. Local opinion pollsters in Makassar were often accused of manipulating the polls to shape 
public opinion, aimed at garnering public support for their preferred candidates (Pinardi, 2013). 
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four programmers. They bought monitoring application software from a foreign-
based IT company and customized it for the purpose of crawling through social 
media conversations in Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesia).  The company 
started to promote its services by conducting social media conversations around 
the monitoring of the 2012 South Sulawesi gubernatorial election. It was a long 
process to convince potential clients because “social media monitoring work was 
new in Indonesia” (Anwar Abugaza, personal communication, April 2015).    
The software employed by wwcomm was able to monitor, among other things, the 
popularity and presumed electability of the candidates as well as social media 
users’ sentiment toward the candidates.  Such results were deemed important by 
the campaigners, to support a social media campaign strategy and to give solid 
evidence to the candidates and the campaign teams regarding the necessity of the 
social media campaign service (Anwar Abugaza, personal communication, April 
2015).  
 
5.4.1. Assessing the Impacts of Social Media Campaigning 
This section focuses on the significance of social media to the development of the 
political campaign industry, and the extent to which social media contribute to the 
local electoral process. Social media did not drive the transformation of electoral 
campaigning in the light of technological change or modernization (Norris, 2000).  
The economic forces facilitated the use of social media in electoral campaigning 
(Sussman, 2005).  However, the control of political economy elites in the electoral 
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process provided limited opportunities for the political campaign industry to 
exploit social media as a new campaigning service in Makassar. 
 
In comparison to Jakarta, social media campaigning in Makassar was built mainly 
to serve the interests of the candidates in winning the election. It did not serve the 
business interests embedded in the political campaign industry in Makassar.  Such 
social media campaigning services were not part of bigger strategy by the industry 
to get wider access to the economic resources available in Makassar, which were 
under the control of a few members of the political and economic elite.  
 
Moreover, in comparison to Jakarta, social media campaigning services were not 
able to accommodate an expanding scope for the political campaign industry to 
play more strategic roles in electoral campaigning.  Industry professionals in 
Makassar were not able to employ social media campaigning strategically to raise 
funds and mobilise middle class social media activists.  
 
Unlike in Jakarta, there was no incentive for the political campaign industry to 
reach out to middle-level donors to fund social media campaigning, because of the 
domination of the elites in the candidates’ campaign team.  In addition, social 
media campaigning failed to attract the middle class social media activists to 
volunteer for any candidates in Makassar.  This is demonstrated by the refusal of 
some prominent Makassar bloggers to buzz for the candidates in the 2013 
election, despite the financial compensation offered by some campaign 
	
	 210	
professionals (M. Rachman, personal communication, September 2013). The lack 
of candidates who were able present themselves as figures who were able to 
develop Makassar was cited as a reason for their refusal; indicating the 
complexity faced by the Makassar political campaign industry in engaging 
influential buzzers to support their clients.  In addition, social media were not the 
only avenue for the middle class in Makassar, especially students, to express their 
political expression.133  This finding confirmed, once again, the idea that the use 
of social media in electoral campaigning was dependent on the middle class; 
which tends to form alliances with capital owners or other social groups which 
share common interests with them, instead of joining a political movement 
(Robison & Goodman, 1996, p. 8).   
 
5.5. Conclusion  
The case study in this chapter has painted a complex picture of the political 
campaign industry’s mediation of social media campaigning in Makassar; an 
election environment with a history of domination by predatory political elites 
who were able to seize the decentralization mechanism.  It has shown that, in 
addition to money politics and political violence (Hadiz, 2010), consent from 
voters was equally as important for the local elites to form power.  The use of 
social media electoral campaigning suggested the elites’ attempts to capture social 
media as a new arena to generate such consent, which calls for the political 
campaign industry’s mediation.   
																																																								
133  University students in Makassar were known for their engagement in street rallies or 
demonstrations, often marred by violence, to express their views over various issues, including 




Similar to the situation in Jakarta, social media electoral campaigning during the 
2013 Makassar election was driven mainly by the political campaign industry.  It 
signified the expansion of the political campaign business, which was in fact 
groomed by decentralization reforms.  The new mode of campaigning, however, 
reflected the stable relations pertaining to local political and economic sphere.  
Problems within the political sphere, as suggested by the massive internal conflict 
within Golkar, did not open up opportunities for non-elites or peripheral elites to 
compete in the election, due to strong web of relations between local political 
economy elites. 
 
It is within this context that social media campaigning functions mainly for its 
persuasive purposes. This condition restricted the opportunities for industry 
professionals to seek alternative financing from campaign donors for social media 
campaigning as a new campaigning service. The limited stakes at the Makassar 
election, in combination with the limited expertise of local campaign industry 
professionals, eventually failed to attract leading social media users, who had little 
incentive to participate in social media campaigns. Eventually, the political 
campaign industry professionals were not able to align the interests of the 
candidates, new campaign donors, and social media users through social media 










The Use of Social Media in the 2014 Presidential Election  
 
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter examines social media use during the 2014 Indonesian Presidential 
Election, the country’s most competitive arena of political contestation.  Social 
media campaigning was a distinct feature of the 2014 Indonesian presidential 
election campaign (Heryanto, 2014; Mietzner, 2014).  It contributed to intense, 
dramatic and, at times, hostile electoral campaigning throughout the election 
campaign period, pitting two presidential candidates, Prabowo Subianto and Joko 
Widodo (known as Jokowi), against each other in a contest visible on every 
campaign channel.  
 
In this particular election, the electoral players unanimously accepted social media 
campaigning as a mode of campaigning. Members of the political campaign 
industry were able to penetrate the candidates’ campaign teams and gain strategic 
positions to mediate the extensive use of social media throughout the electoral 
process. However, evidence demonstrates that while the political campaign 
industry drove viral social media campaigning, the massive popularity of social 
media campaign both on air (on mass media) and offline was in fact facilitated by 
the continuation of Jokowi’ relations with the other elites.  The evidence gathered 
	
	 213	
here confirmed Gramsci’s hegemony over the dynamic relationship within the 
elites, or in other words, that the elite is not a solid block. 
 
Similar to the situation during the 2014 Jakarta election, Jokowi had not 
developed stable relations with the political elite; although he had no problem 
securing campaign donations from high-profile campaign donors.  His campaign 
team remained decentralized, in stark contrast to Prabowo’s highly centralized, 
almost militarised team.  While Jokowi’s victory was influenced by many factors, 
this chapter focuses on his social media campaign against Prabowo, and how the 
political campaign industry manoeuvred in different ways as campaign teams ran 
their social media campaigns.  Some studies have suggested that Jokowi’s victory 
against Prabowo was a consequence of the enormous support the former received 
from pro-democracy and progressive civil-society organisations; which was 
expressed, among other ways, through social media (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014; 
Mietzner, 2014).   The use of social media was seen as organic and spontaneously 
generated by Indonesian volunteers, who voiced their demand for a change in a 
country plagued by wide-spread corruption, incompetent bureaucracy, low living 
standards and so forth, despite more than a decade of political and economic 
reform after the fall of the authoritarian government of Suharto.  
 
Both Jokowi’s and Prabowo’s campaign teams employed a number of industry 
professionals to support their campaigning, including their social media 
campaigning.  In fact, the significance of the political campaign industry in 
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assisting social media campaigning became more prominent during such intense 
competition. Therefore, this chapter reiterates the dissertation’s argument that the 
use of social media in an electoral context, including in the 2014 Indonesian 
presidential election, is not organic or spontaneous.  Rather, this chapter seeks to 
analyse how the political campaign industry penetrated the candidates’ campaign 
teams, enabling industry professionals to promote and employ social media 
campaigning as a part of a business strategy; and in so doing, shape the electoral 
process. 
 
To this end, this chapter starts with a short overview of the social media landscape 
in Indonesia.  This is followed by an examination of the political campaign 
industry’s penetration of both Jokowi’s and Prabowo’s campaign teams.  Central 
to this discussion is the relationship between the candidates, political parties, 
campaign donors and voters. The chapter’s third section examines the ways in 
which the political campaign industry employed social media campaigning. This 
includes examining the issues of social media content, users, and the labour which 
constitutes the social media campaigning services.  The chapter’s final section 
assesses the impact of such processes and services on the overall electoral process 
at the presidential level. 
 
6.2. The Internet Landscape in Indonesia and Social Media Campaigning 
The expanding reach of the Internet and increasing numbers of social media users 
in Indonesia became crucial factors in the employment of social media in 
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Indonesia’s electoral campaigns.  The number of Internet users – and 
consequently social media users -- in Indonesia grew steadily following the end of 
Suharto government.  From 2010 to 2014, Internet users increased from 42.2 
million to 74.6 million (Markplus, 2014).  Internet penetration was partly a 
consequence of the post-authoritarian government’s efforts to improve Internet 
infrastructure in the regions. Internet users in Indonesia mainly accessed the 
service via mobile devices.  One study showed that most users are young, 
educated residents of the western part of Indonesia (APJII, 2014). 
 
Most Indonesian Internet users were either employed or university students, with 
87 percent of frequent social media users accessing the platforms via their mobile 
device. The most popular social media platforms in Indonesia as of 2014 were 
Facebook and Twitter.  In 2014, there were 69 million active Facebook users, 
making Indonesia home to the fourth largest Facebook user population in the 
world. In early 2013, Indonesia was ranked first worldwide in terms of growth of 
Twitter accounts. Jakarta contributed 2.4% of the global total of 10.6 billion 
Twitter posts, making it the city that generated the most tweets in the world in 
early 2014. Its highly active online social community has gained Jakarta its 
nickname as “the social media capital of the world” (Semiocast, 2014). This high 
level of social media activity represents a huge opportunity not only for global 
and regional brands with commercial goals, but also for politicians and political 
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parties seeking to engage with their electorates; and for the political campaign 
industry offering services to assist politicians with such engagement.134 
 
The use of social media during the Jakarta election in 2012, however, was a push 
factor which stimulated the use of social media during the presidential election 
two years later.  The candidates and political parties, as well as the political 
campaign industry, were not only aware of the potential for social media to 
mobilize popular support; they also had direct experience running social media 
campaigning during election campaign periods in the recent past. 
 
6.3. The Candidates and Their Relations to Other Electoral Players 
This section argues that social media were acknowledged as a central mode of 
electoral campaigning during the 2014 presidential election – in constrast to the 
situation during the 2012 Jakarta election and 2013 Makassar election.  To 
understand that transition, it is crucial to trace the ways in which political 
campaign industry professionals inserted themselves into the candidates’ 
campaign teams and initiated social media campaigning.  This section underscores 
the argument of this study that relational campaigning determined the ways in 
which social media were employed in the electoral campaigns. 
 
Central to this discussion are the candidates and their relations to other electoral 
players.  The 2014 Indonesian presidential election initially attracted many 
																																																								
134 The discussions about the 2014 presidential election also attracted Indonesians living abroad, 
whether or not they had the right to vote. 
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interested members of the country’s elite.135  Most of them were at the heart of the 
political elite, with many serving in the top positions of the country’s various 
political parties.  The exceptions were Jokowi and top dangdut singer Rhoma 
Irama.136  However, most of these members of the elite were unable to proceed 
because of their low electability (Nurdin, 2015).137     
 
Eventually, Jokowi and Prabowo Subianto firmed up as the candidates running in 
the election. Despite his strong electability, Jokowi was only able to secure 
support from a coalition of political parties which represented 36.9 % of the total 
seats in DPR, while Prabowo’s support base included some 63 % of the total seats 
in DPR, as shown in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1. 
Presidential candidates and political support 
 




PDIP, PKB, Nasdem, Hanura, PKPI 
(not represented), equivalent to 207 




135 Indonesia’s presidential election is held every five years.  Incumbent President Yudhoyono was 
not allowed to participate in the 2014 presidential election as he had served in the position for the 
maximum two terms.  
136 Capitalising on his position as the central figure of dangdut, Rhoma was able to insert himself 
in the political arena (Frederick, 1982; Sen & Hill, 2000).  He was a DPR member in 1993, 
representing a group (golongan) of artists. During the New Order period he was associated with 
PPP, however he then moved between different political parties, finally founding a party by the 
name of Idaman, a shortened version of the Islam damai aman or peaceful and safe Islam, which 
also literally means hope or desire, in 2016.  
137 Electability refers to the capability of the candidates to get elected.  Adapted from political 
science, this method of predicting the chances of the candidates winning the elections based on 
opinion polling has become an influential service of the opinion polling industry.  The political 
parties’ endorsement of a candidate to run in elections after 1998 was increasingly shaped by the 
candidate’s electability, which defined the significance of the opinion polling industry in 
Indonesia. It indicates not only the significance of opinion polling services but also the 






Gerindra, PAN, Golkar, PKS, PPP, 
PBB, equivalent to 353 seats or 63% of 
the total seats in the DPR  
Rp 166,559,466,941 
Source: KPU, (2014). 
             *   As many as 0.1% of  the votes went to political parties that were not represented. 
             ** Data on campaign funds for the second round are not available, as the campaign teams 
were not required to declare this information, unlike in the first round.  
       
 
6.3.1. Joko Widodo 
In the 2014 presidential election, Jokowi’s campaigning was characterised by its 
decentralized, if not chaotic, nature. The decentralized nature of his campaigning 
opened up wider opportunities for professionals from the political campaign 
industry to join in his campaign team, but also for such professionals to employ 
social media more strategically in his campaign.  This character mirrors that of his 
campaign teams during the 2012 Jakarta election, which was shaped by his 
relations to the political parties and his subsequent relations to campaign donors 
and voters.    
 
On the one hand, Jokowi was not a part of the country’s web of national political 
elites.  Indonesian political elites were initially rather reluctant about the idea of 
having Jokowi as the president.  Among the most visibly hesitant were the PDIP 
elite, exemplified by Puan Maharani Sukarnoputri, Megawati’s daughter,  who did 
not fully support Jokowi’s nomination.  She even blamed him for the PDIP’s poor 
performance in the legislative election, and challenged his nomination (The 
Jakarta Post, April 2014).138  Even after the PDIP’s official endorsement of 
																																																								
138 Due to his popularity and electability, the PDIP elite expected Jokowi to bring the party to 
victory in the legislative election in April 2014.  However, the PDIP only announced its 
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Jokowi, which was enabled by its coalition with PKB, Nasdem and Hanura, Puan 
reportedly challenged Megawati’s decision to pair Jokowi with Jusuf Kalla as his 
vice presidential candidate (Tampubolon, 2014). News reports about an internal 
PDIP rift did not cease until the end of the campaign period on July 5, 2014 (The 
Jakarta Post, 2014)139.  
 
In addition to the PDIP’s apparent hesitation, Jokowi also faced similar 
reservations from Kalla, who had helped him during the 2012 Jakarta election.  
Kalla was widely known for his opposition to Jokowi’s potential nomination in 
the presidential campaign: During an interview with Bisnis Indonesia.com, a 
website version of Bisnis Indonesia newspaper, for example, he reportedly stated:   
“Who said that Jokowi is inexperienced? He became a Jakarta 
Governor (because) he had experiences as a Solo mayor.  But, this 
country may be destroyed and in trouble if he is nominated as a 
president simply because he is famous in Jakarta.  But if (he is) 
successful in (governing) Jakarta, then go ahead.” (Jusuf Kalla, 2012). 
 
The footage of the interview was made public (both through conventional media 
as well as the Internet news sites and social media) after he ran as a vice 
presidential candidate alongside Jokowi in 2014.140  Kalla was forced to retract his 
																																																																																																																																																							
endorsement for Jokowi in March 2014, several weeks before the legislative elections.  PDIP 
eventually won the legislative election, but it could only garner less than 20 percent of votes; 
which was less than required to permit the party to nominate a presidential candidate without 
having to form a coalition with other parties. 
139 PDIP’s internal rift in supporting Jokowi mirrored that of the 2012 election, when he ran for the 
Jakarta governorship.  
140 Bisnis Indonesia television is not a terrestrial television station.  It is a part of the Bisnis.com 
website, owned by PT Jurnalindo Aksara Grafika.  The company was founded in 1985 by high-




statement, saying instead that Jokowi was fit to run for president, as he had 
obtained sufficient leadership experience after being the Jakarta governor for 
nearly two years.   
 
Despite Kalla’s initial reservations, Jokowi eventually selected him as his vice 
presidential candidate.141  Kalla was a seasoned politician and entrepreneur, who 
had been groomed by Golkar during the Suharto government.142 After the end of 
the Suharto government, he became President Abdurrahman Wahid’s minister of 
industry and trade in 1999 (although he was sacked six months later for a 
corruption, collusion and nepotism allegation he strongly denied) (n.n., 2001).  
Megawati, who succeeded Wahid, made him coordinating minister of people’s 
welfare in 2001.  In 2004, Kalla ran as a vice presidential candidate to Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono in the first direct presidential election in the country, and 
the pair won.143  After his defeat in the 2009 presidential election against 
																																																								
141 Jokowi had earlier considered having KPK Chairman Abraham Samad (who, like Kalla, came 
from Makassar), as his vice presidential candidate. Samad was instead charged by the National 
Police with a document forgery in 2015; not long after KPK declared Gen. Budi Gunawan, a 
confidante of Megawati, as a suspect in a graft case, blocking his installment as National Police 
Chief.  Jokowi opted to install him only as the deputy national police chief, despite Megawati’s 
endorsement.  KPK and the National Police headquarters engaged in an open, bitter conflict – until 
Jokowi installed Gunawan as deputy chief of the National Police and ordered the Attorney 
General’s Office to suspend the charges against Samad and KPK deputy chairman Bambang 
Widjojanto. 
142 While in university, Kalla chaired KAMI, a student organisation supporting the New Order 
government, in South Sulawesi.  After graduating, he chaired Sekber Golkar, and became a 
councillor of DPRD South Sulawesi representing Golkar.  He became a DPR member representing 
Golkar in 1987. 
143 Before running in the election as Yudhoyono’s vice presidential candidate, Kalla attempted to 
seek Golkar’s endorsement as a presidential candidate through the Golkar convention.  In the 
middle of the convention, he withdrew and ran instead as Yudhoyono’s vice presidential 
candidate.  After winning the election, Kalla became Golkar chairman, serving until 2009. 
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Yudhoyono and Megawati, he continued to stay in Jakarta where most of the 
national elite reside.144 
 
Given this background, Jokowi’s ascension to national politics was not only 
autonomous of the political elite, but, quoting a title from The Jakarta Post 
newspaper, it was elite engineering that gave birth to Jokowi's ascension (Dewi & 
Aritonang, 2013). 145 As shown in Chapter 4, Jokowi’s political passage to the 
centre of the national elite was related directly to his connections to established 
members of the elite such as Kalla and Prabowo, who convinced Megawati to 
nominate him in the 2012 Jakarta election. Jokowi is an example of a middle level 
elite reaching the epicentre of the national elite (Hadiz, 2010), instead of a 
challenger of the elite (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014).    
 
In comparison with the 2012 Jakarta election, Jokowi’s campaigning in the 2014 
presidential election was much better funded. Notable donors included Surya 
Paloh ($US387 million), Kalla’s brother in law Aksa Mahmud ($US1.1 billion), 
and Kalla himself ($US550 million) (150 richest Indonesians, 2013).146  There 
were also the likes of cosmetics conglomerate owner Mooryati Sudibyo, and 
Luhut Panjaitan, a former Army general-turned-entrepreneur who became one of 
																																																								
144 Following his vice presidency appointment, he used his position as the chairman of the 
Indonesian Red Cross to maintain his connections with local elites across the country.  
145 Jokowi disclosed that Kalla represented the support of PDIP, Nasdem, Hanura and PKB 
(Prasetya, 2014).  Kalla has maintain his personal relations with PDIP’s Megawati, Nasdem’s 
chairman Surya Paloh, and Hanura’s chairman Wiranto, who was his vice presidential candidate in 
2009. 
146 Surya’s net worth was $US387 million, Aksa’s $US1.1 billion and Kalla’s $US550 million 
(150 richest Indonesians, 2013). 
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Jokowi’s main advisers.  In addition, many Chinese Indonesian oligarchs 
supported his campaigning; because as an entrepreneur Jokowi was perceived not 
to pose a threat to their businesses, while Prabowo with his nationalistic rhetoric 
failed to appeal them (Anonymous campaign donors, personal personal 
communication, January 2015).  
 
The majority of Indonesian campaign donors, particularly high-profile ones, 
rarely made their donations public. Most such donations were made in the form of 
money. However, some donors provided campaign donations in the form of free 
use of vehicles (cars to private jets) crucial for the candidates, who had to 
campaign across the archipelago during the limited campaign period; free use of 
their premises for campaigning purposes (offices or hotels); or campaign 
gimmicks (promotional shirts, hats and the like) (Anonymous campaign donor, 
personal communication, June 2014).  Jokowi, however, continued to maintain 
some middle level donors amongst his new base of campaign contributors.  
 
While Jokowi’s campaign was well funded, the lack of full support from PDIP 
influenced his attempts to mobilize voters.  PDIP owned the most effective 
machinery for reaching most parts of the archipelago, in comparison to PKB, 
Nasdem, Hanura and PKPI.  Such party machineries were crucial for the 
mobilization of voters, particularly in the context of an electoral process that 




These relations shaped the penetration of the political campaign industry in 
Jokowi’s campaigning.  In comparison to the 2012 Jakarta election, his 
campaigning in 2014 appeared slightly better organised, with PDIP coordinating 
his campaign team.  However, Jokowi also developed some campaign teams 
organised by members of the political campaign industry. 
 
Jokowi’s social media campaigning was mostly entrusted to the political 
campaign industry professionals who helped him in the 2012 Jakarta election, 
such as Sonny Subrata (PT CDA/Arwuda, a marketing and advertising agency), 
Kartika Jumadi  (Spin Doctors Indonesia, a lobbying company), and Jose Rizal 
(PT Politicawave, a social media monitoring company). Not all of the industry 
professionals who supported Jokowi’s electoral campaigning in the 2012 Jakarta 
election were recruited again in the 2014 presidential election.  Katapedia no 
longer supported Jokowi in 2014, due to increasing competition; with the 
emergence of many agencies offering similar services (Deddy Rachman, personal 
communication, June 2014). Another social media monitoring company, Provetic, 
replaced Katapedia in Jokowi’s campaign team.  
 
These professionals engaged some of their colleagues to support Jokowi’s social 
media campaign teams. The PDIP-led campaign team, which focused mainly on 
handling mass media campaigning, recruited Romanus Sumaryo (Narrada 
Communication, a digital communication agency), to oversee its social media 
campaigning division.  
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6.3.2. Prabowo Subianto 
In contrast to Jokowi, Prabowo’s campaigning was far more centralized and better 
organised, if not militarised.  Prabowo’s background in the military led to him 
incorporating hundreds of former generals and military officers into his support 
team in addition to civilians.  Some of these military officers held important 
positions and significant influence in his campaign team (Ambarita, 2014).147  
Prabowo’s highly centralized campaign teams defined the ways in which media 
and social media were used for his media campaigning. 
 
Prabowo has been a long time member of the national political elite.  He is a son 
of former Suharto’s minister Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, and former son-in-law of 
Suharto.  He had a rapidly rising military career before he was sacked as the chief 
of the Indonesian Army Special Forces Command during the upheaval in 1998 
that accompanied Suharto’s resignation.148 Prabowo then had a period of self-
imposed exile in Jordan under the protection of his long-time friend, Crown 
Prince (now King) Abdullah.  After a couple of years, he returned to Jakarta as a 
businessman.  His ambition to become president had been evident since 2004 
when he sought Golkar’s endorsement as a presidential candidate, which he failed 
to secure. In the 2009 presidential election, he ran as Megawati’s vice presidential 
candidate, after founding the Gerindra Party in 2008 (Aspinall, 2014).  
																																																								
147 Prabowo’s campaign teams engaged more than 200 former military general and officials 
(Ambarita, 2014).  Among them were Gen. (ret) George Toisutta, who was the vice chairman of 
his national campaign team, and former Gen (ret) Johannes Suryo Prabowo, who was his 
spokesperson.  In comparison, Jokowi’s campaign teams also engaged former military officers, 
however, they did not play visible roles in the operation of his campaign teams. 
148 The military headquarters considered him responsible for the unlawful kidnapping of some pro-




Unlike Prabowo, his vice presidential candidate, Hatta Rajasa, was not born into 
the elite.149  Rather, he was a businessman in the oil and mining sector before 
starting his political career through PAN, which was founded by Amien Rais in 
1999.  After being elected a DPR member in the 1999 election, Hatta assumed 
various ministerial posts in the cabinets of Presidents Wahid, Megawati and 
Yudhoyono respectively.  Hatta also chaired PAN in 2010 and become the father-
in-law of Yudhoyono’s son, Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono.  
 
The pair of Prabowo and Hatta gained the support of the political parties 
Gerindra, PAN, Golkar, PKS, PPP, PD and PBB.150 This coalition brought 
together party machineries that were both large and with substantial connections 
into the electorates, such as in the case of PKS.  These party machineries, which 
were important to mobilize voters, were also able to work effectively because of 
the strong financial donations that Prabowo accumulated.    
 
Prabowo secured a list of well-known high-profile donors, including his younger 
brother Hasyim Djojohadikusumo whose net worth reached $US 1.05 billion; 
Golkar’s Aburizal Bakrie with $US 2.45 billion; Harry Tanoesudibjo with $US 
1.70 billion; and Hatta’s ally, M. Riza Chalid, with $US 415 million (150 richest 
Indonesians, 2013).  Prabowo’s personal net worth was estimated at around 
																																																								
149 Hatta became Prabowo’s running mate following his failure to get the PDIP’s endorsement to 
run with Jokowi in the 2014 election. His efforts to pair with Jokowi were rebuffed by Megawati, 
mainly because of his personal connection with Yudhoyono (Anonymous senior PDIP member, 
personal communication, 2014).	
150 PBB had no seat in the DPR. 
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USD140 million, while Hatta reported his net worth to be slightly less at USD2.5 
million.  Behind them there were also the likes of the Suharto family and 
President Yudhoyono, who still held control over both the finances and the 
networks necessary to support the pair. 
Table 6.1. shows, based on their campaign teams’ official reports to KPU, that 
Jokowi’s campaign funds were nearly double those of Prabowo.  However, these 
figures did not reflect the true resources received (and spent), because some 
donations were not in the form of money or goods, and because often donations 
were not channelled through political parties or campaign teams’ treasurers. 
 
The centralized nature of Prabowo’s campaigning defined the penetration of the 
political campaign industry professionals into his campaign teams.  Industry 
professionals were hired to handle his media and social media campaigning.  
Among them were Juke Sutaram (Think Big Indonesia, a public relations and 
business development company), Budi Purnomo Karjodiharjo (Kelompok Media 
Peluang, a media publishing and consultancy company), and a number of 
individual professional campaigners.151   
 
6.4.  Social Media and The Political Campaign Industry 
Extending the argument made in Chapters 4 and 5, this section discusses the 
mechanisms by which the political campaign industry developed social media 
campaigning services during the 2014 presidential election, identifying three areas 
																																																								
151 Prabowo also recruited Rob Allyn, the director of US-based Margate House.  Allyn previously 
worked on George W Bush’s gubernatorial election in the U.S. through his previous consultancy 
company, Allyn & Co. 
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for examination: content, users and labour. The Jakarta-based campaign industry 
professionals, most of whom managed and operated social media campaigning in 
the 2012 Jakarta election, played a crucial role in the process.  This is not 
surprising, given the fact that Jakarta is the centre of the national campaign 
industry. The findings show that the political campaign industry was able to 
develop and market social media campaigning as a new campaigning service, 
because the professionals had developed the requisite skills to operate social 
media campaigning and because the political actors appreciated its value and 
impact (see Table 6.2.).  
 
Table 6.2. 
Presidential candidates & mode of campaign 
 
Source: Author 
Candidates Consultants Offline 
Campaign 




























































There were no data available about the presidential candidates’ budgets for mass 
media and social media campaigning.152  However, Table 6.3. shows that the 
campaign teams of both candidates spent substantial funds on television 
campaigning.  If the total campaign budget they reported to KPU was declared 
honestly and accurately, this suggests the significance of television campaigning 
in their campaign strategies.153  Prabowo’s campaign team spent more than half of 
their total campaign budget on television advertisements alone, while Jokowi’s 
team allocated nearly one third of their total budget on this.  
 
Table 6.3. 
Estimated TV ads spending during campaign period 2014 
 
Candidates Estimated TV ads spending Total campaign budget 
Prabowo Subianto  
Hatta Rajasa 
Rp. 93 billion Rp 166,559,466,941 
Joko Widodo  
Jusuf Kalla 
Rp. 92 billion Rp 312,376,119823 
Source: Sigi Kaca Pariwara, 2014; KPU, 2014 
 
6.4.1. Social Media Content  
This section found that the involvement of the political campaign professionals  in 
the production and distribution of social media content during the presidential 
campaign period.  This finding does not contradict studies suggesting that social 
media users expressed their true political preferences (Ibrahim et al., 2015). 
																																																								
152 The Bank of Indonesia estimated that the total costs of running elections in 2014, involving 
around 200,000 DPD, DPR and DPRD legislative candidates across the country, plus the 
campaigns of the two presidential candidates and the cost of operating the KPU, reached Rp 44.1 
trillion.   
153 Candidates are required by law to submit their campaign financial reports to KPU.  However, 




However, it indicates that the political preferences of social media users were not 
autonomous of the engineering of the political campaign industry that developed 
social media campaign services out of content. 
 
In the 2014 presidential election, the political campaign industry employed the 
same strategy to generate content as it had employed during the 2012 Jakarta 
election and the 2013 Makassar election.  The strategy centred on the 
development of positive and negative campaign issues aimed at maximising social 
media content.  There was a stark contrast between the campaign strategies of the 
two candidates.  Prabowo’s team tended to employ negative and smear 
campaigning, while Jokowi’s emphasised the positive. One of the industry 
professionals on Prabowo’s team explained that the negative campaigning against 
Jokowi was inevitable, 
“An election campaign is nothing different to a football match.  In this 
match, we certainly couldn’t play a defensive strategy. Everybody 
knows that Prabowo’s popularity was far below Jokowi. We have to 
be offensive in all fields (of campaigning) to ensure that all eyes (of 
the voters) are on us. Jokowi is not a saint. (He has) plenty of 
(negative) issues.  Our business is to ensure our client’s victory.” 
(Budi Purnomo Karjodihardjo, personal communication, June 2014). 
 
Prabowo’s offensive strategy was aimed at reducing the gap in popularity between 
the two candidates (see Table 6.4.).  This strategy partly contributed to the 
plummeting popularity of Jokowi between the end of 2013 and the close of the 




Candidates’ popularity over time 
 
Time Period Joko Widodo Prabowo Subianto 
December 2013  62.0 % 23.0 % 
March 2013  56.0 % 27.0 % 
April 2014   52.0 % 36.0 % 
June 2–9, 2014  47.8 % 41.5 % 
June 16–19, 2014  46.5 % 44.9 % 
June 30–July 3, 2014  47.6 % 44.9 % 
Source: SMRC in Mietzner  (2015). 
It is possible to interpret the social media campaign during this period as 
indicating that social media did not always facilitate civil discussions; in contrast 
to the suggestion of some scholars, such as Shirky (2011).  Instead, during the 
2014 presidential campaign, the content of social media and the very negative 
tone to the rival campaigns indicated that social media might be employed 
effectiely to foster uncivil conversations, and to produce, distribute, reproduce and 
redistribute negative and slanderous campaign messages – facilitated strongly by 
the fact that campaigning through the new media was not regulated in Indonesia at 
all.  One striking and well-known example of the production and distribution of 
such uncivil social media content was the case of M. Arsyad Assegaf in Jakarta, 
who posted a meme of Jokowi and Megawati in a sexually compromising position 
on his Facebook page that openly declared Anti Jokowi.154  
 
The smear campaigns on social media against Jokowi were similar to those in the 
2012 Jakarta election, which focussed mainly on personal issues and his 
																																																								
154 Arsyad was reported to the police by Jokowi’s lawyers during the presidential campaign period 
in July 2014.  The police arrested him ten days after Jokowi was inaugurated as a president in 
October 2014.  However, Jokowi decided to pardon him after finding out that the junior high 
school graduate was a helper to a satay vendor living with his poor family.  Arsyad admitted that 
he sourced the meme from an online group he followed during the height of the presidential 
campaign period (Rachman, 2014). 
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connection to PDIP.  The first type of smear involved a number of rumours that 
reflected poorly upon Jokowi.  Among them were the accusation that Jokowi was 
a son of a PKI leader, a son of a Chinese-Singaporean man, and that he was a 
devotee of Javanese customs (Kejawen) and a fake Muslim, who was unable to 
pray properly. At one point, Jokowi was accused of fabricating the story of his 
modest upbringing as a son of a carpenter in Surakarta. Such issues were mainly 
produced in the form of news-like articles by the campaigners, and distributed 
through both blogs and paid websites. Such blogs and websites become sources 
for the proliferation of content on social media.  
 
The second common type of accusation against Jokowi revolved around the claim 
that he was not independent.  Unlike the baseless rumours about his biographical 
background or religious beliefs, accusations of him lacking independence did 
have truth to them, as demonstrated in a speech by Megawati declaring Jokowi 
was a petugas partai (party official) and therefore not non-party or independent 
(n.n., 2014).  The proliferation of social media content about this issue was based 
on online articles of conventional news which carried not only news stories about 
the facts of Megawati’s speech, but also pictures and videos depicting Jokowi 
kissing the hands of Megawati, symbolizing his obeisance to the party chairperson 








Figure  6.1. 
Pictures of Jokowi’s submissive gestures towards Megawati Sukarnoputri 
 
Source: Kelana (2014). 
 
 





Such smear campaigns on social media become the main sources for subsequent 
articles published in a free tabloid by the name of Obor Rakyat (People’s Torch).  
The tabloid, which was in fact campaign material produced by the Prabowo camp 
rather than non-aligned commercial mass media per se, was distributed to Islamic 
boarding schools, mainly in Java.  The first publication of the tabloid during the 
campaign period in June 2014 captured public attention because it clearly 
discredited Jokowi.  Under the front page headline entitled Capres Boneka 
(Puppet Presidential Candidate) was the infamous picture of Jokowi paying 
obeisance by kissing the hand of PDIP Chairperson Megawati (Rochman, 2014).  
It also carried articles with provocative titles such as “The puppet candidate likes 
to break promises, Held hostage by Chinese bosses and missionaries”, “From Solo 
to Jakarta de-Islamisation a la Jokowi”, and “Chinese bosses behind Jokowi”.155  
These headlines summed up the range of negative issues mobilised against 
Jokowi, which were produced and distributed offline to reach offline voters. 
 
The tabloid’s articles were written mainly by Darmawan Sepriyossa, a former 
Tempo Magazine reporter who had become an editor of the Inilah.com news 
website156, and published by Setiyadi Budiono. The latter was also a former 
Tempo Magazine journalist who worked as an assistant to President Susilo 
																																																								
155 The original titles in Indonesian are Capres Boneka Suka Ingkar Janji, Disandera Cukong dan 
Misionaris, Dari Solo Sampai Jakarta De Islamisasi Ala Jokowi, and Cukong-cukong di Belakang 
Jokowi.  Such provocative titles are clear evidence of negative campaigning against Jokowi. 
156 Inilah.com is part of the Inilah group, which is owned by Muchlis Hasyim Jahja, a former 
journalist-turned-press officer of Vice President Jusuf Kalla.  Kalla accused Jahja of being a 
financier of Obor Rakyat (Trianita, 2014), while media reported that the group was funded by 
businessman Muhammad Riza Chalid, a close friend of Rajasa (Tobing, 2014), The Jakarta Post 
noted that he was “widely alleged as the country’s largest broker of subsidized fuel and oil 




Bambang Yudhoyono’ special staffer Andi Arief.  Setiyardi served as a 
commissioner of the state plantation company PT Perkebunan Nusantara XII.  He 
claimed to fund the publication – which had a print-run of 100,000– with the help 
of undisclosed donors.  In a press conference, Setiyardi claimed that the tabloid 
was a form of (what in Indonesia is called) ‘citizen journalism’, as many of the 
articles were sourced from social media and written by amateurs with no 
professional training or experience as journalists.157  
 
Therefore, through both positive and negative campaigning, social media become 
an important avenue for the industry to cultivate and distribute campaign issues 
that went beyond the restrictions of the Internet.  Such negative campaigning 
enhanced the industry’s profit-making capacity, quite apart from whether this 
form of campaigning was good or bad for the electoral process (Aspinall & 
Mietzner, 2014; Brooks, 2006; Kaid & Johnston, 1991; Mayer, 1996).  
 
The aims of the negative and smear campaigning against Jokowi through social 
media, the Internet and canvassing were two-fold.  First, it was important to 
define the position of Prabowo as a decisive, thorough and nationalistic leader 
(Aspinall, 2014).  Second, it aimed at attracting Muslim voters, who made up the 
																																																								
157 Setiyardi was reported to the police by Jokowi’s campaign team during the campaign period.  
The police named him and Darmawan as suspects in a libel case in July 2014. However, the police 
only started the investigation after Jokowi was declared the election winner.  Setiyardi was later 
discharged from his position as a PTPN XII commissioner.  Both Setiyardi and Darmawan stood 
trial for the charges. In 2016, Setiyardi supported the campaign of Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, the 
first son of former president Yudhoyono, in the 2016 Jakarta gubernatorial election. Later in 2016, 
Both Setiyardi and Darmawan were sentenced to eight months in jail.  
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majority of the electorate (see Miichi, 2014).  Accusations over Jokowi’s 
credentials as a Muslim were particularly useful in swaying the voting preference 
of urban, educated and increasingly conservative Muslim voters; who were avid 
users of social media.  According to a campaigner, 
“We hope to reach out to Muslim voters, mainly PKS sympathizers 
and conservative urban Muslims who used Facebook and Twitter 
daily.  They are more independent in making their choices.  But, 
obviously, it is not targeted at NU followers (jamaah) in the villages.” 
(Anonymous campaigner working for Prabowo, personal 
communication, June 2014).158  
 
Responding to Prabowo’s aggressive campaign strategy, Jokowi’s campaign team 
appeared to be overwhelmed.  This is significant because, in addition to his 
tainted professional career, Prabowo’s personal life would have provided an easy 
source of negative campaign targets, which may have struck a chord with 
conservative Muslim voters. His Muslim credentials were easier to question to 
attract Muslim electorates. Although his father, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, was a 
Muslim; his mother, Dora Sigar, was a Christian and a Chinese-German 
Indonesian from North Sulawesi.  In addition, none of his three siblings is 
Muslim.  Moreover, his marriage to Suharto’s daughter, Titiek Hediati, broke 
down in 1998, which showed his failure to fulfil traditional Muslim requirements 
regarding being the leader of a family.  
 
																																																								
158 NU followers totaled nearly 40 million. Most of them resided in small cities and rural areas in 
Indonesia, particularly Java. Their leaders are considered to have an important role in shaping their 
voting preferences.  
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The industry professionals were reluctant to develop such campaign issues. This 
was partly because Jokowi himself instructed them not to exploit Prabowo’s 
personal life, as he feared it would have fuelled increasing campaign tensions at 
the grass-root level (Kartika Jumadi, personal communication, June 2014).  He 
restricted these campaigners from launching smears against Prabowo, and 
instructed them to focus instead on developing positive images of Jokowi as a 
man-of-the-people, a humane technocrat, and countering negative rumours.  
Nonetheless, his campaign team was able to develop and distribute negative 
campaign issues against Prabowo focussed on his track records in human rights 
violations, his failed military career, and his connections to Suharto.   
 
Jokowi’s media campaign team appeared to be over-confident about his 
popularity prior to the campaign period.  Quoting a remark from a LIPI political 
scientist that “Jokowi will win the election even if he is paired up with thongs”, a 
leading professional campaigner working for Jokowi suggested that despite 
Jokowi’s declining popularity, Prabowo would not be able to match it.159  Such an 
attitude contributed to the steep decline of Jokowi’s popularity, which, however, 
opened the door wider to a number of middle class activists to support his 




159 LIPI political scientist Fachri Ali’s remarks were delivered in Indonesian in a discussion in 
2013 which gained wide media coverage. His original remark in Indonesian was “Jokowi itu 
dipasangkan dengan sandal jepit pasti menang”.  The comment was made before the PDIP 
decided to endorse Jokowi in the 2014 presidential election (Aritonang, 2014). 
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6.4.2. Mobilising Users 
The 2014 presidential election showed more intense strategies employed by the 
political campaign industry professionals to mobilize users.  The findings of this 
section conform to the argument of Fuchs that “the commodification of audience 
participation is easier to achieve [on social media] than on other mass media” 
during the age of the Internet (Fuchs, 2009, p. 84).  The commodification 
converted random social media users into producers and distributors of electoral 
campaign messages.160 This partly explains the tendency of the political campaign 
industry to recruit volunteers to engage in online campaigning during the electoral 
campaign period.  
 
In an election campaign, issues developed by media professionals are not only 
useful in maximising campaign content; more importantly, the circulation of such 
issues mobilizes social media users to engage in the production and distribution of 
social media, as part of the overall campaign. In this particular case, social media 
campaigning had started prior to the one-month long presidential election 
campaign period from June 4 to July 5, 2014.  Prabowo, who had run for vice 
president in 2009, was more prepared than Jokowi to engage in the new mode of 
campaigning.  His team had been operating his Facebook fan page account since 
July 15, 2008, and his Twitter account @Prabowo08 since May 16, 2009. The 
team also maintained his social media accounts regularly, and intensified their use 
after early 2013.   
																																																								





Prabowo appeared to be more informed about social media than Jokowi, as the 
latter only opened his personal twitter account @jokowi_do2 on September 3, 
2011.  Jokowi’s and Kalla’s official Facebook fan page was only set up on May 
30, 2014, a few days prior to the presidential campaign period. Table 6.5. shows 
that Prabowo’s Facebook fan page generated more supporters than that of Jokowi, 
but his twitter account generated fewer supporters than that of his contender. 
 
Table 6.5. 
Presidential candidates’ social media performance 
 





http://www.facebook.com/PrabowoSubianto Facebook fan page                 
: 5.9 million likes  
Twitter  @prabowo08: 872,000 followers 
 
Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla 
 
 
http://www.facebook.com/JKWofficial Facebook fan page                               
: 1.6 million likes 
Twitter  @jokowi_do2: 1.5 million followers 
Source: Adapted from Facebook and Twitter on June 18, 2014 
 
While social media campaigning was done prior to the election campaign period, 
online conflict (or cyber wars) were designed to mobilize users throughout the 
campaign period.  Therefore, the campaigners designed themes for cyber wars, 
which were commonly used to support offline campaign events. For example, 
some such events included the registration of candidates, the announcement of the 
competing candidates by KPU, the televised debates on five different days, the 





Campaign issues developed by the campaigners were distributed to users with the 
help of both paid and unpaid buzzers or influencers. Buzzing was a main step in 
the development of cyber wars, as it enabled campaigners to distribute the 
campaign issues to a wider range of social media users.  In the 2014 presidential 
election, pseudonymous Twitter accounts characterised social media 
campaigning.  Some prominent accounts active in the election campaigning were 
@triomacan2000, @kurawa and @partaisocmed.  The first account engaged in 
buzzing in support of Prabowo, while the last two buzzed for Jokowi. The Twitter 
account @triomacan2000 served as the main engine to buzz rumours against 
Jokowi.  However, the account, which had developed a network of more than 
800,000 Twitter users, was permanently suspended under mysterious 
circumstances on June 13, 2014. 161   Prabowo’s team denied using 
@TrioMacan2000 services (Tarigan, 2014). 
 
The account of @kurawa, was set up in 2009, and @partaisocmed was opened in 
2012.  The account of @kurawa mainly buzzed negative issues against Prabowo 
to counter rumours against Jokowi.  Among the issues that it raised were 
irregularities regarding Prabowo’s campaign budget, his relations to tycoons such 
as Harry Tanoesudibjo, and the behaviour of @triomacan2000.  The account of 
																																																								
161 The @TrioMacan2000 account was suspended temporarily twice in 2012 and 2013, but its 
administrators were able to recover their account.  During the election period, however, the 
account was permanently unrecoverable.  Its administrators set up another account @Ronin1946 
to replace @triomacan2000 account, but it was also suspended permanently. The administrators of 
@triomacan2000 opened a new account with the name @TrioMacan2000Back, but it failed to 
attract a substantial number of followers. The account was suspended permanently with the 
support of a telecommunications provider upon the request of Jokowi’s campaign team 
(Anonymous politician, personal communication, 2014). 
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@partaisocmed mainly buzzed about Jokowi’s positive achievements and 
attempts to mobilize his supporters. 
 
In addition to the pseudonymous accounts, social media campaigning was also 
driven by popular celebrity buzzers.  Among those supporting Prabowo’s social 
media campaigning were television presenter Raffi Ahmad, actress Pevita Pearce 
and rocker Ahmad Dani. Not only did they post their positive testimonies about 
Prabowo, they also appeared on Internet videos produced by Prabowo’s 
campaigners for social media distribution.  These celebrities were mobilized to 
support the campaign based on their personal and professional relations with 
Prabowo, Hatta, their family members and campaign team members (Noudy 
Valdhryano, personal communication, October 2013).   
 
Jokowi’s buzzing was also supported by celebrities such as conductor Addie 
M.S., pop singer Sherina Munaf – who has over 1 million followers on Twitter162  
– and singer/writer Dewi Lestari, who buzzed for Jokowi for free (Sodikin, 2012).   
The mobilization of these celebrities was due partly to the urgings of pro-Jokowi 
industry professionals and volunteers, including Diaz Hendropriyono, a son of 
former BIN head A.M. Hendropriyono.163  
																																																								
162 Sherina’s father, Triawan Munaf, who owns Adwork (an advertising agency that had served 
PDIP for some time) and who was a Jokowi supporter, was later appointed as the chairman of the 
Creative Economy Body, a new institution established by President Jokowi. 
163 The elder Hendropriyono has been a key adviser of Jokowi. He was appointed a BIN head by 
Megawati.  His track record in human rights violations was on a par with that of Prabowo. 
Hendropriyono was implicated in the military attack against cilivians in Talangsari village in the 
province of Lampung in 1989, which lead to torture, massacre, and the forced disappearance of 
some villagers. Hendropriyono was also implicated in the 1999 terror campaign in East Timor, as 
well as the murder of human rights activist Munir Said Thalib, who was poisoned on board a 
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Ultimately, the cyber wars were driven by paid buzzers attached to the 
campaigners. Professional campaigners working for Prabowo recruited a number 
of university students and fresh graduates to operate his social media 
campaigning.  Campaigners for Jokowi were able to recruit mainly volunteers, but 
otherwise they engaged university students, who received small amounts of 
financial compensation in return of their labour. Through the creation of hashtags 
and a consistent supply of online material to create campaign content (texts, 
pictures, videos, and memes), these buzzers played critical roles in maintaining 
the production and distribution of social media campaign content. 
 
To support attempts to mobilize social media users, the campaigners were 
required to understand users’ behaviour throughout the campaign. Social media 
monitoring services provided data on the users’ behaviour. This information was 
critical in assisting the campaigners to develop appropriate tactics. The campaign 
professionals could then monitor the distribution of campaign issues, knowing 
what issues attracted users and when to buzz and provoke users to engage in the 
production and distribution of campaign content.  According to one campaigner, 
“Social media monitoring is very important for our campaigning.  
Data from the monitoring enabled us to develop our strategy to engage 
users in our campaigning.  I don’t think we could do our campaigning 
effectively without it.” (Kartika Jumadi, personal communication, 
June 2014).  
 
																																																																																																																																																							
Garuda flight to the Netherlands (where he was supposed to be undertaking postgraduate study) in 
2004, by a BIN agent.  The identified BIN agent, Pollycarpus Budihari Priyono, was sentenced to 
14 years in jail.    
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6.4.2. Managing Labour 
Like the 2012 Jakarta election and the 2013 Makassar election, social media 
campaigning in the 2014 presidential election accommodated new players in the 
political campaign industry.  However, the ways in which Jokowi’s and 
Prabowo’s political campaign professionals managed campaign workers were 
different, due to the different styles of their campaigning. 
 
The main vehicle for Jokowi’s social media campaigning was JASMEV, a 
volunteer group organised by the political campaign industry professionals, which 
had been used previously during Jokowi’s competition and eventual victory in the 
2012 Jakarta election, and then disbanded.  For the presidential campaigning, 
JASMEV was revived in March 2014 as JASMEV2014.  As in the 2012 Jakarta 
election, JASME2014 recruited volunteers as well as waged buzzers; mainly in 
Jakarta, but also in several cities in Indonesia, to engage with Jokowi’s social 
media campaigning. 
 
The volunteerism mode prevented the factory-like working conditions that 
prevailed in Prabowo’s campaign (as will be discussed later in this section).  
Comprising mostly university students, the volunteers were compensated with a 
small amount of pocket money, free lunch and free seminars by respected 
lecturers (Kartika Jumadi, personal communication, June 2014). Working 
conditions were also flexible; as was reported for some of JASMEV’s operation 
rooms in Nasdem headquarters in Menteng, Central Jakarta.  According to one 
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buzzer, their working times were specifically not rigid, as most students also had 
to attend classes in their universities. 
 
This was a stark contrast to the working conditions within the social media 
campaign teams working for Prabowo.  The low-paid buzzers recruited by Think 
Big Indonesia also consisted of university students and fresh graduates.164  In 
return for Rp. 2.5 million (AUD$ 250) a month, they worked in three shifts for 24 
hour a day, seven days a week, under strict control; to the extent that they had to 
record on written forms when they needed to go to the toilet (Bhawono, Rifai, 
Sutrisno, & Yumiyanti, 2014)165.  The tight control of their labour was a 
consequence of the highly centralized and controlled nature of Prabowo’ 
campaign (Bhawono et al., 2014).166   
 
Similarly, the Gerindra party headquarters also recruited waged buzzers.167 Their 
tasks included monitoring Prabowo’s accounts, updating his status, and 
responding to queries from social media users. It was this team that was 
authorized to handle Prabowo’s official social media accounts. This team’s main 
																																																								
164 The company had done commercial work from Prabowo’s offices. Sutaram claimed that her 
company’s campaigning for Prabowo was voluntary. 
165 When the author visited the media room in October 2013, they resembled the media rooms of 
mass media companies: with several big TV screens, radios and dozens of computers manned by 
each of the team of campaign professionals. 
166 The activities of Prabowo’s buzzers were not covered by conventional media; while in contrast, 
the work of Jokowi’s volunteers, including buzzers, was widely publicized by journalists. 
167 Prabowo’s campaign team was also supported by PKS, which is known for its intellectual-
urban constituency.  PKS members were among the most prolific social media users during the 
campaign period from June 5 to July 5, 2014.  Other members of the party coalition supporting 
Prabowo did not become involve formally in his social media campaigning. 
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task was to develop a positive image for Prabowo. 168   For example, they 
distributed photos through his official accounts of Prabowo when he was young 
andr while he was in the military, as well as photos with his only son Didit 
Hadiprasetyo, former wife Titiek Suharto, and with his supporters.    
 
The 2014 presidential election was marked by an increasing number of social 
media monitoring companies. As of June 2014, there were nine companies 
offering social media monitoring services, in addition to the previously 
established firms Politicawave and Katapedia, as shown in Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6. 








Lembaga Indeks Digital 
Digimed 
Vcomm 
IndexPolitica (a subsidiary of PT Global Premier Solusindo/Creative Head) 
Citra Survey Indonesia – ZoomMonitoring 
Source: Author 
 
The intense nature of the presidential contest increased the demand for both ICT 
and communication professionals to support social media campaigning. The 
campaign teams of Prabowo did not hesitate to recruit ICT engineers and 
																																																								
168 Among the issues against Prabowo were his involvement in the kidnapping of pro-democracy 
activists in 2008, some of whose fates remained unknown up to the election campaign period; his 




communication professionals who had previously worked for Jokowi in the 2012 
Jakarta election. Budi Purnomo Karjohidardjo, for example, was earlier the head 
of Jokowi’s communication team when he was running for Jakarta governor.169  
Budi was a founder of Kelompok Media Peluang, which published some lesser-
known media in Jakarta. Social media enabled his company to expand their 
business.  While Budi was tasked with the mass media operations of Prabowo’s 
campaigns, his business partner, Nanik S. Deyang, supported Prabowo’s social 
media campaign operation.170  The company also developed a volunteer group by 
the name of Jaringan Merah Putih, which was inspired by Koalisi Merah Putih, 
the party coalition supporting Prabowo (Damayanti, 2014a). 
 
6.4.2.  The Impact of Social Media Campaigning 
The use of social media as part of the 2014 presidential electoral campaign 
showed how social media were captured by the political economy elites through 
the complex, commercially-focused efforts of the electoral campaign industry.  
The mediation of the industry (the economic forces) enabled the political 
economy elites to extend their influence on social media as a new site of 
contestation during the electoral campaign period.  Thus, this chapter’s finding 
disputes earlier suggestions that social media was “a battleground in the 2014 
																																																								
169 Karjodihardjo was a journalist working for lesser-known print media in Jakarta.  He had 
previously recruited a number of people to pretend to be journalists and follow Jokowi when he 
performed his impromptu visits to Jakartan slums; such recruitment was intended “to attract 
mainstream journalists [because] this guy has news value” (Budi Purnomo Karjodihardjo, personal 
communication, October 2013).  This strategy was taken because mainstream media had been 
under the influence of incumbent governor Fauzi Bowo.   
170A prolific Facebook writer, her Facebook posts consistently degraded Jokowi; in stark contrast 




elections, a battleground that was largely not controlled or manipulated by 
oligarchs, but rather dominated by volunteer groups and individual citizens” 
(Tapsell, 2015, p. 41). 
 
While it may appears that volunteers ruled social media during the cases discussed 
above, the involvement of volunteers in social media campaigning was in fact not 
entirely autonomous from the involvement of the political campaign industry 
professionals working for both Jokowi and Prabowo.  The political campaign 
industry’s commodification of social media campaigning did not enable it to 
control the electoral campaign messages (or social media users as a main producer 
of such messages) in the traditional sense.  Instead, the industry was able to 
expand the commodification of content “extending the range of opportunities to 
measure and monitor, package and repackage” (Mosco, 2009, p. 135) information 
pertaining to the elections.  
 
More over, the use of social media in the 2014 presidential election demonstrated 
the increasing significance of the political campaign industry in cementing social 
media campaigning services as part of the electoral process.  Similar to the 2012 
Jakarta election, the industry professionals supporting Jokowi played a leading 
role, due to their use of social media campaigning strategies that were able to gain 




Through its volunteering strategies, JASMEV2014 was able to gain campaign 
donations from both high profile Indonesian business people and medium-size 
campaign donors, to help run its social media campaigning (Kartika Jumadi, 
personal communication, June 2014).  In addition, Nasdem’s chairman Surya 
Paloh supported JASMEV2014’s social media campaigning by providing a room 
for JASMEV2014 operations in Nasdem’s party headquarters, in the vicinity of 
Cikini, Central Jakarta. Thus, JASMEV2014 not only had free use of office 
rooms; it also gained in-kind support in the form of payment of its electricity and 
Internet connection bills, dozens of networked computers, and several big screen 
televisions for its operation.  In addition to JASMEV2014, several other 
professional campaigners also secured campaign donations from medium-sized 
donors to run social media campaigning for Jokowi (Ajianto Dwi Nugroho, 
personal communication, November 2013).  
 
The industry’s strategy of encouraging volunteers led to the proliferation of 
campaign teams. Both Jokowi’s and Prabowo’s campaigns were supported by 
volunteer groups, as shown in Table 6.7.  
Table 6.7. 
Volunteer groups in the 2014 presidential election  
 
Jokowi & Jusuf Kalla Prabowo Subianto & Hatta Rajasa 
Pro Jokowi (Projo)  Gerakan Pemuda untuk Prabowo-Hatta (Gema) 
Sekretariat Nasional Jokowi  Relawan Nusantara Jaya 
Duta Jokowi  Aliansi Rakyat Merdeka 
RPJB (Relawan Penggerak Jakarta Baru) Geber Prabowo 
Jo-Man (Jokowi Mania) Rajawali 
Pusat Informasi Relawan (PIR) Jokowi-JK Rajasa 
Kawan Jokowi Relawan Sayap Tanah 
Jasmev Rumah Indonesia 
Bara JP Barisan Relawan Jokowi Presiden Gerakan Pemuda untuk Prabowo-Hatta (Gema) 




Sahabat Rakyat (Makassar, Sulsel)  
Relawan Papua untuk Jokowi (Lapak)  
Relawan untuk Indonesia (REDI) Dahlan  
Pos Perjuangan Rakyat (Pospera)  
Komunitas Pengusaha untuk Jokowi-Kalla  
Relawan Jaringan Nasional Aliansi 
Mahasiswa dan Pemuda (Aswaja) 
 
Gerakan Rakyat Merdeka (ARM)  
Komunitas Pengusaha untuk Jokowi-Kalla  
Source: Author 
 
These online volunteers comprised mainly middle class people residing in large 
and medium-sized cities in Indonesia.  Some studies have suggested that their 
volunteerism reflected the political demands of Indonesia voters for a change in 
the country (Hermawan, 2014).  This study, however, found that the middle class 
had a different agenda in their participation in social media campaigning, and in 
the 2014 presidential election in general.  Again, this study’s findings in this 
regard support the views of Robison and Goodman (1996) that the middle classes 
tend to coalesce with the political economy elites to further their own economic 
and social agendas; instead of participating in political movements separate from 
such interests. 
 
Jokowi’s online volunteers appeared to represent pro-democracy and progressive 
activists.  Seknas, for example, was a volunteer group with a clear, overarching 
political agenda that went beyond bringing their candidate to power.  The agenda 
was to ensure that Prabowo did not come to power in Indonesia. Seknas consisted 
of academics, communication and IT professionals, and activists (working in 
various civil society organisations); such as historian Hilmar Farid and former 
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human rights commission chairman Ifdhal Kasim.  Some of these volunteers had 
previously engaged in the pro-democracy movement to topple Suharto in 1998.  
 
One Seknas volunteer, Margiyanto, a human rights and Internet activist, joined 
after he and a number of activists and professionals were asked to support the 
Jokowi campaign by Saiful Mujani, an academic and political consultant who 
owns Saiful Mujani Research Center (SMRC) survey company, who “panicked” 
at the decreasing popularity of Jokowi in a number of polls (Margiyanto, personal 
communication, June 2014).  In a similar way, Fajrul Rachman, a political activist 
who chaired a small online publication, joined the Salam Dua Jari volunteer 
group, which consisted of popular celebrities, due to his concerns over Prabowo’s 
chances of winning the election.  Fajrul became one of the most prolific Jokowi 
volunteers on Twitter. 
 
In addition to these groups, there were other types of volunteer groups supporting 
Jokowi, including Kawan Jokowi (literally, Friend of Jokowi), an abbreviation of 
Koalisi Anak Muda dan Relawan Jokowi (the Coalition of Jokowi’s Youth and 
Volunteers).  This group was set up by Diaz Hendropriyono, a businessman, PhD 
student of the United States-based Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University, and son of former National Intelligence Body (BIN) head A.M. 
Hendropriyono.171  
																																																								
171	A close ally of Megawati, Hendropriyono’s poor record on human rights was comparable to 
that of Prabowo.  While he was a military colonel during the New Order period, he was involved 
in overseeing a spate of notorious murders in a village in Lampung province in 1989, which 
claimed nearly 300 lives.  As well, he was linked to the murder of Indonesian human rights activist 
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Both Seknas and Kawan Jokowi were among the volunteer groups that formed 
close relations with Jokowi.  Both groups consisted mainly of middle class 
residents of Jakarta and other major Indonesian cities. These volunteers played 
crucial roles in producing campaign text, monitoring social media campaigns and 
“protecting the campaign from possible disruption such as hacking” (Margiyanto, 
personal communication, June 2014).  This last task was necessary because 
Prabowo’s campaign team hired some professional campaigners, who previously 
worked for Jokowi in the 2012 Jakarta election.  These campaigners were 
perceived as potential threats to Jokowi’ social media campaign as they 
understood not only Jokowi’ social media campaign strategies but, more 
importantly, technological flaws that were prone to abuse.  In addition, these 
volunteers were tasked with seeking donations, in a public fundraising campaign 
that recorded nearly Rp 300 billion in donations from nearly 50,000 individuals 
(The Jakarta Post, 2014).172  While this fundraising may be seen as an historical 
achievement, Jokowi’s team did not actually use this money, and donated it 
instead to Palestine (Republika, 2014).  The donation may be understood as 
Jokowi’s attempt to attract Muslim voters (due to the massive negative 
campaigning against him), and as a demonstration that his campaign was 
financially secure.173  
																																																																																																																																																							
Munir Said Thalib, who was poisoned on board a Garuda Indonesia flight to Amsterdam in 2004.  
Should you provide a reference for these 2 claims. In addition to Luhut, Hendropriyono’s presence 
in Jokowi’s camp was crucial to confront Prabowo’s team, which was supported by many former 
military generals.   
172 In the 2012 Jakarta election, candidate Faisal Basri had also conducted fundraising that resulted 
in Rp 1 billion. 
173 While this fundraising featured prominently in the media, the ultimate donation of the funds to 
Palestine did not attract as much media coverage.  One of the few media outlets that published the 
story about the donation to Palestine was Republika, whose main readership was Muslim. 
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This chapter does not disregard the works of the volunteers in Jokowi’s social 
media campaigns.  There is no doubt regarding the contribution of the volunteers, 
but this study has found that these various volunteer groups worked under the 
coordination of the political campaign industry working for Jokowi (Kartika 
Jumadi, personal communication, June 2014). The domination of the industry 
professionals tended to edge out political party staffers from Jokowi’ social media 
campaigning.  PKB, which supported Jokowi, was not involved in Jokowi’ social 
media campaigning; despite having already formed a team to handle its social 
media campaign (M. Syaifullah, personal communication, June 2014).  This 
suggests that the party machinery staff were not important in such social media 
campaigning.  In other words, social media campaigning enabled the political 
campaign industry professionals to become further entrenched in the electoral 
process, at the expense of the party machinery. 
 
In the case of Prabowo’s social media campaigning, the centralized nature of his 
campaigning limited the scope for political campaign professionals to attract 
social media activists as volunteers.  The high financial dependence of the 
industry professionals upon the Gerindra-led campaign team shaped the 
mobilization of volunteers for Prabowo.  It was not that Prabowo’s campaigning 
lacked volunteer support, but rather, those who volunteered for him were often 
financially motivated. Prabowo’s campaign was characterised by the emergence 
of people forming volunteer groups, most of which were based offline. They 
typically declared their support to Prabowo and Hatta during press conferences at 
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Rumah Polonia, Prabowo’s campaign centre, in the expectation of receiving some 
financial benefit from Prabowo’s team.  
 
In the 2014 presidential election, the political campaign industry was able to build 
further social media campaigning services to serve the interests of the candidates 
to win elections.  However, these social media campaigning services also carved 
their significance in serving the interests of other electoral players, quite 
separately from their main function of serving the candidates.   
 
To start with, social media campaigning enabled some medium-sized campaign 
donors, who had previously supported Jokowi’s campaigning in the Jakarta 
election, to continue to contribute to his campaigning in the presidential election.  
When Jokowi won the election, some of these donors were rewarded generously, 
gaining positions not only in government enterprises but also in Cabinet.174 
 
Most of the industry players’ political campaign businesses were embedded in 
other commercial communication business areas; such as advertising, public 
relations, marketing or digital communication.  In the case of Jokowi, for 
example, industry professionals provided pro-bono social media campaigning 
services.  While they appeared to be volunteers, their pro-bono services should be 
seen as part of the overarching strategy to get wider access to the economic 
resources available in Indonesia, such as in the form of work projects handed out 
																																																								




by a new Jokowi national administration. Some political campaign industry 
professionals who joined Jokowi’s campaign team were subsequently granted 
positions as commissionaires in several state-own enterprises.  Sonny Subrata, 
who was a main figure in coordinating Jokowi’s social media campaigns, was 
installed as a commissionaire of PT Semen Indonesia, while Kartika Jumadi was 
appointed as a commissionaire of PT Danareksa.175  Their positions would enable 
them to expand both their political and commercial interests beyond their political 
campaigning businesses.176   
 
More importantly, however, leading social media users have gained a prominent 
role in the country’s electoral and political scenes. Shortly after he was declared 
the winner of the presidential election even before meeting representatives of his 
party coalition – Jokowi personally met some 50 figures who had helped his 
social media campaigns; indicating his strong appreciation for those volunteers 
(n.n,, 2014).   
 
As well, after Jokowi’s victory, several key people who had played roles in his  
social media campaigning were granted strategic positions in various state 
enterprises.  Margiyanto was appointed as the commissionaire of PT Telkom, the 
largest telecommunications provider in Indonesia; Fadjroel Rachman was 
appointed as the commissionaire of PT Adhi Karya, a state infrastructure 
																																																								
175 PT Semen Indonesia is the biggest cement producer in Indonesia, and PT Danareksa operates in 
the financial services. 
176 Andrinof Chaniago, who chaired Cirrus Surveyor opinion polling agency, was installed as a 
Minister of National Planning Development, which was seen as compensation for his campaigning 
assistance for Jokowi.   
	
	 254	
developer; and Diaz Hendropriyono was appointed as the commissionaire of PT 
Telkomsel, the largest mobile telecommunications provider in Indonesia (Asril, 
2015, 2016b).  Many others, who felt left out, publically voiced their concerns 
over Jokowi’s failure to accommodate them after the election (Kuncahyo, 2014).  
One such complainant, Boni Hargens, a University of Indonesia political science 
lecturer who claimed to lead 88 volunteers representing 15 volunteer groups, 
eventually gained a position as a member of the supervisory board of the state-
owned Antara news agency (Asril, 2016a).   
 
In addition, following the election, some volunteer groups which had focused on 
social media efforts turned their loose groups into more consolidated civil society 
organisations (organisasi masyarakat), while some others even contemplated 
becoming political parties (Mayasanto, 2014; Permana, 2015).  Together this 
range of strategies and outcomes for volunteers and volunteer groups indicates 
that at least some volunteers and groups, although initially remote from the 
national political epicentre, found a way not only to contribute but also to get 
recognized and rewarded by the elites for their contribution.  This finding 
confirmed Gramsci’s over the possibilities of the alliances and cooperation 
involving the ruling class and the ruled. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
 This chapter has presented a case study of a more advanced use of social media 
during an election; in the biggest arena of contestation with the biggest stakes to 
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fight for in Indonesia, and which further expanded the scope of the campaign 
consulting industry in the country.  The use of social media in the presidential 
election, which engaged two candidates only, resonated well both in mass media 
and offline; indicating to both the political elites and the political campaign 
industry that social media campaigning could be accepted as a new mode of 
campaigning. 
 
The political campaign industry professionals were evidently more prepared to 
engage with social media campaigning during this election than during previous 
electoral contests. With bigger incentives and experienced manpower, they 
appeared to have no problem in commodifying content, social media users and 
labour.  Their efforts resulted in, among other things, intense negative campaigns 
– mainly focusing on identity and personality – which often triggered users to 
engage in viral but uncivil conversations on social media. However, the use of 
social media during the presidential campaign, including the viral messages that 
became popular on mass media and offline, was still influenced by Jokowi’s 
unstable relations with the elites. 
 
Political campaign industry professionals working for Jokowi were able to seize 
opportunities to employ social media strategically, as a means of persuasion and 
to manage the interests of their candidate, his campaign donors, and the social 
media users who supported him.  Although the industry professionals had no 
problems accessing funds from high-profile donors, they continued to maintain 
	
	 256	
their relations with the middle level donors (who had supported Jokowi’s 
campaigning in the 2012 Jakarta election) and with leading social media users; 
due to the decentralized nature of Jokowi’s campaigning.  In contrast, those 
working for Prabowo were only able to use social media campaigning for its 
practical, persuasive purposes. Such relations left not much room for the mid-
level campaign donors and social media users to obtain any benefit from 
Prabowo’s social media campaign.  Regardless, the industry professionals 
working for Prabowo helped to strengthen the significance of social media 
campaigning in the Indonesian electoral process. Overall, the use of social media 
in the 2014 presidential campaign has enabled the political campaign industry to 
engage in novel ways to serve the political elite’s interests that eventually 





















This dissertation set out to examine the contribution of the political campaign 
industry in mediating social media use for electoral campaigning in Indonesia. It 
has shown how the political campaign industry mediate the use of social media in 
electoral campaigns by establishing social media campaigning as new mode of 
campaigning service. This profit-making quest took place within a broader 
constellation of power and interests, shaping the ways social media are used for 
campaigning to support the maintenance of elite rule and competition among 
elites themselves. 
 
These findings highlight the presence of social media as a new media technology 
in electoral environments. The use of social media for electoral campaigning has 
facilitated the emergence of the political campaign industry, which includes 
communication and marketing, public relations, advertising and opinion polling 
businesses. The increasing significance of this particular industry in the 
application of mass media, and more recently the Internet and social media, to 
electioneering is shown to be dependent on the fluctuating relations between the 
candidates and other electoral players.  In post-authoritarian Indonesia, the 
political campaign industry’s existence has strengthened new electoral and media 
systems that required political candidates to reorganise their modes of 
campaigning in order to mobilise popular support from voters. Such mobilisation 
	
	 258	
was consequently no longer as centrally determined and operated by the elites 
such as party leaders, local leaders, religious leaders or the nobility as it had been 
during the New Order period.  
 
Social media facilitated the exercise of new campaigning practices in recent 
Indonesian elections. This study has demonstrated that the use of social media as 
a new site of contestation is not necessarily driven by the technology. As chapter 
3 has shown, the contribution of the political campaign industry in mediating the 
use of media technology in electoral campaigns has been present since the 1955 
elections, even if only in nascent form.   There is evidence that such strategy had 
begun to be adopted in the 1955 elections by the political elites that used 
newspapers, films and outdoor media to attract voters.  Throughout the New 
Order period, the political campaign industry gradually expanded its significance 
in supporting the political elites in the electoral process. The strategy of using new 
media, most specifically television and radio, to mobilise popular support is 
enabled by the expansion of media industrialisation, driven primarily by the 
Suharto family and their cronies. While social media campaigning appeared to 
engage novel and ‘state of the art’ practices spurred on by the advancement of 
media technology in more recent post-authoritarian Indonesian elections, the use 
of new media is in fact a common strategy of popular support mobilisation by the 
political elite in Indonesian elections.  This finding is in line the view that “digital 
media appear not as a primary lever of change but as a new field of struggle 
dominated by long-standing battles and combatants.  The sites and terms of 
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engagement may shift, but the stakes remain the same” (Wasko, Murdock, & 
Sousa, 2014, p. 5). 
 
Through close analysis of electoral campaign practices in the 2012 Jakarta 
gubernatorial election in Chapter 4, this study has analysed the roles of the 
Jakarta-based political campaign industry in one of the most important arenas of 
electoral contestation in Indonesia.   In such an environment, the industry 
mediated not only the use of social media for electoral campaigning but more 
importantly the political economy elite’s capture of social media as a new field of 
struggle in the electoral process.  At first glance, social media appeared to be a 
novel means for an outsider, as represented by Jokowi, who challenged members 
of the political elite in the Jakarta gubernatorial election. His position as an 
outsider was evident too in difficulties he had in attracting campaign funds from 
the regular high profile campaign donors, mostly owners of large enterprises who 
typically sought support and protection from the political elite.  Jokowi’s 
difficulties provided opportunities for some middle level campaign donors to 
contribute to his campaign through his industry-driven social media campaigning, 
which was their strategy to gain access to the political elites.   In addition, 
Jokowi’s nomination attracted troops of volunteers, who were willing to defend 
and promote him on various social media platforms for free.    
 
This research, however, found that, although he had been presenting himself in 
public as such, Jokowi was not a complete outsider to the national political 
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economy elites in Jakarta.   Although several members of the political elite were 
reluctant to support him in the first round of the Jakarta election, some others 
were more supportive of him.  More importantly, these elites largely supported 
Jokowi in the second round after observing his enhanced prospects of winning the 
election.  Such a fluid stance shows their pragmatic approach toward a candidate 
who is not a core member of the elite. The strategy of high profile campaign 
donors to contribute to more than one candidate in the election, while allocating 
the biggest portion to the candidate with the greatest chance of victory, similarly 
demonstrated the donors’ pragmatic approach to supporting candidates.   Such 
strategies highlighted the elasticity of the political economy elite in maintaining 
its power and rule through the electoral procedure.  It is possible for peripheral 
members of the political elite to climb up to the centre and, conversely, it is not 
impossible for those in the centre of the political elite to be sidelined.  In 
democracy, direct elections increasingly shape such mobility within the elite. 
 
Chapter 4 has also highlighted how the campaign industry employs social media 
campaigning as a new commercial service.  Through commodification of content, 
users and labour, political campaign industry professionals were able to exploit 
social media to establish new campaigning practices and methods to serve the 
political elite. One such practice resulted in the production and distribution of 
campaign content that was no longer tightly controlled by the industry.  In 
contrast to the pattern of consumption of the mass media audience that only 
consumes campaign content in the form of advertisements and news, social media 
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users are able to engage actively in the production and distribution of content.  
Therefore, the political campaign industry’s approach was to produce and 
distribute campaign issues so as to herd social media users toward re-producing 
and re-distributing content in the form of campaign messages on social media. 
 
The industry’s commodification of users has facilitated the engagement of the 
Jakartan middle class, who volunteered to work in the social media campaigns of 
the candidates, more prominently Jokowi.  This study found that the middle class 
did not mobilise themselves organically on social media to support Jokowi.  
While this study does not dispute the genuine intent of many of the social media 
volunteers, who were displeased by the administration of incumbent governor 
Fauzi Bowo and sought therefore to support Jokowi, this thesis found evidence 
that the presence of the volunteer groups was led by figures close to the political 
elite.  Despite their intention and affiliation, all volunteer groups were 
appropriated by the political campaign industry to engage in social media 
campaigning to support their clients (the candidates) during the electoral 
campaign period.  
 
The development of social media campaigning services also facilitated the 
emergence of so-called ‘buzzers’, who worked to provoke social media users to 
engage in the production and distribution of campaign messages, as well as the 




In the case of the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial elections, commodification of social 
media campaigning was not easy, because social media was so new that most 
industry professionals themselves were not yet able to make the associated 
opportunity profitable. In addition, in that election the political elites were also 
unable to recognise the persuasive capacity of social media and so they were not 
yet willing to pay for this new service (Rogers, 2010).  Industry professionals 
working for Jokowi gained a particular attention due to their ability to employ 
social media not only for persuasive purposes but also as a new means to organise 
– albeit temporarily - relations between Jokowi and other political players 
(political parties, middle level campaign donors and social media users). Thus, 
social media campaigning further enabled the industry professionals to encroach 
not only upon the electoral process but also into the broader domain on the 
political economy – where political and economic opportunities and protection are 
available. 
 
The analysis of the 2013 Makassar mayoral election in Chapter 5 has 
demonstrated the role of the local political campaign industry in a smaller arena of 
contestation under the control of more limited elite, competing over smaller 
stakes.  Similar to the situation in Jakarta, the industry professionals also engaged 
in mediating the use of social media for electoral campaigning.  However, unlike 
what transpired in Jakarta, this study has showed that the social media campaign 




This dissertation has shown that M. Ramdhan Pomanto, or commonly known as 
‘Danny’, the winner of the election, shared with Jokowi the fact that he was not a 
direct member of the local political elite.  However, unlike Jokowi, Danny gained 
full support from a local political elite figure who supported him and who was 
able to garner broader support and access to campaign resources in Makassar. In 
contrast to Jokowi, who needed to present himself as a non-elite to the public 
while attempting to garner support from the national political economy elites, 
Danny had to capitalise on, and highlight, his close connection to Mayor Ilham 
Arief Sirajuddin as his patron.   This strategy was adopted to gain support from 
the political economy elite around Mayor Ilham and to attract voters, many of 
whom still admired Mayor Ilham’s leadership.  This situation limited the 
pressures upon Danny’s campaign team to implement a social media campaign in 
Makassar, where the local political economy elite relied heavily on established 
modes of campaigning, namely canvassing and mass media campaigning. 
 
Unlike the situation in the Jakarta elections, both the Makassar elite and the 
political campaign industry understood the potential of social media to mobilise 
support.   However, the local political campaign industry struggled to develop 
social media campaigning as a new campaigning service.  This occurred because 
the support of the elite did not automatically lead to the elite’s disposition to 
finance social media campaigning as a new campaigning service. This explained 
the lack of involvement of the more-experienced Jakarta-based industry 
professionals in the social media campaigns during the Makassar elections. Few 
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Jakarta-based ICT specialists were hired, and those hired were only to provide 
technological assistance in the social media campaigns, insofar as they were 
launched.  It was the less experienced local campaign industry professionals who 
directed and operated the social media campaigns.  While such financial problems 
lead several local industry professionals in Jakarta to reach out to middle level 
campaign donors in that campaign, this did not happen in Makassar due to the 
local elite’s centralised control to access the campaign resources. Nonetheless, 
there were some professionals of the local political campaign industry in 
Makassar, who were able to convince some financially strong candidates to 
operate social media campaigning.  
 
Such conditions shaped the commodification of social media campaigning in 
Makassar.  Unlike the situation in Jakarta, there were less incentives in Makassar 
for leading local social media users to engage a candidate’s social media 
campaigns.  This led to a lack of involvement by leading local social media users 
in the candidates’ social media campaigns in Makassar.  The lack of involvement 
of local social media users acted as a key barrier for local political campaign 
industry professionals to produce viral social media campaign.  
 
As illustrated in Chapter 6, in the 2014 Indonesian presidential election the 
political campaign industry’s mediation of the use of social media had become an 
acknowledged mode of campaigning.   The political campaign industry, and the 
political economy elites’ acceptance of social media campaigning, paved the way 
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for the industry professionals to further their businesses in the biggest electoral 
environment in Indonesia.  Social media nurtured large inter-connected networks 
of users that fostered unmediated, interactive forms of communication enabling 
the development of users capable of not merely consuming, but of contributing to 
the production and distribution of political content (Steinfield, Ellison, & Lampe, 
2008). During the presidential election, some professional campaigners were more 
conversant in making use of the new opportunities enabled by social media to 
expand their campaigning business services.  The extensive use of social media 
campaigning operated by industry professionals, the increasing involvement of 
social media monitoring companies and buzzers as well as more complicated 
social media campaigning practices have demonstrated further encroachment of 
the political campaign industry into the field of campaign content creation and 
distribution.  Evidence from the elections studied in this dissertation supports the 
argument that “[d]igitization expands the commodification of communication 
content by extending the range of opportunities to measure and monitor, package 
and repackage, information and entertainment” (Mosco, 2009, p. 135).   
 
Eventually, the political campaign industry’s social media works cemented the 
capture of social media as a site of struggle by the political economy elites in 
future electoral campaigns in Indonesia.   Chapter 6 has demonstrated that it was 
the relations between Jokowi, Prabowo and the other electoral players that 
enabled the social media campaigns, which resonated so well in other media and 
offline.  This chapter did not find that the largely dramatic use of social media in 
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the presidential election reflected the social media’s ability to support a minor 
candidate against an established one. This dissertation’s analysis of Jokowi’s use 
of social media campaigning has shown that he was in fact closely attached to the 
established elite, which only endorsed him because the most powerful factions 
within the elite had failed to regenerate sufficiently to produce popular figures 
capable of garnering the votes required to ensure the maintenance of elite power 
in the country.  The finding in this research contradicts previous studies 
portraying Jokowi as an outsider to the political elite circle that won the election 
against Prabowo, who is a member of the Indonesian elite (Aspinall & Mietzner, 
2014).  Such studies readily praised Jokowi as a saviour of the country’s 
democracy. Instead, the findings support the suggestion that Jokowi is best 
described as a member of the elite from the periphery climbing to the centre of the 
national elite (Hadiz (2010). 
 
In the 2014 presidential election, Chapter 6 has shown that it was mainly the high 
profile campaign donors who funded the social media campaigns of both 
candidates. Jokowi gained further supports from the middle level donors, who 
previously contributed to his gubernatorial campaign.   The middle level 
campaign donors were still able to get an opportunity to contribute to his 
presidential campaigning by funding some of his social media campaigning 
operations.  By doing so, these middle level donors were able to maintain and 
strengthen their attachment to Jokowi, in the hope that they would either gain 
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business protection and opportunities, or even direct employment opportunities, in 
the subsequent government.  
 
The emergence of social media volunteers in the presidential election reflected the 
increasing involvement of a faction of voters from the middle class. Social media 
thus enabled social media users from the middle class to further their interests.  As 
shown in Chapter 6, several Jokowi’s leading social media campaign volunteers 
gained influential government appointments after this victory. This suggested 
compensation for their “voluntary labour” in his social media campaign.   Most 
importantly, however, their appointment signified not only the importance of 
social media campaigning to support his quest to presidency but also his need to 
maintain support from the middle class and the political campaign industry, due to 
his precarious position as a novice in the centre of the established the Indonesian 
elite.  
 
Overall, this dissertation has critiqued analyses of the debates about online 
campaigning, or the Internet and politics studies. The findings in this research 
showed that the pluralist’s understanding of social media as a neutral mode of 
electoral campaigning was not supported.  Instead of helping poorly resourced 
politicians by ‘levelling the political field’ dominated by established elites, social 
media are subject to capture by the political economy elites seeking to maintain 
their interests.  Similarly, the pluralist vision of the establishment of a public 
sphere on social media that enabled users to discuss political issues online was not 
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also challenged by the results of this study.  While there is no doubt that some 
users go online to express their ideas during an electoral campaign period, the 
economic forces (as represented by the political campaign industry) have 
unobtrusively appropriated the users’ social media activities into social media 
campaigning services, which are profitable for their business and useful to the 
political elites expanding their influence online. 
 
This dissertation has shown that the impact of the new media on society, as 
imagined by the pluralist approach, is often exaggerated (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 
1985).  A major issue in the debates about online electoral campaigning concerns 
the impact of online media (social media and other Internet-based media), upon 
political inequalities offline.  Some studies tend to focus on the online feature of 
the new media technology rather than its interaction with the electoral players 
(politicians, campaign donors, voters, journalists or professional campaigners) in 
the real world offline (Abdillah, 2014; Ibrahim et al., 2015; Naradhipa & 
Purwarianti, 2012). Granted, technological features brought about by social media 
have changed mechanisms for political articulation (Hamid, 2014) or political 
mobilisation (Tapsell, 2015).  However, social media were not the sole engine of 
the operation of social media campaigning.  In fact, social media campaigning 
operations occurred within the confines of an invisible web of changing social 
relations in the post-authoritarian political environment, which required increasing 




The constructivist approach about the power of media to define politics was not 
substantiated in this study.  Social media have transformed the political 
campaigning practices in Indonesia. The candidates employed the new practice of 
social media campaigning, a new campaigning practice with the assistance of the 
political campaign industry.   However, this new practice adopted by the 
candidates does not suggest that the political field is dictated by social media.  
Instead, the candidates’ use of social media for electoral campaigning constitutes 
merely an aspect of their campaigning strategies in their struggle to win the 
election.   
 
This dissertation does not deny the fact that social media can be used to 
manipulate voter attitudes.  On the contrary, this dissertation has shown that the 
political economy elites have used social media to engineer the formation of 
opinion online to further their interests. However, such engineering does not stop 
at that.  This dissertation underlined that manipulation through social media 
occurred within the web of power and interests of the electoral players. In fact, it 
is the constellation of power and interests that facilitated the use of the new media 




177 The manipulation of social media for electoral campaigning also occurs elsewhere.  For 
example, the recent American elections have shown how social media were manipulated and 




Thus, the structuralist approach provided sounder analysis of the use of social 
media in the electoral campaigns.  To begin with, the structuralist approach has 
aptly suggested that  
“Rather than starting with the technology and asking what is its likely 
impact, critical analysis starts from the prevailing distribution of 
power and inequality and asks whose interests will be best served by 
…new potentialities” (Wasko et al., 2014, p. 4). 
 
The dissertation agrees that new features of social media have enabled the 
political campaign industry to embed itself further into the electoral process in 
post-authoritarian Indonesia.  These economic forces, instead of the new media 
per se, have facilitated what some scholars have referred to as the 
professionalization or commercialization of politics and campaigning (Mietzner, 
2013; Qodari, 2010; Ufen, 2010a).  Such economically-driven transformation of 
the electoral process in Indonesia was necessary to maintain the elites in power. 
 
However, a more detailed explanation of the involvement of the political 
campaign industry in the operation of social media campaigning and its further 
impact in the electoral process could not be achieved by analyzing the political 
elites or capital factors only.  Established politicians could not easily dictate the 
impact of social media in society simply because they have the biggest resources 
to fund social media operations, led by an increasingly expensive political 




This dissertation has demonstrated instead that the candidates’ relations with 
political parties, campaign donors and social media users are crucial to 
understanding how social media are employed, through the mediation of the 
political campaign industry.  The political campaign industry, however, did not 
define the operations of social media electoral campaigning.  On the contrary, 
these operations were very much dependent on the candidates’ relations with 
other electoral players. Commodification theory is useful for the insights it 
provides into the ways the industry packages social media campaigning services 
for sale (Mosco, 2009).  Here, the Internet is understood as an arena “where 
popular uses are increasingly organised by a handful of companies who generate 
revenues by extending the principle of the audience as commodity, selling user 
data to advertisers and capitalizing on the online contributions produced by their 
voluntary labour on social networks and other sites” (Murdock, 2015, p. 70). 
 
Such a process, accommodated by the Internet, is not without contradictions.   
Social media challenge the power of conventional media as the main space for 
political contestation, which facilitate the expansion of the business of the 
political campaign industry. The nature of conventional media, characterised by 
filtering and ‘gate-keeping’, had enabled the industry to assume an increasingly 
prominent role in political campaign message production and circulation.   By 
contrast, conventional media position the audience (voters) as consumers of 





In drawing together the lines of inquiry of this dissertation, Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony is useful; to explain the significance of industry-driven social media 
campaigning and the ways it plays out in the web of social relations in Indonesia.  
Gramsci posited that power could not be maintained by force alone.  The use of 
violence is not the only mechanism to maintain the elite in power. In a democracy, 
power-holders seek the consent of people under their rule to maintain their 
control. 
 
In the context of electoral campaigning in Indonesia, money politics or political 
violence are not the only mechanisms to maintain the power of the political elite 
(Hadiz, 2010).  In a democracy, candidates also encourage voters to vote willingly 
for them on polling day. Industrialized campaigning that has shaped the use of 
media for political purposes plays an important role in this regard. The direct and 
innovative use of media becomes stronger in a civil society where capitalism has 
become more established and where related social institutions and traditions are 
more entrenched (see Gramsci, 1971; Bates, 1975; Fontana; 2008). 
 
The use of social media for electoral campaigning is particularly visible in 
democracies that adopt direct elections.   While candidates may choose whether to 
use social media for campaigning, the new Internet platforms have the potential to 
encourage alternative ideas or counter-hegemony.  Therefore, through the support 
of the campaign industry, as the Indonesian examples selected illustrate, 
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candidates’ use of social media campaigning was aimed at mobilising people to 
engage in the election and support them, willingly and enthusiastically.  This sort 
of everyday behaviour supports the existing power structures that allow the elites 
to hold on to power.  
 
Hegemony is commonly examined through media texts.   But this dissertation has 
shown that the ways media are used can also reveal the elite’s efforts to maintain 
hegemony.  The ways social media campaigning are arranged offline provide 
more insights into the use of the new media technologies in the maintenance of 
hegemony.  In fact, it is the first step to examining the hegemony that supports the 
established political economy that favors the elite. 
 
Central in this process is the political campaign industry whose significance is 
“not only to win elections, which is what makes them marketable to other 
politicians and corporate patrons, but also to build public interest or at least 
consent around specific politicians, parties and hegemonic ideas.  The most 
important of the hegemonic ideas is that the electoral process itself is a legitimate 
means by which citizens engage in a meaningful exercise of democracy 
enfranchisement and register their political preferences” (Sussman, 2005, p. 58). 
 
In the context of a growing political campaign industry, social media campaigning 
is used as a mechanism to form social alliances comprising of politicians, 
campaign donors and voters in the post-authoritarian electoral context. The use of 
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social media as a new technology brought new ways for the elite to maintain 
hegemony in the country’s increasingly competitive political arena.   Social media 
campaigning has changed the ways election campaigning is conducted. However, 
at the end of the day, in the cases examined above, it is the political economy elite 
that acquired the most benefit from this new mode of campaigning. This 
dissertation has shown that social media campaigning is essentially a new 
mechanism for the elite to encourage voters in their constituency, as users of 
social media, to consent to the prevailing power structures. 
 
However, the dissemination of hegemonic ideas that the electoral process is the 
accepted mechanism for citizens to choose their leaders still runs the risk of 
posing a challenge to the political structures and processes. This is where the 
middle class may become important. When elite ideas are firmly embedded, the 
Indonesian ruling elite may cooperate with the middle class. Failure by the elite to 
do so may undermine elite political legitimacy and jeopardize their political 
fortunes. In short, when hegemonic ideas are transmitted to, and become firmly 
embedded in, the electoral process, the middle class acquires a subtle yet 
independent source of influence on the political process, which may be conducive 
to the maintenance of hegemony on a more enduring basis. 
 
This dissertation has shed light on a new form of elite capture of social media, 
which relies less on the established mechanism of maintaining hegemony such as 
media ownership and control (Tapsell, 2015).  By employing social media 
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campaigning, the political economy elite have gradually co-opted social media as 
a new arena of contestation.  Social media campaigning enabled the arrangement 
of relations between the electoral players (as shown by the ascension of Jokowi to 
the centre of national politics) as well as the maintenance by the elite of 
established relations within the spheres of politics, economics and culture.  
Regardless, both mechanisms enabled the elite (as a whole) to capture a new arena 
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